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Abstract  
In Jamaica the economic environment is characterized by abiding foreign dependence, stagnant 
growth, and deficient development. This thesis, based on fifteen months of fieldwork in Montego 
Bay is concerned with the everyday understanding and management of Jamaica's adverse 
economy. This is explored through an ethnographic analysis of economic practice among five 
groups variously involved in Montego Bay's tourist sector. These groups include Sindhi 
merchants, local craft vendors, an artisan cooperative, a Rastafarian tour village, and local lottery 
scammers. Their dynamic case studies illustrate a diverse set of responses to the constricted 
political, economic, and social structures of the Jamaican economy, depicted as one of 
comprehensive and inescapable precariousness, or as a state of sufferation. This thesis examines 
these groups' everyday strategies and ethics of survival in sufferation, which include articulations 
of market failure, production, commercial skill, cultural property, and capital seizure. From these 
strategies emerges an understanding of how notions of history, citizenship, race, and cooperation 
structure the formation of economic practice, and bear upon constructions of the market. 
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If we must die—let it not be like hogs 
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot, 
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs, 
Making their mock at our accursed lot. 
If we must die—oh, let us nobly die, 
So that our precious blood may not be shed 
In vain; then even the monsters we defy 
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead! 
Oh, Kinsmen!  We must meet the common foe; 
Though far outnumbered, let us show us brave, 
And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow! 
What though before us lies the open grave? 
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack, 
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back! 
  Claude McKay, "If We Must Die" 
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                                 Introduction 
Sufferer's Market 
 
Huh, leaders listen to these words I'm utterin'  
Firmly, I ain't stutterin'  
Look around can't you see my people sufferin'  
The future is weak and it's gutterin', well! 
-Bounty Killa, "Sufferer"; 2006 
This thesis is concerned with how culturally and historically influenced ethics are embedded into 
the economic processes and everyday lives of Jamaicans. To this end I spent fifteen months with 
craft vendors; an artisan cooperative, the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Co-op (JAMIA); Sindhi 
merchants; a Rastafarian tour village—the Rastafari Indigenous Village; and local lottery 
scammers, who variously participate in the tourist economy of Montego Bay. The ethics and 
strategies of these groups represent a diverse set of responses to the constricted political, 
economic, and social structures of the Jamaican economy. That economy can be characterized as 
one of comprehensive and inescapable precariousness, or as a state of sufferation. Despite the 
broader potential implications of such a term, such as in physical suffering, everyday claims of 
sufferation are predominantly made in response to adverse economic circumstances. Like in 
other accounts of social suffering, sufferation "results from what political, economic, and 
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institutional power does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves 
influence responses to social problems" (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 2007:ix).  
Sufferation is a descriptive public discourse used in Jamaican society to denote a condition of 
being existentially and economically stuck. It is the desire for progress, while lacking the traction 
and momentum for its accomplishment, and is perhaps more specifically characterized by "…the 
will to consume outstrip[ping] the opportunity to earn" (Commaroff and Commaroff 2001:27). 
This latter description highlights the context in which claims of sufferation are most commonly 
expressed, such as instances of not having the money for a child's school fees, to pay one's 
utilities, or to buy food. While these examples provide insight into the moments in which 
sufferation is expressed, it is not understood as discrete occurrences of financial insufficiency. 
Rather, sufferation is viewed as a state, a condition, and a position in which one economically 
struggles. It is thus commonly expressed as such in daily conversation. So a reply to a benign 
"Wha' gwaan [What's going on]?" might likely be "Boy, mi deh yah a suffer [I'm here 
suffering]," or "Man a suffer still." 
Sufferation is not just poverty, but also the incapacitating process of impoverishment. It is an 
arrested self-determination and self-realization couched in structural inequality. Therefore, 
sufferation is not only definitive of the lives of struggling Jamaicans, but reflects similarly on the 
Jamaican state. This study primarily offers sufferation as an analysis of the precariousness sensed 
in the everyday experience of Jamaican economic life. However, when this concept is applied to 
the level of the state, evidence is found in Jamaica's abiding foreign dependence, stagnant 
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growth, and deficient development. Sufferation is thus a means by which the Jamaican economy 
is understood, both in the minutia of everyday life, and in Jamaica's larger fiscal circuits.  
Sufferation is perhaps closest to what Obika Gray (2004) has identified as the "urban exilic 
space" occupied by poor Jamaicans.  This space serves as both "a site of repression" but also "a 
place where forms of social autonomy could be generated" (Gray 2004:102). This thesis picks up 
on this dialectic and aims to provide a sociology of sufferation in the repressiveness of the tourist 
market, but also in the ways Jamaicans generate strategies of coping. By examining the 
economic circumstances that shape the lives of this market's participants I seek an 
anthropological understanding of the particular strategies enacted in relation to the public 
discourse of sufferation. In particular I explore how the different groups I worked with used 
concepts and practices of cooperation, the claiming of rights, and the act of seizure to navigate 
the adverse space of the Jamaican economy. By examining these specific responses I reveal how 
notions of history, citizenship and race structure economic practice and forms of the market.  
Sufferation and its Counter-ethics 
Sufferation has been, to my mind, the underlying conceptual ground for analysis in 
anthropological studies of Caribbean life, and especially those concerned with the forms of 
political economy that emerged out of the plantation system. Sufferation, as I have defined it, is a 
means of identifying adversity in the economy, and also a framework for reconciling that 
adversity. In this thesis I make explicit the concept of sufferation in order to foreground ethics 
that I assert serve as responses to inequality. The various ethics discussed in this thesis are 
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examples of reconciliatory strategies employed by the groups herein. Each ethic, as it were, takes 
the form of particular modes of activity, such as cooperation, the claiming of rights, market 
capitulation, and the act of seizure. However, despite their different approaches, and their 
reasons, each of these are derived from ethical frames, which developed out of Jamaica’s 
histories of slavery, emancipation, independence, and modernity. As Lambek asserts, "Ethics 
must be grounded in previous acts" (2010:18). Therefore, in order to appreciate how sufferation 
economically employs these ethics, we must first examine the components of its make up, 
especially as they will appear throughout this thesis embedded in the varied ethics employed.  
The market ethics that this thesis examines are indelibly shaped, in part, by the history of 
markets in the region. Therefore, there is a link between time and practices, which permit them 
both to be understood through sufferation. Throughout early Caribbean anthropology much 
attention was paid to the working of contemporary food markets and the history of slave plots 
and the "Sunday market" at which their produce was vended. These plots and early markets were 
the product of food supply crises facing plantations. Land, which was ill fit for cash crop 
cultivation was thus allocated to slaves as provision grounds. The surplus from these grounds 
went on to be sold in the Sunday markets (Besson 2002: 86). This practice has been noted as a 
form of  "protopeasantry" established within the plantation system (Mintz 1979, 1985). While 
access to land was central to this particular practice of the market, the ethics discussed here are 
products its historical development, and generate the same ethical forms "associated with 
autonomy from, and resistance to, political economic and physical control and 
manipulation" (Mantz 2007: 29). 
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Resistance in Jamaican history is most popularly envisioned through narratives of slave revolts, 
marronage, and later acts of anti-colonialism, all denoted and commemorated by one or another 
member of Jamaica’s ensemble of national heroes. It has been shown that resistance also came in 
much smaller everyday acts of defiance on the plantation (Burton 1997). Taking inspiration from 
de Certau’s differentiation between resistance and opposition, Burton additionally argued that 
many of these acts should be considered forms of opposition rather than resistance. Resistance 
required "an ‘elsewhere’ from which the system may be perceived and grasped as a whole 
and from which a coherent strategy of resistance may be elaborated, " while opposition occurred 
from within the system (Burton 1997:50). And so some of the greatest displays of resistance 
were undergirded by a sense, whether real or imagined, of separation from the system. The 
"socially separate worlds" of the estate and free settlements post emancipation allowed for an 
"elsewhere" from which great resistance leaders, like Paul Bogle, could not only judge, but act 
against the injustices of the British Crown (Holt 1992:290; see Austin-Broos 1997:38; Heuman 
1994). In an ideological sense, the Rastafarian "idealization of Africa," which created a notion of 
distance among Rastafarians between Babylonian Jamaica and their true African homeland, 
likewise provided an elsewhere from which to agitate against the wickedness of the Babylonian 
system (Chevannes 1994:34). This idea is epitomized by Rastafarian pioneer Claudius Henry, 
who asked his congregation "…[S]hall we sacrifice the continent of Africa for the island of 
Jamaica?" (Bogues 2003:167). Additionally, resistance, Burton argued, was a product of a 
sentiment of hope, but opposition belonged to "periods of pessimism when all outlets seem 
blocked" (1997:51).  
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There is a congruency between the pessimism Burton mentions and sufferation as I have defined 
it. I would venture that the small acts of opposition ultimately functioned as methods of coping 
with this pessimism. If so, then their coping can help situate the ideological inheritance of the 
economic ethics I discuss. Afro-Jamaicans have long developed a complex spiritual repertoire for 
coping, rooted in multiple encounters of Christian ideology and Africanist cosmology. These two 
influences coalesced to create a particular notion of the present. On the one hand there was the 
Christian belief in the "kingdom come" shared among the dominant European Baptist, Methodist 
and Pentecostal faiths. On the other there was an extant West African notion of the eudemonic 
present (Austin-Broos 1997:35). Austin-Broos explains more fully: 
At the outset, Europe brought a sense of sin located in the person and addressed 
through moral discipline that allowed transcendence only in death. West Africa 
brought a more nuanced experience of good and evil as companions in the world, 
controlled by rite and a sense of the trick. Able to transform good into evil and 
evil into good, African ontology allowed a present though inconstant joy in life 
(1997:233-234). 
So, central to European Christianity was the transcendence of "a flawed human present," which 
would always be flawed, but in "felicitous" West African belief, life required no transcendence 
(Austin-Broos 1997:35). This contradiction was reconciled, Austin-Broos argues, by "sin 
becoming experienced as bodily malaise to be healed by embodied transformation…" (1997:234). 
I would argue that hardship becomes similarly embodied, and thus reconciled as a kind of 
present that is difficult, and like the flawed human present, always difficult, but not absent of joy. 
There is, thus, an underlying acceptance that the conditions of sufferation, like Burton’s 
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pessimism, aren’t expected to change, or at least not by much. And so it is through the notion of 
a eudemonic present that one copes and seeks a way of navigating and enduring the system.   
This thesis presents the strategies of groups attempting to endure and overcome a system of 
sufferation. Those strategies are influenced by the ethics of cooperation, rights and seizure. 
However, those ethics have their bases in three major ideological thrusts that have shaped the 
political, religious, and social formations of, and responses to, life in Jamaica from emancipation 
to the present day:  
The ethic of cooperation in Jamaica has its basis in what Huon Wardle identified as "the 
syncresis of Christianity with [the] post-emancipation experience… converted into an egalitarian 
view of other individuals as brethren and sistren (brothers and sisters) under God" (2000:7). The 
Baptist free village community system, created by Baptist missionaries in the 1830s was the 
absolute embodiment of this notion. Out of this system emerged a new subjectivity for the newly 
emancipated, identified as "Christian Black" (Austin-Broos 1997; Bogues 2002; Thomas 2004). 
For this new subject, redemption would come through "sober and industrious" living, that saw to 
the "cultivation" of education, family, and land (Austin-Broos 1997:38; Thomas 2004:39; see 
Besson 2002:98-107). These values were identified as the criteria for western respectability, 
which went on to constitute Jamaican cultural and political ideals of "progress" and 
"development" "institutionalized through the initiation of social welfare work and democratic 
political nationalism in the late 1930s…" (Thomas 2004:5-6). As we will see in this thesis, the 
idea of cooperation stemming from this moment makes its way not only into the formal spaces of 
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state development ideology, but into public discourses and cultural expectations of social and 
commercial interaction. 
As noted by Anthony Bogues, the Creole leadership of Jamaica's independence movement would 
carry this belief into their formula for nation building "on the silences of the lived experiences of 
the Afro-Caribbean" (2002:15, 26). The counterculture of Rastafari would be most visible and 
vocal at giving voice to those silences. However, Rastafari was a latter formation of "millenarian 
outbursts" (Wardle 2000:6) that did so beginning in the 1860s with Afro-Christian (Native 
Baptists) movements responding to Baptist missionaries' "refusal to recognize…existing black 
culture" (Thomas 2004:40). Austin-Broos tells of the endeavors to "supersede the persona of the 
Christian black" and its "rigorous ethical program that inevitably staunched the eudemonic of 
freedom" (1997:39).  
What occurred was a radical, subaltern shift, by which Afro- Jamaicans, as Bogues explains,  
[S]taked out their humanity on the terrain of cultural-religious practices. As the 
rulership practices of "colonial governmentality" in the post-emancipation period 
consolidated itself, Afro-Jamaican subjects engaged in a process of symbolic 
construction in which texts, signs and myths were intentionally reordered. This 
made the symbolic universe of colonial rule the site of everyday struggle for the 
subaltern subject (2002:17) 
.
This era saw the arrival of the religious movements of Revival, Bedwardism, Pocomania, 
Convince, and Kumina, all seeking for the "African substrate" to break through the fluctuating 
mix that was Afro-Christianity (Burton 1997:97). The "radical potential" of these forms of Afro-
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Christianity would eventually be "neutralized by the spread of Pentecostalism…" and their 
radical sensibilities taken up in Rastafarianism (Burton 1997:98). In this thesis I will show how 
the  radical, and to an extent separatist, ideology that sprang from the racial and political 
imperatives of Rastafari culture, has found a novel space for development and deployment in the 
rhetoric of economic rights and cultural sovereignty.  
Seminally, Deborah Thomas has argued for an iteration of Jamaican subjectivity, coined 
"Modern Blackness," which diverges from the cultural and religious schemas of respectability, 
radicalism, and their respective "blacknesses" (2004:241). It does so by subverting both 
Rastafarian emphases on African identity and its accompanying politics, and middle class 
influences as "cultural, political, and economic brokers in the lives of working people" (Thomas 
2004:242, 245). This notion has brought about a cultural, social, and ideological autonomy for 
the poor to engage in local and global circuits of cultural creation and consumption on their own 
terms. This thesis will demonstrate how this framing is taken to its extreme through an ethic of 
seizure in which the local exploits its long engagement with the global. In the following section, 
a brief overview of the history of Jamaica’s political economy provides further contextualization 
for the creation of these ethics.  
A Brief History of Jamaican Political Economy 
Even as the nineteenth century saw the outlawing of slavery in 1838, the plantation model 
remained in place and emancipation was little more than a "modification" to the region's long 
dominant economic model (Best 2009). With the advent of post-emancipation waged labor, the 
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only significant change was the creation of a "protopeasantry" in the "residentiary sector" (Mintz 
1979, 1985; Best and Levitt 2009:14). This residentiary sector produced for domestic and export 
markets in the agricultural industry, which remained the dominant economic sector well into the 
start of the twentieth century. 
Beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s increasing industrialization brought 
about creating employment to accommodate a growing population that the agricultural sector 
was unable to support. The move to industrialization saw steady growth and the creation of a 
stable economic environment that characterized the promise of the ascendant independence era. 
With the realization that traditional agricultural exports could not sustainably maintain the 
economic development of Jamaica, the discovery of bauxite, the primary component of 
aluminum, on the island, and Jamaica's maturation into a popular holiday destination saw the rise 
of Jamaica's two largest industries— tourism and mining. The next phase of Jamaica's economic 
development was thus based on a multipoint strategy of tourism, bauxite, and import-
substitution-industrialization (ISI). The latter of which, was highly promoted by Caribbean 
economist and Nobel Prize winner, Sir W. Arthur Lewis as a viable means of economic 
development. On the backs of the development of these two industries, the construction sector 
experienced great expansion. The adopted model, dubbed "industrialisation by invitation" saw 
the investment of foreign companies in Jamaica, however, on the bases of cheap labor and tax 
incentives. The "industrialisation by invitation" policies of the 1950s-1960s eventually failed to 
produce the projected industrial growth in the country, as the reach of economic prosperity was 
limited. Ultimately, a large portion of the population remained marginalized from the process of 
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economic development. This was at least partly due to the dualistic nature of the urban labor 
market and to the inability of the agricultural sector, based on preferential treatment of its export 
products and on an inefficient domestic/subsistence sector, to provide much prosperity for the 
rural population (Bulmer-Thomas 2012:378-379). 
The period from the 1930s through the end of the 1960s would be dominated with working 
towards, and ultimately achieving Jamaican independence. As Obika Gray tells it those decades,  
…[S]aw a reform agenda of liquidating colonial rule, achieving sovereignty and 
inaugurating national development. Despite important improvements, this phase 
collapsed. It broke up because it was embedded in Euro-American racist notions 
of cultural difference, it was grounded in liberalism’s arrested understanding of 
democratic rule and it was wedded to catch-up models of developmental 
economics (2004:355). 
As an attempt at course correction, the 1970s saw increased state intervention from newly 
elected Prime Minister Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP) administration, as it 
forwarded a populist and redistributionist economic agenda, under the political ideology of 
democratic socialism. PNP social policies increased public expenditure on health, education, 
housing, and public works programs. The government also oversaw the nationalization of some 
of Jamaica's most profitable industries in the banking, public utilities, and mining sectors. 
Notably, this was the era of much improved social equality, and the expanded public sector 
catalyzed the creation of a newly mobile black middle class as poor and rural Jamaicans were 
economically and culturally brought in from the margins. The international oil crisis of 
1973-1974 coupled with the state expenditure costs of the PNP government's social reforms, 
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however, had detrimental effects on the Jamaican economy. Despite the increase in social 
mobility, the decade of Manley's first administration was also associated with an increased 
inflation rate, currency depreciation, an overall increase in poverty, and the stalling of the 
economy. Policies, which led to market restrictions, resulted in a restrained international trade 
initiated through increased tariffs, and licensing requirements for all imported consumer goods. 
However, these restrictions meant an increase in market productivity for small-scale traders, such 
as higglers, within the country. 
By the end of 1980, the opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), came to power offering a 
change in economic strategy. Prime Minister Edward Seaga's government, through foreign 
investment and market capitalism, ushered a return to the positive direction of growth that 
existed before the PNP came to power. Over the decade of this administration from 1980 to 1989 
there was a modest fiscal balancing and reduction in inflation as a result of compliance with IMF 
and World Bank structural adjustment policies that began under Michael Manley. More 
pragmatic and less ideologically inclined, Seaga ended many of Manley's social programs. 
Manufacturing and construction revived, while agriculture returned to a state of decline. There 
was a massive reversal of the nationalization project of the 1970s, as by 1981 an extensive 
privatization program was introduced in sectors of tourism, banking, manufacturing, agriculture, 
media and telecommunications. Much of the privatization was undertaken at the behest of World 
Bank structural adjustment loan agreements. Many of the social gains achieved in the previous 
decade had been largely undone, as many on the ascendant path to the middle class experienced a 
reversal of their mobility.  This period, which started in 1970 and ending with the 1989 elections 
 23
that resulted in the return to power of the PNP with Manley again as Prime Minister is 
considered by Jamaican political scientists to have been the most tumultuous socially and 
economically (Gray 2004:356). 
Manley’s second administration, which underwent a radical departure from his first by acceding 
ideological room for private enterprise, was elected on a more moderate campaign platform with 
a much-softened rhetoric of state populism. Manley retired after three years in office after which 
his protégé P.J. Patterson succeeded to the premiership. Patterson would remain in power for an 
unprecedented 14 years. Portia Simpson-Miller, Jamaica’s first female Prime Minister, who held 
office for one year during her first administration, followed him. This chain of succession 
resulted in nearly twenty consecutive years of PNP rule.  Under the PNP, during the 1990s there 
was a continuation of privatization initiatives, economic reforms, and structural adjustments 
undertaken in compliance with IMF recommendations. Although the PNP rejected IMF 
agreements late in the decade, they nonetheless continued adhering to their earlier policy 
prescriptions in order to be included in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which 
required IMF-type economic policies to be in place (Carrier 2004:129). Despite these measures, 
the Jamaican economy nonetheless suffered resulting in currency depreciation and cost inflation.  
At the turn of the millennium the Jamaican economy finally experienced a return to growth. 
However, it was not enough to offset the debt accrued to mitigate the consequences of the 1997 
Jamaican banking crisis caused by poor financial sector governance, government economic 
policies, and bank regulation and management. By 2002 the country's debt was 133% of GDP. 
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The 2008 economic downturn caused an already struggling Jamaican economy to suffer a 
reduction in tourism, decreased export demand, and critically a stagnation of foreign resident 
remittances. In an effort to recover from the downturn and from pathological indebtedness, 
which in 2013 reached 143% of GDP, the country twice restructured local debt in the past three 
years starting with the Jamaican Debt Exchange (JDX) in 2010. The second adjustment in 2013 
was undertaken to secure a nearly US$ 2 billion joint bailout from the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
From the brief history provided above, the economic growth and reform process in Jamaica has 
been plagued by an inconsistency of economic policy and political ideology. Development 
assistance from international banking agencies, it has been argued, replicates some of the 
features of the old mercantilist corporate relations in the region (Girvan 2009). As the New 
World Group thinkers postulated, for the Caribbean the conditions at decolonization and now are 
little more than the continuations of the plantation model of old, as the relationships between 
Caribbean countries and MNCs and development banks, are just variants of "the hinterland tied, 
by its nature, to the metropole" (Best and Levitt 2009:15). The traditional export model continues 
to dominate the economies of the Caribbean, despite variances in the circumstances and 
strategies of individual countries. Rapid development has come to those countries rich in energy 
resources, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and service-based economies have also done 
comparatively well. But those countries in which the economies rely on natural resources have 
seen the worst rates of growth since their respective independences. Tourism and remittances are 
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now largely the bases on which the majority of Caribbean citizens survive, as the agricultural 
industries of many countries have seen sharp declines. 
Structural adjustments have done little more than "prop up" the Jamaican economy, which has 
failed to move beyond foreign dependence and ineffective export-oriented and service models 
(Best and Levitt 2009). Norman Girvan asserts that economic progress rests upon Jamaica's 
ability to move "from 'passive' to 'active' incorporation into the international economy" (Best and 
Levitt 2009:xxi). His prescription is the discontinued dependence on foreign initiative and 
externally determined demand and a transition to "local entrepreneurship organizing production, 
accessing technology and capital…" (ibid.) Interestingly, through their respective strategies, 
JAMIA, the Rastafari Indigenous Village, Sindhis, and the scammers, are enacting the 
requirements laid out by Girvan, however, dependence on foreign initiative remains as will be 
demonstrated. Throughout the oscillating periods of economic policy and political ideology 
between parties over the decades, tourism has remained Jamaica's most promising industry. The 
following is a brief history of the industry's development and current performance. 
Tourism, the Lifeblood of the Economy 
The passing of the Jamaica Hotels Law in 1890 began the development of Jamaica's formal 
tourism industry. The Jamaica Tourist Association formed in 1910  "to enhance the claims of the 
colony as a health and pleasure resort at home and abroad and to give 'reliable' information to 
both prospective visitors and those already holidaying in the island" (Taylor 1993:124). Only a 
few short years after this energetic start, the First World War impeded progress. In the early 
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1920s, however, the Tourist Trade Development Board (TTDB) was founded, which would later 
become the Jamaica Tourist Board (JTB) of today. It was around this time that Montego Bay 
began its ascent as a tourist destination with the opening of several hotels, and the growing 
renown of the healing waters of Doctor's Cave Beach. To generate revenue for the TTDB, the 
government passed a duty tax for tourist arrivals in 1935 (Taylor 1993:142). The interwar period 
saw a steady increase in tourism for the country; however, war would again stunt the progress of 
the island's burgeoning tourist sector with the start of World War II (Taylor 1993). 
Taylor notes that the 1950s and 1960s were "a veritable golden age" of tourism, and Jamaica's 
north coast was its "gold coast, pulsating with tourism development" (1993:159). A great deal of 
this success was due to the reorganization of the TTDB into the Jamaica Tourist Board in 1955. 
The postwar years saw tourism grow so significantly that it came second only to Jamaica's 
revenue in sugar export. During the 1960s, Jamaica, like elsewhere in the then "Third World," 
"embraced mass tourism as the policy for development to bring in foreign currency, counteract 
negative balance of payments, diversify the economy, and generate employment" (Kingsbury 
2005:115). Up to this point Jamaica almost exclusively served wealthy clientele. Pan-American 
Airlines brought the arrival of middle class tourism to the country. Restructuring the holiday 
season schedule into a “low” and “peak” season split did this. Pan-American Airline's "Clipper 
routes" departed from Miami and serviced the several Caribbean islands and a few South 
American countries (Taylor 1993: 156). Visitor numbers began to climb— from 202,000 in 1963 
to 300,000 in 1965 and nearly 400,000 in 1968. It was in 1968, on the back of this growth, that 
Air Jamaica would be founded, initially serving Kingston and Montego Bay to Miami and New 
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York. The 1970s would see an expansion of the airline's routes to Canada, other countries in the 
Caribbean, and Europe by the middle of the decade.  
The effects of tourism on the ground in Montego Bay resulted in a sense of isolation and 
marginalization among local residents. Exclusion from hotels, the US Dollar becoming the de 
facto local currency of trade to accommodate American tourists, and land speculation, were just a 
few of the practices that led to this sentiment. Taylor notes that the tourist industry had become a 
"neoplantation enterprise" (1993:175), where "Montegonians [residents of Montego Bay]…were 
left with little more than an intense feeling of claustrophobia and a sense of being less and less 
the masters of their own land" (1993:176).  These inequalities would be addressed by the PNP 
government in the 1970s through broader economic and social policies that would see greater 
integration of locals into the industry. "To ensure this," Taylor explains, "small businessmen and 
craftsmen…were brought into the mainstream of tourism through the establishment of more craft 
markets, craft stalls, and craft production centers in the principal tourist areas" (1993:181).  
However, despite this increased integration of locals and the expansion of Air Jamaica's routes, 
the decade experienced a number of external and internal problems for Jamaica and its tourism. 
Principal among the internal problems were those associated with the overall economic, social, 
and foreign policies of the Manley administration. Externally, the 1973 oil crisis brought a 
dramatic decrease in airline travel due to the increase in fuel prices. Taylor also notes two 
interesting coincidences in the US and Canada, Jamaica's two largest markets. The first is that in 
the mid 1970s, the American population was strongly encouraged to keep spending at home, 
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through promotions such as the "See American First" program, which coincided with the bi-
centennial celebration of US independence. The second in Canada saw the 1976 Olympics held 
in Montreal direct many Canadians' attentions homewards (Taylor 1993:183) 
Tourism recovered in the 1980s reaching the goal of one million stopover visitors in 1987. The 
industry grew steadily through the 1990s and through the first decade of the millennium, 
significantly contributing to Jamaica's GDP (World Travel and Tourism Council 2013). Despite a 
slight dip in 2010 as a result of the global economic downturn the recovery was signaled by the 
number of stopover visitors reaching the two million-marker milestone at the end of 2012 and on 
course to achieve US$ 2 billion in revenue. This success has been due in large part to increases in 
activity among international airlines, the cruise industry and investment in hotel development. 
Twenty years ago Taylor recognized the tourist industry as "the lifeblood of the Jamaican 
economic system" (1993:187). Since then it has remained the dominant sector in the economy 
with a contribution to the country's GDP of 27.4% during the period of fieldwork in 2012 with an 
estimated increase of 3.4% in 2013. Nowhere is the salience of tourism felt than Montego Bay. 
In the most recent national census in 2011, Montego Bay's population stood at 110,115 
(Statistical Institute of Jamaica 2011:32), of which the Jamaica Tourist Board estimates12,203 
hold jobs directly and formally related to tourism. Although that figure only represents just over 
11% of the population, it accounts for 34.7% of all person employed in tourism in the country 
(Jamaica Tourist Board 2012). Throughout the Jamaican economy, tourism accounted for 
311,000 direct, indirect, and induced jobs, and is responsible for more employment than the 
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financial services, banking, communication services, education, mining and manufacturing 
sectors (World Tourism and Travel Council 2013). The only industry that comes close to that 
level of labor involvement is business process outsourcing (BPO), which is also highly 
concentrated in Montego Bay, and employs around 9,000 individuals in various capacities (Heart 
Trust-NTA 2014).  While no exact figures could be found, the United Nations Human Settlement 1
Programme (UN-Habitat 2012) estimates that over 80 % of St. James Parish is dependent on 
tourism in one form or another. Thus  the  tourism  industry,  broadly  construed  to  include  its 
indirect,  or  informal  sectors,  is "the only game in town" in which the broadest selection of the 
population can make a living given that it on average requires a lower threshold of formally 
acquired skill and education (Thomas 2011:217). Also, of any industry in the country  tourism 
epitomizes Jamaica's dependency on external, and relatively uncontrollable, sources of trade, 
thereby embodying the tenuousness of everyday sufferation. 
With numerous all-inclusive hotels and the three major cruise ports in Montego Bay, Falmouth, 
and Ocho Rios, Jamaica's north coast remains the country's premier tourist region, at which 
Montego Bay sits at the center. Home to Sangster International Airport, which serves 72% of the 
country's annual visitors, Montego Bay stands as the most active of Jamaica's tourist cities. This 
fact is evidenced by the diversity of the groups involved who vary in age, gender, and 
occupation. The respective economic activities of these groups fall outside of the dominant 
"closed" formal service sectors, of which the local tourism industry is comprised. The local 
economy is also significantly occupied by the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. 
Despite the tourist and BPO sectors being major employers in the Caribbean, those that work 
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within them, whether in hotels or call centers, still face precarious circumstances caused by 
fluctuations in job opportunity and security and also make claims of sufferation (Gmelch 2003, 
Freeman 2000). However, in this project I have chosen to direct attention outside of these more 
formally structured sites of employment to the more entrepreneurial activities of locals. These 
activities, I argue, reveal most clearly the strategies Jamaicans employ in their response to 
sufferation. In the following section I will briefly outline the history of Jamaica's political 
economy in order to provide a sense of the context in which  a public ethic of sufferation arose. 
However, despite tourism’s high contribution to the country's GDP, very little benefit is shared 
across classes in Jamaica. This is perhaps due to the dominance in Jamaica of the "all-inclusive," 
or "gated" model of tourism, in which over 30% of revenue is leaked out of the economy (World 
Travel and Tourism Council 2013). This model is characterized by an emphasis on full-service 
hotels and cruise ships. Issa and Jayawardena (2003) have noted how an Organisation of 
American States survey on the Jamaican tourism industry discovered that while all-inclusives 
generate the largest amount of revenue of any form of accommodation, their contribution to the 
economy per dollar is the least. Also, as cruise ship holidays gain popularity, the companies 
themselves extend the all-inclusive experience of the ship on shore with the creation of "tourism 
villages" where "passengers swim, eat and play in an artificial environment not knowing whether 
they are in Haiti or another Caribbean nation" (Becker 2013:154). With this model, cruise ports 
themselves are seen as destinations (ibid.). This has been evidenced with the Royal Caribbean 
cruise company's renovation of the port in Falmouth. According to one informant in this thesis, 
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the creation of this port is responsible for the decimation of the local tourism economy of nearby 
city Ocho Rios (see chapter 3).  
So the context of tourism in Montego Bay is a highly appropriate microcosm for the examination 
of sufferation. The industry gives the appearance of opportunity, with little chance of attaining 
any. Therefore, the strategies employed by the groups discussed in this thesis, become of critical 
importance in understanding the potential means of navigating such an economy and the 
market(s) which it creates. In the following section, I will turn to a discussion of current 
analytical debates about what makes a market and how its participants engage with it. Through 
my account the theoretical significance of my project will become clear. 
The Market as a Place of Suffering 
The Performative Market 
The notion of "performativity" has become an influential analytic frame for thinking through the 
market and market practice (Callon et. al 1998; LiPuma and Lee 2004; Mackenzie et al. 2008). 
The idea is that markets are performatively and reflexively composed by the mechanisms used in 
understanding, control, and navigation. Callon, Millo, and Muniesa defined these mechanisms as 
"market devices," a reference to "the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the 
construction of markets" (2007:2). Such devices range from "analytical techniques to pricing 
models, from purchase settings to merchandising tools, from trading protocols to aggregate 
indicators…" and are critical to the performance of the market because they articulate actions by 
acting themselves or by making others act (ibid.).  
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The arrangement of, or relationship between, economic actors and these devices are defined as 
socio-technical "agencements," a term which aims to militate against the bifurcation of agency 
between the two. An agencement then is a collective hybrid, which wholly composes an 
economic actor and renders behaviors and processes economic. Being or becoming "economic", 
however, is not an arbitrary process, as Callon et.al argue, but rather is "included in the 
agencement, through the presence of instruments…" (Callon et. al. 2007:4). These instruments 
are the devices that these authors argue animate the market by "abstracting," which is to say that 
they transport market transactions into "a formal, calculative space" (ibid.) 
Lambek argues that in everyday ethics "performance establishes the criteria …that recalibrate the 
criteria [for] and shift the ethical context" (2010:56). So, departing from presentations of market 
devices and the technological and industry specific orientation of their agencements, I argue that 
race, history, politics, and culture are similarly utilized in the performative ideation of the 
market. These categories are brought to bear on the market ethics and the market strategies 
devised by the groups in this thesis and become types of agencements. Therefore, the Jamaicans 
in this study place themselves in the market in a somewhat different manner than those predicted 
and indicated by Callon, et.al. Though unquestionably concerned with profit and loss, the groups 
discussed in this thesis employ ethical attributions and accounts of community that can tell us 
about various historical and contemporary forms of the market (Bear: forthcoming).  
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Callon argues for a framing of the market, which demarcates relations and considerations that are 
taken into a calculative account, and those, which are not. The latter are deemed externalities, a 
term Callon borrows from the economics discipline. The framing process does much, Callon 
asserts, to demonstrate how markets are "constructed" (1998:17). However, Callon 
acknowledges that a total framing is impossible, as framing or reframing enables the continued 
production of externalities, which lead to externality "overflows." These overflows threaten the 
frame and thus the transaction, which must be stabilized through "leakage" points, the 
permissible passing through of some externality content or component. 
Anthropologist Daniel Miller (2002) took issue with Callon's ideas of framing and externalities. 
Miller admits that he and Callon "both write in terms of frames, and externalities" (2002:238). 
Therefore, the point of contention was not the presence of frames or externalities, but rather what 
exists inside and outside the frame. Miller explains: 
For Callon, what lies within the frame is the market system, indeed it is the frame 
that helps define and preserve it as a market system. In my case — by direct 
contrast — what lies inside the frame is a ritual system, which is supported and 
defined by its opposition to that which lies outside the frame, which is the market 
system…. [In] capitalist society also, what lies within the frame is not the market 
system as an actual practice, but on the contrary a ritualized expression of an 
ideology of the market…The confusion is that this ritual and ideological system in 
the case of capitalism is actually called the market. To understand this we have to 
do what Callon set out to do but does not achieve, which is to radically separate 
out the market as a ritual and ideological system...In short, the frame of the 
market studied by Callon is a moral and ideological system whose intention is to 
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create the normative conditions for exchange rather than a description of practice 
(2002: 224-225). 
I agree with Miller. However, with the notion of sufferation, I would argue for an ever-increasing 
scale of the frame, so much so, that for many Jamaicans it would appear as if no such frame 
exists. If framing is concerned with the overflow of externalities, then sufferation is a tsunami by 
which externalities overtake all framing: the conditions that some would consider being limited 
to the market, comprise a large part of these people's lives. Perhaps this can illuminate why 
Miller acknowledges "anthropologists have had an astonishingly hard time finding anything that 
bears much relation to a framed and isolated market" (2002:228). Sufferation therefore is a way 
of understanding not only one's economic circumstances but also the significant bearing that 
economics have on one's life. This is in line, though perhaps peculiarly, with Callon's assertion of 
the increased marketization of areas outside of the market, as he notes that the "Market seems 
triumphant everywhere and its laws progressively and ineluctably impose themselves 
worldwide…" (1998:1). Also, Miller (2002) notes this influence in the transformation in political 
economy. He argues that economists are increasingly capable of transforming the world to fit 
their theories through the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank Miller, as 
noted in the previous section (2002:229). This is in fact the main argument in Miller and Carrier's 
edited volume Virtualism (Carrier and Miller 1998; Miller 1998). Sufferation thus supports 
Miller's notion that the orientation of the market frame that Callon purports is the wrong way 
round (2002). 
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The experience and history of colonialism and post-colonialism, as Miller notes in the citing of 
his early work on the Indian Jajmani system, "frame market principles in such a way that 
decisions were taken according to ideological determinants that were cut off from actual 
commercial imperatives" (2002:229). Cultural meaning and history likewise play a critical role 
in Jamaican economic practice, which is often viewed and interpreted through them.  Just as in 
Miller's findings in the Jajmani system, the Jamaican understanding of the market is brought 
about by Jamaicans' moral bearings. While I believe that Miller correctly argues for that which 
comprises both the "inside" and "outside" of the market frame, I will try to argue that sufferation 
is an all-encompassing phenomenon that does much to blur that distinction for most. 
Market Ethics 
Discussing the market activity of poor and struggling Jamaicans might seem anachronistic in this 
post-crash economic context, especially when "the market" has come to be so identified with 
financial instrumentation, abstracted commodities, and the overall practice of digital trade 
(Callon 1998, Ho 2009, Miyazaki 2003, Zaloom 2006). The term’s increased use in this context, 
and its implications in particular, have lead Miller to argue against "the market" as being seen as 
"a given, natural phenomena that simply exists in the world and that must be allowed to manifest 
its own inherent logic" (1997:10). Outside of this limited application, I believe that Miller would 
agree that for the world's poor there is a market that is a natural, or at least naturalized, 
phenomenon intrinsic to the everyday economic and social negotiations necessary to their 
survival. I would argue that the "market" that gets to the heart of the economic practice of this 
thesis' subjects is defined through the experience of sufferation. 
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To be sure, there is a market in Jamaica not so directly tied to narratives of sufferation. This 
market can be found in the economic activity of the more privileged and minority classes 
throughout the Caribbean. Miller's Capitalism (1997) is notable for illustrating that market in 
Trinidad, which is found among "white collar professionals in areas such as media and shopping 
malls" and larger consumer brands (1997:17). However, as Capitalism shows, problematic 
macroeconomic circumstances and policies, which Jamaica and the region nonetheless face, 
provide for these "up market" individuals an awareness of the daily precariousness of poorer 
Jamaicans. 
With that being said, perhaps it is useful to take up the position forwarded by Julia Elyachar who 
suggests that instead of thinking of just "the market," consideration needs to be given over to "a 
multiplicity of markets" that are the products of particular labors and cultural modes (2005:24). 
She demonstrates this with her work among Cairene merchants in Egypt who underwent a 
process of free-market expansion by the reconstitution of the social networks and cultural 
practices of the poor into the free-market (Elyachar 2005:5). What she shows is that the market 
was always there for these merchants and was contextually and multiply situated and constituted, 
and thus the merchants already had means to understand, form, and navigate variable market 
circumstances. This is what Miller posits as "organic capitalism" (1997) and also what Gudeman 
(2001) advances as his "community"— simply put, economic practices are always locally 
contextualized, irrespective of the levels at which they are performed. These all support Carrier, 
who warned against the hegemony of the "western Market" by arguing against it as a unitary 
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"idealization of economic activities" simply contextualized "in particular times and places" that 
doesn't even exist in the 'west' (1997:13). 
Whether in the tedium of waiting for profits that may never come, or in the dizzying speed of 
electronic trade where profits are made and lost over and again in minutes, engagement with the 
market is never done without an ethical or affective result. As noted in Zaloom's work with 
speculators in Chicago and London, traders through the practice of discipline make themselves 
deserving of their profit by becoming "embodied instruments for sensing the market and reacting 
to its every twitch" (2006:127, 125). Or, as shown by Japanese arbitrageurs, who by more fully 
"knowing" and "acting" in the market negotiate temporal incongruities "inherent in the Japanese 
self-location of being behind" (Miyazaki 2003:261; emphasis added).  I am not arguing here for a 
"Jamaican" market model, but rather, like these examples, seek to illustrate how Jamaicans see 
themselves within market arrangements in Jamaica.  
Zaloom makes an interesting note of how speculators have a technique allowing the "flexibility 
to move in and out of the market in an instant, taking advantage of every rise and fall of a 
commodity's price" (2006:129). Through such mechanisms, these traders construct the market as 
something permeable. A market defined as sufferation, however, is opaque at best, and absolutely 
impenetrable at worst.  There is no "moving in and out" but what we see are means by which this 
thesis' subjects move "around." Such movement results from what Janet Roitman has identified 
as "the history of incorporation and exclusion [which has] structured both the organization of the 
economy and economic practice" (2003:220). As Roitman (2003) shows in her Cameroonian 
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ethnography, market transactions are shored up by ethical and social expectations and serve as 
the bases of multiple social relations.  She demonstrates this with the example of the baaba saare 
who "becomes indebted through advances and yet receives credit due to his social position and 
responsibilities within the community" (2003:219). The market in this context is structured by an 
ethic of social hierarchy and obligation. Within this market ethic, "money" can be "captured" and 
"price" becomes "a way of discussing a social relation" (Roitman 2003:220-221). 
As the above-mentioned references have demonstrated the market is always moral, which is to 
say displayed through an ethic of the market (Bear 2015). As Lambek (2010) has shown, ethics 
are encountered as part of the everyday experience of humans, and are therefore discernible in 
those everyday encounters. However, reconciling those ethics, such as through judgment, are 
often tacitly located "…in the dialectical movement between the spoken and unspoken…between 
words, rules, and objects and…bodily disposition, comportment, affect, and character" (2010:6). 
For some of the groups discussed in this thesis that is presented as an ethic of Christianity and 
cooperation, as understood by both craft vendors and the artisan cooperative; and as indigeneity, 
as well as one of anti-capitalism, as fashioned by the Rastafari Village. For scammers, the failure 
of those ethics in producing success has meant their abandonment, but even in that context the 
market is nonetheless shaped by an ethical expectation. Those ethics, while determining how 
these groups go about "doing the market" (Roitman 2003:230), also serve as a means by which 
they cope with the disappointment of that market. The following section forwards sufferation as 
the normalized experience of what has been recently and popularly theorized in anthropology as 
"precarity." 
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Precarity Normalized: Strategies through Sufferation 
In her latest work, Anti-Crisis, Janet Roitman asks: 
 [I]f crisis designates something more than a historical conjuncture, what is the 
status of that term? How did crisis, once a signifier for a critical, decisive 
moment, come to be construed as a protracted historical and experiential 
condition? The very idea of crisis as a condition suggests an ongoing state of 
affairs. But can one speak of a state of enduring crisis? Is this not an oxymoron? 
(2014:2). 
I believe that Roitman's questions can be answered with an examination of sufferation. And in 
particular from the vantage point of Jamaican sufferation, as it has been time and again noted for 
its crises (Bogues 2002; Gray 2004; Meeks 1996; Scott 2014; Thomas 2004).  As Anthony 
Bogues expresses, 
Politics and the Anglophone Caribbean nation-states are in acute crisis, from 
which there seems no easy exit…I suggest that the present crisis in politics and 
the nation is one in which the economic relations, political ideas, and old patterns 
of domination and power are undergoing wrenching convulsions. To put it another 
way the crisis is one of "language, life and labor" (Bogues 2002:2).  
Again, I have defined sufferation as an inescapable precariousness, which is not dissimilar to 
Roitman's positing of crisis as "an epistemological impasse" (2014:4). This impasse, she asserts, 
has led the term to develop omnipresence in the many narratives of contemporary life. The 
"accession to crisis" following on the 2007-2009 financial collapse gave rise to a "frenzy of 
academic analyses…all attempting to explain 'the crisis'" (Roitman 2014:5). What emerged from, 
or at least alongside, that analysis was the concentration of pervasive precariousness that the 
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crisis may have brought into focus. "Precarity" became a shorthand for academics "documenting 
the multiple forms of nightmarish dispossession and injury that our age entails" (Muehlebach 
2013:298). 
Most recently, and arguably most illustrative of the ethnographies depicting the rise of 
precariousness is Allison's, Precarious Japan (2013). She tells of "the collapse of mundane 
everydayness – of lives at once obsessed with and then left unfulfilled by food, human 
connection, home" (2013:2). "Precarity," Allison argues, is a "word of the times" (2013:6) and is 
evidenced in the global, yet everyday pervasiveness in which "human time energy and 
relationships" strain to "fit into the calculus of capitalist value" and where "[w]hat doesn't fit gets 
strained or dumped out" (2013:16). "The social and human garbage pit is precarity," she 
continues, "And as the sensory nature of precarious living, it is pain and unease. Life doesn't 
measure up: the future, and everydayness, as secure as a black box" (ibid.). Life lived in 
precarity is bleak. It is a bleakness, however, that many in both the developed and developing 
world have known for a great length of time.  Such bleakness stands at the center of the cultures 
formed from in the dispossession of African slave descendants. However, in what Allison calls 
"the soul on strike" she notes a glimmer in attempts to survive, located in "different alliances and 
attachments, new forms of togetherness, DIY ways of (social) living and revaluing 
life" (2013:18). It is "an unwillingness to die, a demand to live (better), and insistence that 
society must change…" (2013:129). That noted glimmer, in the Jamaican context, has matured 
into the normalization of sufferation, in which the bareness of life is complemented by a 
"eudemonic hope in the present and millennial expectation for the future," which has been 
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cultivated through repeated hardship (Austin-Broos 1997:19). It is, therefore, not an experience 
exclusive to Jamaica or the Caribbean. But the region, born out of violence and exploitation for 
the sake of capitalist endeavor, can be considered to be an early site where the conditions that 
inspire the charge of sufferation were not only enacted but also institutionalized. 
While the financial crisis may have broadened precarity's reach, as well as further entrenched it 
for those already with its grasp, for many within the latter category defensive techniques for 
coping with such conditions had long been created. The strategies employed by these groups 
might qualify as what Povinelli has termed "techniques of persistence" (2011:95). Many of these 
techniques have been documented in ethnographies that predate the increased interest in 
precarity: among Brazilian catadores, or garbage pickers creating novel forms of economic and 
social relations (Millar 2008); or selling Avon to alleviate poverty and foster empowerment in 
South Africa (Dolan and Scott 2009). In addition to understanding the market ethics of this 
thesis' subjects, I am concerned with their strategies, or techniques, with coping with sufferation. 
Each group has a particular approach that is specific to their experiences and to their place in the 
Jamaican economy. 
These techniques and their wielders, however, according to Povinelli are "allowed to continue to 
persist in the seams of neoliberalism and late liberalism until they exhaust 
themselves" (2011:95). There is a lesson to be learned from Jamaican techniques in this regard: 
sufferation is not only a framing of the market, but also a framework of tempered expectations 
that attenuate its "letting die" effects capacitated in the "structural space[s] no longer valued by 
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the market and its cultural forces" (Povinelli 2011:22, 95). And so, Jamaicans have created 
strategies to prevent, or at least postpone, this exhaustion. What has resulted is an overall 
analytic of sufferation generated from individual ethics and experiences of coping with 
sufferation. 
These strategies have been developed over centuries bracketed by the inception of slavery and 
the provision of independence, as I have discussed above. And so when accounts of emergent 
"precarity" are made from newer spaces of disaster, whether in post-Fukushima Japan (Allison 
2013) or post-Katrina New Orleans (Adams 2013), it is hard to not see their victims eventually 
creating similar methods of coping formed in a much earlier moment of disaster in the 
Caribbean. Indeed the lessons learned from understanding sufferation can be applied to the many 
other areas in which social inequality and social and economic dysfunction occurs. There would 
be nothing novel about such a contribution coming from the region as the Caribbean has long 
been a productive site that has provided early and rich insight into issues that would have global 
impact. Slocum and Thomas note how because of "the particularities of the region’s historical 
development," the Caribbean has always been influential in "developing several methodological 
and conceptual tools that are critical within contemporary anthropology" (2007:2). 
My argument here is that the particularity of the local market context in the Caribbean creates a 
kind of ontological "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, Macquarrie et al. 1962), in which economic 
concerns are overwhelmingly hegemonic. The market framed as sufferation is seen as 
"generating both wealth and misery, movement and immobility" (Biehl 2005:49). Sufferation is 
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in the absence of wealth and movement, both remaining perpetually elusive, thus furnishing the 
conditions for misery and immobility. Sufferation thus renders cognatic the relationship between 
hope and despair. As a space of sufferation, the local economy becomes occupied by "…those 
incapable of living up to the new requirements of market competitiveness and profitability and 
related concepts of normalcy…" (Biehl 2005:50). Through the strategies of "making life" (Horst 
and Miller 2006) in the outer zones of the free market, we can grasp what makes up citizenship 
through interpretations of the market.  
Sufferation here is presented as a historical and cultural concept. It serves as a particular site of 
entry into Jamaican history and the cultural products of that history, but it also reveals a broader 
experience of everyday senses of lived contingency. Therefore, sufferation provides a 
counterpoint to the political urgency and academic impulses following the financial crisis—that 
protracted denouement of the last decade. If that crisis can be regarded as a flash point brought 
about by "irrational speculation, corrupt culture, erroneous policy, faulty regulation, defective 
models, missed fore-casting, or systemic failure and underlying contradictions" (Roitman 
2014:12), sufferation does more than provide anthropological insight into presentations of 
suffering as normalcy. Sufferation should be seen as the fallout from crisis, and so the ethics 
noted in this thesis are not merely rationalizations of current experiences, but an archeology of 
past moments of crisis.  
And so this thesis contributes a means of identifying recovery processes, perhaps even 
incognizant ones, where crises, not entirely overcome, linger in small and great everyday failures 
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and resistances. It does so by examining the conceptual and even cosmological ways of 
understanding economic life and how those resistances are legitimated and the failures consoled. 
These processes are not limited to Jamaica, however, they are presented here as particular to the 
black, postcolonial experience and the project of understanding responses to structural inequality, 
and especially how the comparative history and experience of blackness throughout the diaspora 
informs those response
Methodology 
Remaining in "the Market" 
In this project I have intentionally chosen to keep my research circumscribed to the market place, 
and forgo the conventional (but admittedly effective) ethnographic tradition of investigating the 
project’s themes in the neighborhoods and home lives of my informants.  In doing so I am 
following the ethnographic model of Zaloom and Ho by focusing on the ethics of the market. 
The reason why I believe this to be a valid approach is not because the realm of the market 
contains specific ethics that do not extend to other areas of life (although Zaloom (2006:117) 
makes this assertion regarding the competitiveness of traders). In fact, the market and 
experiences of it are always internal to the social, and, as I have argued above, represent to this 
thesis’ informants an existential state that goes beyond the market. 
However, I believe, in all the alternative spaces of the family and of neighborhoods, the ethics 
and strategies surrounding sufferation— which I argue is a socio-economic phenomenon— get 
obscured. The market space then is where the ambition, desires, and the histories behind the 
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activity of those spaces can be most clearly observed. This is my assertion because it is in the 
market that these groups reflect most explicitly on the inequality and disenfranchisement that 
make up sufferation than I believe they would in their accounts of kinship, family, religion etc. 
Field Site and Methodology 
This project began during a trip back home to Montego Bay in 2008. Walking to Doctor's Cave 
Beach I walked into one of the tourist gift shops along Gloucester Avenue, or what is more 
popularly known as the "Hip Strip" for the first time. Welcomed in by the Jamaican woman who 
sat outside the shop soliciting tourists passing by to come in, I was immediately struck by an 
Indian clerk standing behind the register. He did not seem like any other Indo-Jamaican I knew: 
his style of dress and his manner were both quite foreign. Walking around browsing with the 
assistance of the Jamaican worker, I surreptitiously asked her if he was in fact Jamaican. "No mi 
dear, him come straight from India," she replied. My response was, "Just come [recently 
arrived]?" to which she responded with an affirmative "mmhmm". I didn't buy anything, but I 
left with an intriguing new piece of information, new at least to me. These "Indians" I would 
learn have been in Jamaica for well over eighty years, though only on the Hip Strip for the past 
twenty. As I continued my walk to the beach I popped in an out of the shops and every single one 
would have an Indian clerk manning the till or giving direction to a member of staff. Their 
presence was no longer intriguing, but fascinating. For one, because how had I never noticed? 
But more so, how could I have not noticed? They ran nearly every gift shop on the strip (with the 
exception of two).  
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My fascination with these Indians, who over the course of preliminary fieldwork I would learn 
are Sindhis, and have a brilliant history of mercantilism, brought me to the LSE for PhD 
research. The idea was that as far as Caribbean anthropology was concerned, to study East 
Indians you went to Trinidad and Tobago, or perhaps Guyana. And even then one would likely 
study East Indian descendants of indentured workers, who had long become a part of the nation
—though not without a bit of racial contestation, which of course would figure largely in the 
ethnography. With these Sindhis, on this little strip of tourist road, I hoped to demonstrate a new 
form of interaction of Indian nationals with the Caribbean— which I hope I have done to some 
useful extent herein. However, after arriving in the field in late 2011 I quickly learned that this 
study could not solely focus on the Sindhis. They were an extremely important part of a much 
larger network of activity surrounding the local tourist trade in souvenirs and craft goods.  
The Sindhis, to speak of them collectively, if inaccurately, not only dominated the retailing of 
souvenir goods, but also their manufacture. I immediately realized that their involvement most 
affected the work of local craft vendors, and thus they were the first group to be added into the 
research profile. From time with the craft vendors I was made aware of the artisan co-op, 
JAMIA, who had begun recruiting craft vendors to train them in craft skills as a means to offset 
vendor reliance on Sindhi made souvenirs. From JAMIA, I was told about the Rastafari 
Indigenous Village, who were successfully accomplishing that which JAMIA was working 
toward, namely becoming a valuable and effective social organization that provided 
opportunities for everyday Jamaicans to participate in tourism. The last group to join this 
growing collective of research participants was that of local lottery scammers, whose 
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participation was the result of pure luck, if you will. For ethical reasons I will say no more of 
how I came to know them beyond that I knew someone who put me in touch. They did not 
participate in tourism, at least not conventionally. Through their Internet telephone-based scam, 
the scammers were targeting the ideal market of Jamaican tourism— middle class and middle-
aged and upwards white Americans. I realized that each group was doing more than merely 
participating in the local tourist economy, they were in fact trying to "make a way" through it. 
Their economic practices were actually strategies for surviving an environment of sufferation, 
which I have described as that of economic will without infrastructural support and traction. This 
notion was not superimposed a priori onto these groups, but rather emerged through my work 
with them.  
Though the methods whereby these groups engage in the economy prove quite disparate, they 
are nonetheless located in rather close proximity. The various nodes of the field site were found 
within less than a 4-kilometer (2.3 mile) radius. The craft market was located in a quite busy 
commercial district, in which the neighboring banks, offices and shops contrasted strongly with 
the heavy bamboo and rustic motif of the markets exterior. The Sindhi merchants had come to 
dominate Gloucester Avenue, renamed the "Hip Strip" by an area restaurant association in the 
mid 1990s. The strip, also known as "bottom road," was the main artery for tourist activity in the 
city, and along its half mile stretch of road operated over forty Sindhi gift shops anchored on one 
end by the famous Doctor's Cave Beach Club, and by Jimmy Buffet's Margaritaville Bar on the 
other. The artisan cooperative, JAMIA, which again stands for the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans 
Co-op, was located on Queen's Drive, or "top road" named so for it being relative position to 
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"bottom road." They rented out several open areas on the ground floor of the long abandoned 
"Casablanca Hotel." At the periphery of this radius is the Rastafari Indigenous Village. Located 
across town, the village site sits in an expanse of mostly undeveloped private property that 
straddles the Montego River, and nestled between three residential areas. In between all of these 
other locations live the scammers. The residential area was home to mostly poorer Jamaicans, 
but at its founding the housing development was meant to become an aspirant middle class 
enclave. The proximity of these groups to each other made moving between them easy. With the 
exception of the Rastafari Village I was able to walk to each group's respective site. 
Access to all groups but the Sindhis was rather direct. My being Jamaican, I believe made that 
so. But also after I explained that I was interested in understanding the tourist industry from their 
perspective they were all rather keen to take part. This was indeed very fortunate as it helped to 
better facilitate conducting the research among so many groups. I gave the same explanation for 
research to the Sindhis, but they took significantly more time to warm to the idea of talking about 
business, which in the competitive area of souvenirs is often not done. I was able to break the ice 
with many of them with my knowledge of Sindhi culture, and especially religion, which 
surprised them. Also, and quite importantly, through family contacts I was able to personally 
meet some of the most prominent Sindhis from the older generation— who were happy to talk. 
But when a particular Sindhi shop owner on the Hip Strip was especially reticent, mentioning 
that I discussed a particular matter with one of these older Sindhis worked to open dialogue.    
 49
Despite the relative ease of access, working with each group took a specific form and required a 
different strategy. The Sindhi shops required a great deal of patience and a willingness to hang 
around and wait for them to tend to customers. Ultimately, I concentrated on visiting them in the 
late evening when things quieted down. However, I would always visit during one of the "ship 
days" of Monday, Wednesday, and some Fridays, when the cruise ships were in both Montego 
Bay and Falmouth ports. This gave me a good sense of Sindhi customer service and pace of 
business. Conversely, I typically had ample time to visit with vendors at Bay Fort craft market, 
as things were usually slow, only really picking up on ship days. I would also visit them on these 
days, which provided a great deal of insight to the trouble that they have in their business.  
While at the market I would also visit with specific members of JAMIA who had stalls there. As 
I will explain later most of JAMIA's members came from the two larger craft markets in 
Montego Bay. However, my real time with JAMIA would come during their meetings every 
other Wednesday. The meetings themselves lasted two hours, but there was often time for 
chatting afterwards. Also, I would give rides back to the market or to other destinations to 
members, which offered more opportunity to talk. To better understand the "vision" of JAMIA, I 
would have separate meetings with JAMIA's leader, Baldwin Dulston and the executive board. 
My visits to the Rastafari Indigenous Village would become increasingly regular over the period 
of fieldwork and I would spend most Saturday mornings and afternoons on the grounds, helping 
with preparations for tours and with the tours themselves. I would also spend evenings with the 
leaders of the Village at one of their private residences, like with JAMIA's executive board, to 
get a sense of the macro and long-term view of the organization. I would spend mostly late 
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nights speaking with the scammers in their homes and around their neighborhoods. I would on 
occasion take a trip with one to the store, which was often to the mobile phone shop to pay a bill. 
Despite working with several groups over only fifteen months, I never got the sense by 
conducting essentially what was multi-sited ethnography that I was ever in any danger of 
spreading myself too thin (Wogan 2004). 
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Thesis Outline 
This main body of the thesis contains five chapters. Each chapter serves as a particular vantage 
point into the respective ethics and practices of the market of Bay For craft vendors, JAMIA, 
Sindhi merchants, the members of the Rastafari Indigenous Village, and local lottery scammers. 
The chapters therefore function as ethnographic group "portraits" (Miller 2011), where the 
concerns of several members of each are brought to the fore to try and "get at" how market ethics 
are employed to navigate sufferation.  
The first two chapters demonstrate how the market in Jamaica is related to the notion of 
cooperation. In the first chapter, A So Black People Stay, craft vendors interpret the competitive 
strategies of fellow vendors as acts of animosity understood through the trope "bad-mind." 
Despite facing a marketplace increasingly constricted by foreign made souvenirs imported by 
emigrant Sindhi Indian wholesalers, vendors attribute their economic failings and the conditions 
which create them to a chronic black Jamaican disunity inherited from slavery. What emerges is 
an ethic of the market that is framed by an expectation for cooperation. However, when that 
expectation is not met, an ethnicized rationale of disunity is employed as a strategy to cope with 
the failures of the market, which become understood as failures of community.   
The second chapter, Putting Able Hands to Work, introduces The Jamaican Indigenous Artisan 
Cooperative Society (JAMIA). This is an artisan cooperative whose membership is mostly 
comprised of unskilled craft vendors, who have joined in the hope of learning a craft skill. Their 
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motto, "Putting able hands to work," speaks to their market ethic of economic collectivism and 
cooperation, not dissimilar to that of the craft vendors. They assert that these are all resources 
that they see necessary to compete in the souvenir industry, and thus make a way out of 
sufferation. Many members of JAMIA believe that craft is paramount in both representing and 
economically developing the country, though overlooked by government. They seek to 
accomplish their capacity to compete through strategies of organization and production, as 
informed by Jamaica's Department of Friendly and Cooperative Societies. 
In the third chapter, Enter Through the Gift Shop, I show how Sindhis dominate the sale of 
Jamaican tourist goods, an act that is described by vendors and artisans in Montego Bay as being 
to the detriment of local Jamaican traders and artisans. Sindhis make the moral claim that 
without the business acumen and industry of their community, the local trade in souvenirs would 
inevitably fail. However, the cost of Sindhi business success, their alienation from fellow 
Jamaicans and forms of bonded labor suggests that they too encounter sufferation. In fact, I 
show, that they too use this ethical framing at times.  
The fourth chapter, Babylon Makes the Rules, presents the Rastafari Indigenous Village (RIV). 
The group uses their participation in the tourism market to challenge what they believe are 
infringed Rastafarian cultural property rights. They do this through positioning Rastafari as an 
indigenous Jamaican culture. Therefore, their participation in the market is guided by an ethic of 
rights. As a means of commercially defending these rights the group employ a discourse of 
indigeneity. In this process, RIV have gained partial recognition from the World Intellectual 
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Property Organization of the United Nations, and increasing acknowledgement from the 
Jamaican government. While the basis of indigeneity strongly supports the case of intellectual 
and cultural property rights, this recognition ultimately further identifies the group, and Rastafari 
in general, with Jamaica. This association with Jamaica is problematic, as Rastafari perceive 
themselves as "exiles" in the West, "alienated from their African homeland" (Edmonds 2012:40). 
The fifth chapter Seizing Life introduces a group of scammers who have opted out of the tourist 
market of Montego Bay. Facing increasingly limited social and economic opportunity, lottery 
scamming in St. James, Jamaica has become a highly controversial means by which poor young 
men, through the use of communication technology, redress the restricted social mobility 
inherent in sufferation to create opportunities for wealth.  This chapter explores how scammers 
try to exploit the market through acts of seizure. I discuss how the practice of the scam and the 
specific communication technologies utilized enable a novel encounter between scammers and 
the U.S., disrupting long-standing relations of power. The acquired wealth engenders a 
reinterpretation of scammers' place in Jamaican society, obviating popular models of success and 
social mobility tied to migration, as the value of "foreign" is diminished and Jamaica is re-
imagined as a locus of opportunity and possibility. 
 
 55
1                    A So Black People Stay 
Craft Vendors of Bay Fort Market 
 
No white man no fuss nor fight 
No Chiney no fuss nor fight 
No Indian no fuss nor fight 
No Syrian no fuss nor fight 
Only we black man fussing and fighting 
-Barrington Levy, "Don't Fuss Nor Fight" ; 1979 
With a prolonged kissing of her teeth, Hazel, a vendor at Bay Fort craft market,  made it clear 2
that my question of how things were in the market was a silly one. Stretching out her hands 
toward the market stalls behind us in an invitation to survey that which was obvious, she 
answered, "Nuttin' no gwaan fi we!" The phrase fully conveyed a sense of anxiety. Nothing 
really was going on for these women in the market, or at least not anything much. Horst and 
Miller (2006:125) working on cell phone communication in Jamaica several years earlier 
encountered the same phrase among young men stuck in their bored, communal loneliness—
symptoms, they proffered, of poor economic prospects. Then and now, the phrase communicates 
an epidemic sense of precariousness in Jamaica, locally recognized as a state of sufferation.  
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Craft vendors in Bay Fort conduct their business from a position of defeated competition and 
discontented citizenship. This was evident among the over two hundred vendor stalls at Bay Fort, 
the city's largest craft market, where there is a paradoxical amount of inactivity.  On most days 
the slow pace of business leaves vendors dependent upon the intermittent mercies of JUTA 
(Jamaican Union of Travelers Association) bus drivers to bring hotel guests, and cruise 
passengers on ship days, to the market to shop. This dependency is a product of the closed-loop 
all-inclusive, "gated tourism,"  that dominates much of the Caribbean, in which tourists are 3
shuttled between the airport, hotels, cruises, and approved attractions.  For vendors at Bay Fort, 
the already limited business they see is further restricted by the uniformity of goods sold among 
them. Selling the same, or similar, merchandise makes it difficult for each stall to be distinct and 
vendors often resort to assertive sales tactics to gain a competitive edge. These tactics and the 
conditions that generate them create a market of sufferation which as a "...cultured structure that 
organizes everyday life and labor…," produces historicized narratives of race and disunity 
(Zaloom 2006:117).  
The accounts of market vendors draw on wider discourses of Jamaican life, cooperative 
structures, and blackness to construct an ethical account of bad-mind. Bad-mind is a trope used 
to identify the act, or intention of another undertaken as a form of envy. This chapter 
appropriates the term as a market concept related to acts of competition, and responses to acts of 
competition in particular. It, therefore, examines how vendors use the concepts of bad-mind and 
sufferation to frame and reconcile the continued lack of social and economic progress they 
experience in the market.  The chapter also seeks to understand "the measures of failure, [and] 
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the arts of failure" in the market so as to understand failure not as "an ideal form floating outside 
social space [but] instead a socially mediated term for assessing the social world" (Povinelli 
2011: 23). 
Bay Fort and Its Vendors 
Bay Fort sits along three blocks near Montego Bay's downtown area. The market currently has 
245 largely adjacent stalls with roughly two hundred in operation. The vendors at Bay Fort are 
almost all women, most of whom are middle-aged, though a small minority are in their mid-
thirties. The few male vendors either work with their mothers or partners, or are artisans who sell 
their carved goods directly (though at the time of fieldwork I could only count one such stall). 
The female vendors who are in the majority are women who are the characteristic backbone of 
poor and rural Jamaican society, as noted in the numerous ethnographic accounts of Jamaican 
and Caribbean kinship (see Barrow 1999; Besson 2002; Chevannes 2001; Clarke 1999 [1957]; 
Henriques 1968; Smith 1962; R. Smith 1995; and Quinlan 2006).   4
Many of the vendors work to support themselves, their children, and in many cases, their 
grandchildren. Indeed quite a few older women I spoke with were directly responsible for the 
payment of school fees and basic maintenance for their grandchildren. This was achieved 
through forms of direct financial support to their parents or by boarding the grandchildren at 
home with them. Some of these grandchildren were often present in the market. A constant was 
vendor Big Mama's granddaughter, Shanice, who often sat beading bracelets with Big Mama 
during slow periods. Some of the younger vendors would bring their young babies in to work 
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with them. These women told me that the Parish Council particularly discouraged the practice of 
bringing their kids to the market. However, there was little other option for most of them.  
Usually vendors came to the trade from a previous career in vending, whether in produce 
markets, or higglering—the informal trade of home and other goods in public spaces. Others 
came from a variety of backgrounds, but were united by their entry into craft vending as a 
seemingly viable, but mostly accessible means of earning a living. There were a good portion of 
vendors who themselves once were, or continued to be, involved in making handicrafts of mostly 
straw or crocheted goods and thus opened their stalls for their sale. But these crafts, rather than 
taking prime space within the stalls, now largely supplemented other goods purchased from local 
wholesalers.  
Unanimously Christian, the vendors variably belong to Pentecostal, Baptist, and Seventh Day 
Adventist denominations, all maintaining deep religious devotion and commitment to their 
churches. Their Christianity plays a critical role in their market practice and in my analysis of 
that practice. As stated in the introduction, sufferation is a socio-economic condition 
characterized by an inability for economic progress. Sufferation is also a way coping with that 
lack of progress. For these vendors it functions as a Protestant framework that partly  mitigates 
their experiences of economic adversity.  Sufferation, therefore, is an affective ethical term that 
gets to the heart of the vendor's economic concerns. Vendors assuage those concerns by framing 
their experiences with religious and ethical idioms and practice economic strategies related to 
them. 
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Competition and Bad-mind 
I met Doris at stall number one chatting with her neighbor from stall number two. I asked Doris 
about her work as a vendor and the operation of Bay Fort craft market. She explained that the 
market was divided into two zones. These were designed so that tour buses could come to either 
end on specific days, so that one half functioned as a veritable "downtown" while the other, more 
visibly maintained, the "uptown." Doris happened to work downtown. This distinction was due 
to an uneven allocation of renovation funding the market received in 2009 facilitated by the 
Tourism Product and Development Company (TPDCo). The renovation enabled the repair of 
derelict stalls and a bright repainting of their facades. But only the first phase of the renovation 
took place with the enhancement of 127 shops in the market nearest the main entrance.  Doris 5
attributed the disparity to favoritism and bias in the leadership of the craft market and in the St. 
James Parish Council who were responsible for the market's overall operation.  
For Doris, the Parish Council did not care about the vendors, and only wanted to collect the stall 
rent. The truth was, however, that she could barely make her stall's JAM$ 3000 a month rent as 
business was so poor. Although the amount was not exorbitant, Doris claimed that some weeks 
she barely made more than JAM$ 500 ( just over US$ 5). In fact the rent proved a financial 
quandary for most of the vendors. The rent for many vendors was in arrears, and as a result their 
shops had been closed by the Parish Council for non-payment.    6
Whether one worked uptown or downtown, business was still tough and opportunity often only 
came with the arrival of the JUTA bus. So, vendors eager to make their first, if not only, 
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impression often immediately approached tour buses entering Bay Fort market. It is prohibited 
for vendors to solicit tourists in this way, and is an act penalized by a fine. This was faulty logic 
put into practice according to Doris and many other vendors who attested that however verboten, 
it was necessary. Throughout the market tourists are persistently met with solicitations by 
vendors such as, "Shopping today, sir? What are you looking for?" "Hello pretty lady! We have 
some nice things here, just have a look!" They obligatorily reply with a smile, a cursory glance, 
and then reliably utter the hope-shattering phrase, "We'll come back around later," which of 
course they seldom do.  
Although tourists are put off by the vendors' approach, intense petitions such as theirs are 
hallmarks of almost any market. In some contexts such solicitations can be viewed as the 
"bedazzling quality…[of] market patter…" that Webb Keane considers to be "iconic" of the 
market's "allure" (2008:34). However, at Bay Fort the solicitations make it a decidedly 
unenjoyable place to shop. There is a singular reason for this: vendors' clamorous appeals are 
made against the background of a uniform assortment of goods. These items are featured in 
nearly every vendor's tiny 40 square foot stall.  
"It's all the same stuff," one tourist admitted to me, echoing common tourist impressions. "Once 
you go to one stall, there's no reason to go to another," asserted her companion. A market can be 
made into "a utopic space" through the "exploitation of choice," but the lack of choice within 
Bay Fort stifles tourists' interest (Causey 2003:186; Miller 1998:154). This is further frustrated 
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by vendor sales tactics. One tourist's account clearly articulates the annoyance with the lack of 
variety and the sales approach: 
Our hotel put [us] on a free shuttle to the craft market…which we thought would 
be great place to pick up some presents as well ensure some of our spending went 
outside of the hotel resort. Sadly though we found the market very disappointing. 
We were hassled non-stop as we tried to look around the market. In the end we 
gave up, had a drink and got the shuttle back to the hotel. The market is poorly 
designed-there are a lot of traders mostly selling the same thing from their 
individual stalls-they try and get you to come into their stall and then hassle you 
to buy and look at things. There is little variety in what is being offered and there 
was not very much that took my fancy. Why don't they sell a broader range of 
Jamaican goods?  Such a shame— they could do with some help in how to serve 
customers and to find out what tourists actually want to buy. If we had not been 
hassled so much then we would have probably bought something but as it was, we 
only bought a few drinks at the bar.   7
The lack of selection makes the vendors' aggressive approach unbearable. The tourist himself 
made the connection when stating that, "They could do with some help in how to serve customers 
and to find out what tourists actually want to buy." Former Tourism Minister Francis Tulloch at 
the University of Technology's tourism forum held at the Montego Bay Convention Centre in 
October 2012 even commented on current state of the city's markets:  
I am disappointed that our craft vendors after so many years still don't have a 
proper craft market... Anybody, once you can afford it, can come from overseas, 
get the permit and open any little gift shop; not that I do not want foreigners here, 
I welcome them... [but] if you go to the craft market... Bay Fort Street and Old 
Street Craft markets, look at the products. We see everybody selling the same 
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things. We need for these people to diversify. All these people sell the same thing. 
That cannot work… 
In his disappointment with the lack of selection, the former tourism minister picks up on an 
important issue. When each vendor is offering the same product selection at relatively the same 
price, it is a difficult task to make one's stall distinct and attractive.  
The cited lack of variety in the craft market can be attributed to a constricted product range that 
is determined by emigrant Sindhi Indian wholesalers who import "Jamaican" souvenirs from 
Indonesia, China, and India. Sindhi wholesalers and retailers in the souvenir trade were once 
contract workers recruited from India to staff in-bond, duty-free luxury shops run by previously 
arrived generations of Sindhi merchants. Unable to open their own luxury goods businesses, and 
reluctant to return to India at the end of their contracts, Sindhi workers began opening gift shops 
and starting wholesale businesses in the early 90s. The low cost of their imports edged local 
producers out the market, which decreased local output and limited vendors' supply sources to 
Sindhi goods. This eventually led to the homogenization of the selection at the market.  
The circumscription of available goods creates circuits of competition not only among Bay Fort 
vendors, but also between the few markets in Montego Bay. These as a category compete against 
numerous local Sindhi-owned gift shops. Circumstances demanded that Bay Fort vendors 
employ assertive sales strategies, like the "aggressive" solicitation of tourists mentioned earlier. 
Bay Fort vendor, "Big Mama," similarly commented on the practice in a discussion with me that 
indicated vendor awareness of the problem:  
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You see what make us lose business more time? Them [other vendors] go a [to] 
the bus and don't wait. Sometime you fi 'low them [should allow tourists  space] 
and make we do business. Let me tell you something...a we run [turn off] tourist 
you know? You no haffi [have to] call tourists, you fi let them walk. You haffi 
attract the tourist them. One time me foot sprain and me couldn't walk so me just 
sit down and unpack two something and the people them just come right over and 
them make me day. You no haffi call tourist, some of them [vendors] nuh [don't] 
too understand. Me travel you know and when you go a one store inna America, 
you walk round till [for an extended period], you no even see nobody come talk to 
you, you must pick up what you want and take it, and you haffi go ask them for 
help. So most of us no really understand business. 
Though fully aware that their aggressive forms of solicitation are problematic and that inventory 
factors contributed to them, vendors view each other's actions as competitive  sales strategies. It 
has been noted that in the Caribbean, culture "is virtually synonymous with that of competition," 
whether evidenced in strictly commercial realms or in the demonstrations of competing carnival 
bands (Miller 1997: 314, also see Burton 1997).  Competition among market women has also 8
been discussed as being integral to the trade (Besson 1993; Wilson 1974: 234). To vendors, the 
competitive strategies of others were taken as a personal affront and as the manifestation of bad-
mind. 
Bad-mind, as defined at the start of the chapter is a form of envy. Envy can be generalized as a 
culturally informed response to competition, in which the act of another is viewed as 
antagonistic. Bad-mind, as I will show, is also viewed as a product of an inherent disunity among 
blacks. The notion invokes Peter Wilson's seminal work, Crab Antics, which examined the 
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"ingrained...covetousness and contentiousness" that he proposed defined the social life (with 
special regard to land inheritance) of (black) Providencia islanders through a dialectical 
relationship between the values of "respectability" and "reputation" (1973:58, 9).  That dialectic 
and especially its inference of gender relations has been adequately debated (Barrow 1996; 
Besson 1993, 2002; Freeman 2000, 2007; Olwig 1993; Thomas 2004; Yelvington 1995). It, 
nonetheless, remains particularly salient to this discussion, as it has been to many previous 
studies of Caribbean market women and female vendors, their femininity, and social position 
(see Besson 1993; Brown-Glaude 2011; Burton 1997; Ulysse 2007). Carelessly considered, the 
working of disunity as bad-mind among Bay Fort vendors could be seen as confirming the 
stereotype of market women as being of "invasive physical presence…demeanor and 
language…" (Burton 1997:164). Instead it should be considered as a cultured and historicized 
contextualization of the economic precariousness faced in the Caribbean, and disproportionately 
by women.  
A comparative, yet alternatively gendered, account of competitive discord similar to bad-mind is 
the claim of the evil eye among male Cairene merchants in Egypt (Elyachar 2005). Claims of 
both bad-mind and the evil eye are commonly made in response to a lack of business success and 
the proximity of competitors (Elyachar 2005:159). The evil eye, like bad-mind, is a means by 
which merchants manage the instability of the market. Elyachar interestingly notes how when 
things went poorly for the merchants, they placed blame on acts of self-interest, which create 
negative value in the market that ultimately brings on the evil eye (2005:158). For these 
merchants the evil eye was brought onto one's self, often in the form of mystical misfortune. This 
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is similar to the working of "red eye" in China where envy operates against those who fail to 
conceal their "desirable possessions or attributes" (Zhang 2013:115). Evil eye and red eye 
demonstrate a social disinclination toward acts of self-interest, and work to assert the values of 
equality and cooperation over market produced inequality.  
Similarly, bad-mind suggests an expectation of equitability in the market, and is a response to 
displays of inequality. The difference between them is that unlike bad-mind, red eye and the evil 
eye are identified by being met with misfortune, which then prompts one to become more 
equitable through a change of behavior (Elyachar 2005:161-2). They both, therefore, have a 
balancing quality which helps to generate public-spiritedness and over all equality. Bad-mind, 
however, is only identified in the claiming of ill intention in others, without any resulting 
misfortune to serve as an intervention for the act and effect of bad-mind. Therefore, no balance is 
achieved and the only result is a reproduction of ill will. Admittedly, this brought to my mind 
social psychologist Madeline Kerr's findings of Jamaicans' "deep-set defensive mechanisms and 
tendencies to shift blame or responsibility for any lapse or misfortune to other persons or 
external circumstances…" (Clarke 1999 [1957]:xxiv). Though as a generalization, Kerr's blame-
shifting thesis is clearly very problematic, it nonetheless speaks to a trait that is evident in the 
function of bad-mind, and perhaps its employment. 
  
Understanding bad-mind, thus, provides insight into the working of self-interest as an economic 
motivator. It also demonstrates how charges of self-interest operate as a mechanism of morality 
that works as a constraint on, rather than a facilitator of, the market, especially one already 
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hindered by the characteristics of sufferation. As Webb Keane has argued, markets "cannot be 
wholly free of some kinds of moral claim, and thus cannot achieve full social 
disembedding" (2008:28). Market vending in the Caribbean has been noted to "capitalize" on the 
"moral accounting of economic practices" (Mantz 2007:28), and so bad-mind is a means by 
which economic acts are evaluated on a moral basis and by which vendors making the claim seek 
to impede others' advancement. Such is the potentially reproductive effect of bad-mind: in 
claiming bad-mind, one enacts a process, which itself can be identified as such. 
Disunity and Bad-mind  
Through bad-mind, vendors participate in a reflexive critique whereby problems in the market 
are located within themselves and their community. In a similar vein, Andrew Causey, working 
among Toba Batak woodcarvers in Sumatra, shows how despite their souvenir ideas were being 
copied by competitors, which thereby decreased demand of a particular style, these carvers 
ascribed their failures in the tourist market to their own inability to "know" what tourists wanted, 
or to communicate with them (1999:41-42). While Causey did not fully unpack the reasons for 
this sentiment among the woodcarvers, I was able to determine an interesting reason for it among 
Bay Fort's vendors. To vendors, bad-mind was evidence that black Jamaicans are incapable of 
commercial cooperation.  "Business," I was told, was one of the areas where black people "just 
cyaan [can't] agree." Bad-mind as an expression of "black" disunity is a fact for vendors that is 
made real in its blackness, and taking this position seriously is critical for examining this 
proposed narrative of race and its implications. It is important to note that what follows are 
claims of bad mind and not necessarily accounts of the acts of bad mind. 
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Bad-mind is a particular ethic of the everyday, and as Lambek (2010) noted regarding these 
ethics, they are often tacitly identified. Therefore, the first account of bad-mind in the craft 
market I heard came from outside the market, and was the testimony of Stacey, the Jamaican 
owner of a small local wholesale operation. Stacey's claim was that craft vendors "don't want to 
see other black people do well." This was her assertion because the vendors seldom bought from 
her because, as she insisted, they did not want to "build" her up. She further expressed that "they 
rather go to the Indians [Sindhis]." 
Stacey's shop was just across from Bay Fort craft market, so it was perplexing that the market’s 
vendors were overlooking it. A few craft vendors admitted that they did in fact not shop at 
Stacey's, but not for her stated reasons.  They noted the lack of selection and the high cost of 
Stacey's offerings compared to her main area competitor, Dinesh, a Sindhi wholesaler whose 
shop was also located nearby. Why then would Stacey maintain that race drove the vendors' 
decision?  
I asked the vendors about Stacey's assertion, and was assured that racial bias was not their 
motive. However, they admitted that they, too, believed that black Jamaicans did not like to 
"build up" one another, and it was demonstrated through acts of bad-mind everyday in the 
market. Their noted examples included the price reduction of an item under consideration at a 
neighboring stall, the direct solicitation of customers in another vendor's area, and the copying of 
specific merchandise successfully sold by a neighboring vendor. I witnessed the latter one day in 
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Dinesh's shop. One vendor had bought a particular set of ashtrays, and another vendor waiting 
behind her to check out said to Dinesh, "Give me two of them too." The request resulted in a 
quick, silent expression of displeasure on the first vendor's face. But this kind of thing happened 
a lot during my time in Dinesh's shop. Vendors often bought similar items to each other, whether 
knowingly or inadvertently, because despite Dinesh's vast selection, there were a finite number 
of category choices.  
When those same items ended up on sale at two adjacent stalls, whispered charges of bad-mind 
were cast as racial imputations of others' competitive strategies. However, criticisms were met 
with repudiations of prejudicial economic practice. This occurred in a circumstantial interchange 
where free market practices were willfully employed, but problematically received and replaced 
with ethical, and ethnic, market values. When such values were not fulfilled, it was perceived of 
as acts of disloyalty and black disunity, or, simply put, bad-mind. In other words, it was okay to 
copy, but deeply problematic to be copied. Admittedly, this brought to mind social psychologist 
Madeline Kerr's 1952 findings of Jamaicans' "deep-set defensive mechanisms and tendencies to 
shift blame or responsibility for any lapse or misfortune to other persons or external 
circumstances…" (Clarke 1999 [1957]:xxiv).  Though as a generalization, Kerr's blame-shifting 9
thesis is clearly very problematic, it nonetheless speaks to an explicit ethic of bad-mind rather 
than an internal psychological state of distrust.  
As much as bad-mind and "black disunity" illustrate self-perceptions of blackness, I would argue 
that they tell us just as much about blackness as a feature of comparison. In fact for female 
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vendors all comparison within the broader market is carried out through categories of race. While 
black disunity is determined by an assessment of black-black interaction, it is confirmed by 
external comparison. For Bay Fort vendors, unity is found around them, just not among them. 
The comparative assessment of unity was often accomplished by evaluating black Jamaicans' 
economic success and cooperation against that of Jamaica's communities of Chinese, whites, 
Indians, and "Syrians"—a classificatory proxy for the island's population of Lebanese and 
Sephardic Jewish descent.  Despite the Jamaican nationality of these groups, "Terms of 10
reference and signification such as Indian, Chinese, and Syrian," Charles Carnegie (2002: 31) 
notes, "denote immutable characteristics that permanently marked the person as different, no 
matter how integrated she is, or feels herself to be, in the national culture" (also see Maurer 
1997: 138). Through a reductive determination of their perceived collective success, these groups 
were regarded as necessarily united. Commonly cited examples of this assertion include the near 
exclusive Sindhi Indian ownership of souvenir wholesale centers and retail shops, the prevalence 
of Chinese-owned groceries, and the long standing dominance of whites and Syrians in a variety 
of commercial areas (see Brown-Glaude 2011:42).  The ostensible unity and accord exhibited in 11
the business practice of these other groups contributed to the skewed self-evaluation of black 
Jamaican commercial behavior. 
  
To vendors, Sindhis, or "Indians" as they are categorically referred were paragons of unity in 
business. In circulation among the craft vendors was a particular ex hypothesi construction, in 
which Sindhis pooled their resources to purchase and distribute large volumes of merchandise 
among themselves, which explained their lower prices. This was the only conceivable way that 
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Sindhi retailers were able to multiple price t-shirts "3 for [US] $10" while vendors were by 
necessity selling only one of the exact same t-shirts for that price. Collective bulk purchase best 
symbolized the economic and social accord the vendors believed lacking among blacks. The 
notion occupied much of the craft vendor imagination  as evidenced in this account from Bay 
Fort vendor, Kerry: 
I remember about 10 years ago people were complaining how the Indian are 
selling so cheap and I told them that the reason they can do that is because they 
pool their money and buy in bulk. But we can do the same thing and pool our 
money. So why we don't do that so that we can compete? And everyone had a 
little reason why them don't want to do that...and that is our problem. Unite 
together? We have some little petty things that stop we a [us from] unite together. 
And when we can get over that...we gone clear. 
Commercial collectivism among Sindhis proved to only be a vendor fiction.  Sindhi retailers' low 
prices were due to the inventory credit terms they received from Sindhi wholesalers. Inventory 
credit facilitates a more successful and productive, but most importantly, flexible, trade. The 
credit interval provides necessary time for Sindhi retailers to make their profit. The thirty or sixty 
days Sindhi retailers have to make their inventory payment could qualify as cooperative activity. 
However, wholesalers assured me that these arrangements were determined by credit-worthiness
—a metric that is intrinsically problematic, to be sure. 
Access to inventory on credit would enable vendors to become more flexible in their trade, and 
might perhaps lead to greater variation in their offerings.  As Janet Roitman has shown credit is 
advanced to people who are socially sanctioned, as credit relations stand "at the heart of 
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productive associations" (2003: 212). Vendors lack the requisite social position deemed 
necessary for credit worthiness  as determined by the "logics of inclusion and exclusion, and 
hence socioeconomic differentiation" of both Sindhis and formal lending institutions in Jamaica 
(Roitman 2003: 219,220). 
Vendors, as well as many average Jamaicans, are unable to secure credit from the formal 
financial sector, whose lending terms have become ever more stringent and prohibitive as a result 
of policies arising from structural adjustment programs (Handa and Kirton 1999:174). The 
response to the alienation from formal access to credit is the prevalent participation in "partners," 
or the Jamaican variant of a rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA). Due to their 
"relative efficiency over formal savings institutions in terms of access, transaction costs, and 
investor confidence," partners are ubiquitous in Jamaica (Handa and Kirton 1999:193). However, 
receiving a "draw," the term for a partner payout, cannot always facilitate the increased purchase 
of inventory goods, as there are inherent limitations in partner participation. This primarily 
includes the time it takes to receive one's turn— depending on the size of the partner, it may take 
several weeks to receive a payout. Partner as a form of ROSCA does not typically have the 
borrowing benefit of credit-granting savings clubs. Access to borrowing has shown to be quite 
beneficial with the increased success of programs such as an Accumulating Savings and Credit 
Association (ASCA), as demonstrated by Deborah James' account of their use in South Africa in 
local forms known as stokvel or sesebesebe (2012:26). 
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Using partner draws to finance their businesses is also complicated by the commitment to paying 
in, or "throwing" one's regular "hand," the term for the contribution to the partner, as often 
profits made from vendors stall must go toward the partner pay-in. Finally the draw may not 
always exceed one's contribution, such as in cases where other participants withdraw from the 
program thereby decreasing the pot and the draw. In the worst case, there is the chance that the 
"banker," or manager of the partner, might run off with the fund. Ultimately, vendors are 
deprived of the necessary catalysts to bolster their business. Without the liberty to construct their 
own possibilities vendors are economically interned by the circumscribed sources of inventory 
and the craft market itself.  
The belief in Sindhi collective purchasing indicated that to vendors commercial success was 
predicated on cooperation and unity, as evidenced in their participation in the partner. However, 
despite the regular success of partners, vendors believed the supposed cooperative facilities of 
Sindhis somehow managed to evade the black community. Many vendors reasoned, as noted in 
Kerry's account, that given the over two-hundred stalls at Bay Fort, all of which sold similar, if 
not the same, items, they could buy their merchandise in bulk and easily demand lower prices 
from wholesalers. While vendors agreed in principle, they ultimately acknowledged the lack of 
necessary cooperation to do so. I was confused by the juxtaposition of an evidenced cooperation 
in throwing partner with the disbelief in wider cooperative action. This fact seemed to add to the 
questions about cooperation that have been asked by scholars in recent years (Heinrich & 
Heinrich 2007, Tomasello 2009, West, et.al 2010, Tomasello, et. al 2012).  What I realized was 
taking place was an interesting take on Maurice Bloch and Johnny Parry's often-cited idea of 
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transactional order discussed in the introduction to Money and the Morality of Exchange (1989). 
For vendors, throwing partner, and its relatively limited commitment, was in fact what Bloch and 
Parry termed a "short term" exchange cycle— a domain that is both acquisitive, and importantly 
individual (1989:2). However, unifying to collectively demand lower prices from Sindhis would 
qualify as a "long-term" cycle of commitment, which being concerned with morality, serves to 
enable "the reproduction of the social and cosmic order" (ibid.). What vendor disbelief in long 
term cooperative action demonstrated was that the social and cosmic order in Jamaica, as 
gleaned from their accounts, is shrouded in an ethos of pessimism. 
One vendor, Iona, who was frustrated by many vendors’ non-payment of rent, articulated this 
sense: 
Most of the vendors in here, they are parasites. They do not want to pay parish 
council rent and no association dues. When it comes to money, they do not want 
to put it back into the system so we can all benefit collectively. So for those of us 
vendors who pay, it is not fair to sit back and watch them feeding off our money.  12
In Iona's estimation as to why vendors do not pay their rent, none of the aforementioned 
difficulties are described. For her the reason is that non-paying vendors, as parasites, would 
rather "feed off" other vendors rather than pay the rent and association fees so the market can 
benefit collectively. Iona's charge is one that identifies bad-mind in the act of vendors' non-
payment. It also directly suggests a lack of cooperation, while interestingly reinforcing its 
expectation. This is similar to "the tragedy of Ubuntu" among black women in South Africa 
identified by Katrina Greene (2010). The "tragedy" that Greene identifies is the individualizing 
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effect of the market and how it threatens the collective ethos of Ubuntu  or "humanness," "that 
mandates expressions of charitableness, sensitivity, and consideration…" (2010:195). The 
decision to not pay the rent goes against the collective ethos of a market in which each vendor's 
rent sustains the market overall. However, non-payment is a strategic choice for surviving in the 
broader market. It allows for the reallocation of resources, whether to purchase more 
merchandise, or contribute to their partner. Therefore, the demands of the market are that, which 
undermines the cooperation deemed necessary for success and "ubuntu" gives way to bad-mind. 
However, it may be more fruitful to consider not the demands of the market as responsible for 
producing bad-mind, but rather its constraints and inequalities.  
An instructive foil to the relations generated by the conditions Bay Fort craft vendors face is 
provided by looking at another category of Jamaican vendor, Informal Commercial Importers, or 
ICIs. ICIs are more commonly referred to as higglers,  though use of the term is contested 13
(Brown-Glaude 2011). ICI's travel abroad, mostly to the US, but recently as far as China, to 
purchase much in-demand goods, such as trendy apparel and accessories, but also household and 
school related items. Ethnographic accounts of Kingston-based ICIs detail their demonstrated 
displays of collegiality and cooperation "…band[ing] together as black females...historically 
limited by capitalism" (Ulysse 2007: 214). How then do ICI's manage to escape producing the 
racial narratives of their craft-vending counterparts? Like Sindhi retailers, the autonomy inherent 
in ICI commercial practice grants the necessary flexibility to structure the trade as seen fit, 
permitting changes to inventory, or even venue, thereby obviating circumstances that might 
encourage discourses of bad-mind. The desire for autonomy has been noted to be the thrust 
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behind everyday economic choices in the Caribbean since the practice of personal garden 
cultivation among African slaves (Browne 2004:122). The means to achieving this autonomy has 
often come through a practice of flexibility (Carnegie 1987; Harrison 1998; Mintz 1989; 
Trouillot 1992), or "occupational multiplicity," which Lambros Comitas (1973:157) identified as 
being "systematically engaged in a number of gainful activities, which…form an integrated 
economic complex." 
Mantz writing on hucksters in Dominica notes how flexibility has always been a necessary 
component to the trade (2007:29). He further asserts that flexibility as a form of economic 
practice is historically "associated with autonomy from, and resistance to, political, economic, 
and physical control …" (Mantz 2007:28). Flexibility in the market provides the necessary 
lateral space to more productively and satisfyingly participate. The given structure of markets, 
such as bazaars, which engenders individualism and competition already makes accumulation 
impossible (Hann & Hart 2011:113). When this is added to the constrictive commercial 
environment of the craft market is a condition of sufferation that engenders discourses of bad-
mind as a form of market regulation. While not the emphasis of her study, a close examination of 
Brown-Glaude's (2011) work among higglers trading in Kingston's Coronation Market, reveals 
the working of assertive competition, similar to Bay Fort vendors.  As competition increases, 
claims and sentiments of bad-mind  appear and gain interpretive purchase over the state of the 
market. This leads to a further disinclination to invest, whether financially or emotionally, in the 
collective success of the market. Moored to these seemingly immutable circumstances, their 
resorting to intense competitiveness creates conditions for discord. This ultimately reproduces 
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notions of disunity that further embeds the working of bad-mind and the assertion of the market 
as a site of sufferation.  
Bad-mind as Blackness 
Interestingly, the conception of bad-mind did not necessarily manifest itself in overt displays of 
resentment. Most vendors remained reticent over their dissatisfaction, as exampled by the 
vendor's brief look of displeasure at being copied in Dinesh's shop. Also, actual charges of bad-
mind were seldom directly, or publicly raised against an offender, and were instead discussed 
furtively, almost as a form of gossip. In fact, I only confirmed that competitive strategies were 
viewed as bad-mind, through my interviews with vendors that quickly become opportunities for 
them to "su-su," or gossip. Bad-mind, I learned was an accepted fact that defined the normative, 
black practice of business. "A so black people stay [that's how black people are]," casually 
proclaimed one vendor, when I asked about the practice of bad-mind.  
The pervasiveness of the sentiment is evident in the lyrical archive of reggae music, and 
particularly in the canon of "roots" reggae beginning in the 1970s, where song verses decried 
black discord and choruses were often repeated supplications for unity.  The emphasis on 14
disunity expressed in these songs was likely an acute response to the political tumult of the era, 
which stemming from bitterly divisive party politics witnessed the increasingly violent 
politicization of area gangs (Sives 2010). Partisan politics in Jamaica has historically been one of 
the most pronounced examples of disunity at work. Thankfully politically induced violence has 
seen a dramatic decrease over the past forty years, although overall violence remains epidemic. 
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However, the inherent combativeness of politics, to my mind, discounts it as an example of the 
particularly everyday form of black disunity underlying the issue of bad-mind with which this 
discussion is concerned. Nonetheless, whether in commerce or politics, there is at question a 
functioning narrative in which black Jamaicans were bequeathed a contentious constitution.  
  
According to craft vendors, slavery was the unquestioned provenance of black disunity though 
no specific explanation was ever provided as to how exactly it was formed in, or from the 
practice. Although I would not imagine that black disunity would qualify as " important African 
antecedents" that Sidney Mintz many years ago felt characterized the market system in Jamaica, 
but, locating vendor contention within mythic accounts of plantation slavery, or even Africa, 
whether real or imagined, is worth considering (1955:96). This is especially so if one accepts 
M'Charek's  proposition, as I do, that race and narratives of race are "simultaneously factual and 
fictional," and the fiction, therefore, should be taken "more seriously as an inherent part of fact 
making" (2013:437). In examining then what is posited as a slavery-based social inheritance we 
must trace the  perpetuation of the narrative. 
  
Slavery ended one hundred and twenty-four years before Jamaica gained independence in 1962. 
Given the subsequent one and a quarter centuries under colonial rule, there are perhaps vestigial 
social and cultural effects of the extinct practice, which are not entirely imperceptible. The 
remnants need not be real, but only a configuring of slavery as a construct of social memory kept 
alive by referential practices. Writing on the importance of memory in contemporary culture 
Antze and Lambek (1996: vii-viii) suggest that individuals, "articulate, legitimate, and even 
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constitute their selfhood…" through "memories [which] are never simply records of the past, but 
are interpretive reconstructions that bear the imprint of local narrative conventions, cultural 
assumptions, discursive formations and practices, and social contexts of recall and 
commemoration."  
Through memorials and commemorations the memory of slavery, although "no longer 
characterized by a continuous flow or transmission of experiences," becomes 
"crystallized" (Araujo 2012:1). The national observance of Emancipation Day on August 1, 
commemorating the abolition of slavery in Jamaica, is a critical communication through which 
the memory of slavery is crystallized and made publicly available (Thomas 2011:112; see Antze 
and Lambek 1996:xxii). Coming just days before the celebration of Jamaica's independence on 
August 6, Emancipation Day is a reminder of the process through which Jamaicans gained their 
eventual independence and citizenship. As demonstrated by Jamaica's Rastafarians, who, through 
reggae music, provide a custodial memorialization of slavery "Jamaican popular culture has 
always chosen to remember the past, memorialising the nation's history of enslavement in many 
a song and dance" (Paul 2009:70). 
Commemorating and memorializing slavery maintains its salience in the contemporary 
imagination of societies with strong histories of slavery. However, in commemorative practices, 
slavery remains a memory, which is simply kept alive, and thus only partly explains how vendors 
can locate their behavior in the practice from which they are generations removed. 
Understanding how "blackness" and slavery conspire to justify claims of bad-mind requires some 
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consideration. Carnegie (2002: 29), citing Robotham, locates the unquestioned "conceptual 
salience of race" and cohesive "blackness," within the "shared subjective experience of 
oppression…" This blackness formed a "pan-African black ethnicity among Jamaican slaves," 
and therefore the "black" category for racial identity was founded in slavery (ibid; see Olwig 
1993). Contemporary issues of blackness, through a retrospective projection from the present 
conjuncture, can thus be situated there. In simpler terms, if blackness is problematic now, it must 
always have been.  
It is indeed a peculiar teleology. However, markets "never lie 'outside' a cultural and social 
context" and so perhaps bad-mind is just one other way that markets are culturally situated 
(Gudeman 2001:94-95; 2008).  But in its telling here, the attendant histories of slavery and 
colonial race formation provide a background for that position, and imparts an ethnographic 
insight into how markets are constructed in the postcolonial context. To help clarify this position, 
it is useful to reference Jacqui Alexander's (2006) argument for the "palimpsestic character of 
time." In this configuration, the "new" is "structured through the 'old,'" through an "imperfect 
erasure, [and] hence visibility, of a 'past'...rescrambl[ing] the 'here and now' and 'then and there' 
to a 'here and there' and 'then and now'" (2006: 190). And so the iterative experience of blackness 
is a palimpsestic inscribing and re-inscription over former subjectivities of slave and subject 
"imperfectly erased and remaining therefore still partly visible" (Alexander 2006:190).  
In her articulation of "palimpsestic time," Jacqui Alexander evokes the much earlier work of Jack 
Alexander (1977) and his use of "mythical time" as an expression and experience of race in 
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middle-class Kingston. Jack Alexander argued that the past was "not just a completed event…," 
but "events that have taken place in the past and that are yet still in the present, not simply as past 
causes of present conditions, but actually present" (1977:432). He posited that this sense of time 
is expressed by race as it "establishes the historical rootedness of the societies and its members' 
place in it…," by locating this "historical rootedness directly in the experience of persons' 
bodies…" (Alexander 1977:432). Additionally, Michel-Rolph Trouillot noted, "…the past does 
not exist independently from the present….[t]he past—or more accurately, pastness—is a 
position" (1995:15). 
"Pastness," "palimpsestic time," and "mythical time" then all enable the logical oscillation of 
disunity as being both "back" in slavery and in the present. However, what facilitates this 
recollection without necessitating a directly diachronic and traceable inheritance? Laura Bear 
suggests that institutions, such as the craft market, "mediate divergent representations, 
techniques, and rhythms of human and non-human time," (2014: 6). By its relationship to 
institutions, time "thickens" with "ethical problems, impossible dilemmas, and difficult 
orchestrations" such as competition (ibid.). Following this reasoning, locating disunity's origin 
and perpetuation in institutions—be they slave plantations then or craft markets now—not only 
articulates a presentation of black people as inherently antipathetic, but perhaps also enables the 
reproduction of the very institutions that generate inequality. This notion is succinctly expressed 
in the statement, "A so black people stay." Indeed, the term references something of a persisting 
state of being that is replicated in the contemporary conditions, and institutions of sufferation. 
Admittedly, the ethnographic and historical unpacking of "black disunity" requires a breadth and 
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depth of discussion that is simply beyond the limits of a single case. However, the extent to 
which it is examined in vendors' normalization of bad-mind, and in their perceptions of unity in 
the market space helps to elucidate the salience of the notion as a racial phenomenon. 
The narratives of bad-mind, sufferation, and slavery that emerge from vendors' experience of the 
market, I would argue, are in large part informed by what Charles Carnegie has noted as a racial 
myth of "ethnic connectedness" (2002:29). Race is thus used as an idiom to "make  sense of 
social relations and history" (ibid.) This notion of black ethnicity has become a redoubt that 
idealizes a utopic and prelapsarian fiction of race that is predicated upon unification. However, a 
unity based upon  a mythic "blackness" is potentially quite tenuous. Made up of a pervious 
cohesion, the moments in which the myth of blackness, are unable to hold together, such as in 
competition, create opportune spaces for reflexive critiques to give shape to discourses like bad-
mind. Unable to witness the commonness of disunity among other commercial groups, especially 
their Sindhi competitors, vendors' concept of race within the multi-ethnic space of the tourism 
market induces them to perceive these groups as exemplars of unity.  
Slocum and Thomas argue that "race remains a salient and often defining feature of 
contemporary everyday life in the Caribbean and of the region’s political and economic 
formations (2007:4; emphasis added). The apparent failing of black commerce thus becomes the 
failing of the black project of race, leading to a view in which vendors' understand their practice 
of the market as deficient, if not aberrant. Deficiency, or aberrance, then, as figured by blackness, 
both "represents 'the market'"  and those "subject to the market," and is the means by which it is 
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located, localized and embodied by Jamaican craft vendors (Ho 2009:6). Without viable 
opportunities to meaningfully improve their circumstances vendors continue to mobilize history 
and race as means by which they explain their persisting lack of progress. Failure, therefore, is 
not only an individual poor outcome or experience of the market, it is ethically framed and 
understood as a collective racial failure that is essential and persistent.  
The Frame(work) of Sufferation 
The importation of foreign made products has left many craft vendors with few recourses to 
improve their position. Presented with no choice but to purchase from Sindhis, there is little that 
vendors can deploy in their defense. However they do assert periodically that the government is 
at fault because they allowed the Sindhis to take over local industry. It was the government after 
all that issued Sindhi Indian shops' licenses and work permits and that allowed their foreign-
manufactured items to pass through customs. In this sense, the female market vendors' ethical 
accounts of sufferation move outside the market space into the broader realm of the state. This is 
an example of the increasing scale of the market frame that Callon (1998) and Miller (2002) 
discuss.  
Here the experiences of the market are scaled up to the level of the nation-state. Importantly at 
the center of the claims of bad mind, racial failures and the corruption of the government is a 
fundamental assumption that if the market were not corrupted by these externalities then it would 
operate to produce equality or fairness.  So while vendors critique the actually existing market 
place they operate in, they retain a sense that markets, in general, could allow them to prosper. 
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This notion goes back to the discussion of the myth of race and of unity in race. For the vendors, 
blackness disrupts what should otherwise be a cooperative market environment as exampled by 
the market practice of other racial groups like the Sindhis. The vendors are misled by the 
"fallacy," rather than the myth, of race. The market for them could be equal if the right measures 
were taken, perhaps if they weren't Jamaican, or if the government was not corrupt.  
A sentiment of "betrayal" is noted by Bay Fort vendors, and Kingston-based higglers alike. In 
Brown-Glaude's (2011:154) ethnography, she cites higglers' charge that "Jamaica [government] 
encourage foreign business and not encourage vendors." Exceptions for ethnic minority traders 
have been noted as Brown-Glaude tells of the "…tendency of Caribbean nations to bestow on 
immigrant groups better opportunities for economic advancement than long-term 
residents" (2011: 41-43). In her recounting of the economic histories and social mobility of 
Chinese and Lebanese migrant groups from their inception into Caribbean society throughout the 
nineteenth century,  Brown-Glaude (2011:43)asserts that the advancement of these groups was 
not simply the result of an economic aptitude. These ethnic minorities' "historically privileged 
positions" rather followed from a confluence of economic and racial factors (Carnegie 2002: 37). 
The latter being these groups' easy integration into the already advantaged position held by the 
country's "brown" middle class above the black population and below the elite white, which 
served to "reinforce the racial polarity" between the two (Brown-Glaude 2011: 43).  This has 15
put into motion a sequence of interpretations leading vendors to situate themselves as abandoned 
by the state as a result of much broader applied effect of black disunity. Again, black people did 
not like to "build up" each other.   
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The inequality experienced by vendors creates an amplified sense of victimization that resonates 
through economic practice. Although participation in the market becomes perfunctorily 
performed as a result, there nonetheless remains an acute sense of indignation over their 
displacement. When asked about the Sindhi-run souvenir shops in the city, one vendor 
passionately exclaimed that "Dem [they're] not supposed to sell Jamaican things!" revealing an 
anxiety concerning Sindhi retailers' potential to undermine the souvenir trade for locals.  She 16
explained that they were meant to be limited to the sale of luxury items, such as high-end 
watches, jewelry, and perfumes, not t-shirts and other standard souvenirs. These items referenced 
the well-established commercial domain of the earlier generation of Sindhi merchants who have 
owned many of St. James's luxury in-bond and duty-free shops for decades.  For vendors, 17
"Jamaican things" are imbued with culture and should, therefore, be attended to by the cultured.  
The Sindhi sale of Jamaican things thus amounted not only to a wholesale usurpation of the local 
craft and souvenir industry, but of Jamaican culture itself. Although, these souvenir items are not 
actual products of Jamaica, they seize upon the abstract "auratic, affective, social worth..." of 
Jamaican culture materialized through words, colors, and symbols (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009: 27). Their monopolization by foreigners thus becomes construed as an infringement of 
rights. It is this sense of infringement that prompts vendors claim of market immorality. 
Through the lens of sufferation experiences, popular narratives, and history coalesce to form a 
particular definition of the state that reinforces a cosmology of racial discord and suspicion in 
 85
which any act of the state is found bereft of genuine intention and, more importantly, effective 
result. As "sufferers," vendors are fully aware of their limited importance to the state. They, like 
many Jamaicans, fail to realize the economic justice and social equity envisioned at Jamaica's 
independence (Thomas 2004:201). Popular political narratives following independence promoted 
a "common ideal vision of general social equality of a nation in which the black majority would 
have greater access to state power and education, as well as greater control over economic 
resources" (Thomas 2004:206). The promise of that vision is what vendors would hope to see 
reflected in the government's support for them in the market, where they could compete equally 
and fairly. Sufferation then is the failed delivery of that promise. Contemporary economic 
circumstances have done much to erode the "sovereignties gained through decolonization and 
independence" (Slocum and Thomas 2007:3). And so it is unlikely that the independence vision 
could ever be brought to fruition by a government burdened by debt, and made sclerotic by the 
rigidity of structural adjustment and other neoliberal mechanisms of sufferation.  
The Jamaican government is in fact an "apparent state," that passes off bureaucratic interactions 
and public cultural presentations as markers of sovereignty to maintain the impression of an 
"effective state" (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001; Sharma 2006:62). The presentation of 
independence and sovereignty,  Hansen and Stepputat (2001:14) assert, are "mythological 
dimensions" that give a state's authority "both historical aura and weight." It is that presentation, 
or rather myth, however, that provides vendors with an inaccurate sense that the state could 
provide them with assistance, but chooses not to. Unmet expectations lead vendors to place 
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blame on the Jamaican government for the commercial infiltration of Sindhis. However, by the 
neoliberal logic of the state, the economy requires such infiltration. 
Perhaps as "citizens who are deemed…lacking in neoliberal potential…" (Ong 2006:16), free 
business training was offered to vendors at Bay Fort and other local craft markets. The two-week 
training was funded by a provision from the government's Tourism and Product Development 
Company, Ltd., or TPDCo., an agency of the Jamaica Tourist Board (JTB), which has the 
mandate of developing and improving Jamaica's tourism product. The classes covered sales, 
profits, and taxes, and also taught how to put together a business plan and determine prices. The 
training program was the "Business Entrepreneurial Empowerment Programme" (BEEP), 
facilitated by the Institute for Law and Economics. According to the institute's website BEEP's 
main objective was "To provide basic entrepreneurial training and related support services for 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), to assist them in formalizing their 
business activities and in achieving minimum business standards as well as preparing them for 
business risk rating to enhance their access to financing."  The training served as an example of 18
what Carla Freeman has noted in Barbados as an effort to cultivate a "more open mined, 
innovative, creative, [and] entrepreneurial…" culture (2012:87). 
Only six vendors in total from the local markets attended the training, according to Minny, a Bay 
Fort vendor in attendance. "The majority of vendors just ignored it," she attested.  Vendors who 
declined attendance explained that the required two weeks was too long a period to miss any 
potential profits. More importantly, however, none of them had any faith in the efficacy of the 
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training. They explained, that much like the TPDCo. training required to obtain their JTB 
vending licenses, which purportedly only focused on "how to be polite to the tourists,"  they 
expected the BEEP training to be equally futile.   When suggesting that the BEEP training might 19
have taught them how to create a business plan, vendors retorted by quizzically asking what they 
would do with a business plan?  Would it bring more tourists to the market, or make the Sindhis 
lower their prices? Their skepticism signaled the invariability of their circumstances. Even with 
training, there was no supporting infrastructure that would make use of the acquired knowledge 
and skills. This is the paradox of neoliberal self-making: it produces a tension between 
entrepreneurial aspiration and the impossibility for advancement, and it is that tension which also 
contributes to a sense of sufferation. 
The limited vendor participation in the BEEP training communicated a fundamental lack of 
confidence in the government and the market, which they were complicit in creating. The BEEP 
training might have represented the government's effort to provide an entrepreneurial  skill set, 
and even opportunities for vendors, however, measured against feelings of neglect, vendors 
hardly felt like "stakeholders in the corporate nation" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:128). With 
vendors and Sindhi businesses operating within different economic circuits, the BEEP training, 
with its objective of providing basic entrepreneurial training, was woefully misplaced and 
overlooked the conditions faced by local vendors in the market. For any such training to be 
effective the state would first have to regulate the souvenir industry by initiating protective 
mechanisms for the vendors, provide stricter regulations on the kinds and volumes of goods 
imported by Sindhis, and support particular industries. Without these initiatives, the state could 
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never be viewed by vendors as  anything but neglectful of their needs, and complicit in the 
success of Sindhis. The cycle of relations in which the narratives of race and nation, understood 
through discourses of disunity and abandonment, would therefore continue to be perpetuated and 
reconciled in sufferation. 
From their position in the market, vendors construct and embody a discontented citizenship 
depicted through varying narratives of pessimism and lethargic displays of surrender to the 
circumstances of sufferation. Their resignation is epitomized in the Jamaican aphorism "Jackass 
says the world no level." Observing the determined and unfair hardship of a beast of burden, the 
phrase concisely captures the framing used by many vendors to locate themselves within 
Jamaica's political economy. In the phrase, and in its application to the market of sufferation and 
the working notion of bad-mind, is a spirit of forfeiture. However, that spirit is complemented by 
an equal spirit of Protestant optimism, or "eudemonic hope" (Austin-Broos 1997:19; Thompson 
1999).  This anticipatory notion, noted by Christian, and Christian-inspired, locutions such as 20
"later will be greater," "watch and pray," or "better must come" eschatologically emphasize 
waiting out the dreary tedium of one's experience of sufferation. Interestingly, this particular 
style of Christian optimism is not necessarily an active pursuit to change those circumstances 
(Austin-Broos 1997:17). Sufferation, therefore, is a condition of prolonged suspension, in which 
one endures, "persist[ing] in potentiality" (Povinelli 2011:128). It is a kind of patience awaiting 
an eventual economic and social (if not a preceding religious) rapture. Though not quite working 
toward "the eschatological moment of market efficiency" (Miyazaki 2003:261; emphasis added), 
there is nonetheless an expectation, however deferred, of an end to sufferation, where justice and 
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fairness can finally be had both in life and in the market. This is evidenced in Kerry's account of 
the potential for collective action among the vendors, and in Iona's frustration with the 
nonpayment of rent. The ethic of bad-mind is not to simply account for the "wickedness" in 
others, but to assert in every claim the expectation of their goodness, their cooperativeness. The 
vendors have shown that the market can be shaped through expectations of cooperation, but also 
through techniques of disunity. In the following chapter, we will see an attempt at ending 
sufferation through bringing the ethic and vision of cooperation to fruition in the work of the 
Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative. 
 
 90
2                Putting Able Hands To Work 
 Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperation 
 
Don't stand in the gutter  
And say you're gonna suffer 
'Cause god helps the man who helps himself 
So put your shoulder to the wheel 
Who god bless, no man curse 
By the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread 
Keep on working till you reach the top 
-Johnny Clarke, "Enter Into His Gates"; 1975 
Economic collectivism and cooperation were aspired to as a greater good among female vendors 
in craft markets. Therefore, they ascribed their problems in the market and in their market 
practice to a lack of cooperation, construed as an endemic black disunity. Conversely, they 
credited Sindhi commercial success to an inherent Indian unity. Although vendors demonstrated 
their capability to cooperate through activities like church membership and involvement in the 
partner savings scheme, their general assertion was that in the market, meaningful, long-term 
cooperation was nearly impossible. This lack of cooperation is directly related to the state of 
sufferation. Sufferation as I have presented it is an existential state of being socially and 
psychically stuck within immutable economic precariousness. It is a lived anxiety in which 
vendors face economic uncertainty in a state of perpetual quandary, ontologically positioned as 
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incapable of progress. As I ended the previous chapter, there is a sense of optimism that oddly 
accompanies the pessimism of sufferation. It is one in which the hope for betterment and a 
greater ordering, redeeming principle persists alongside the acceptance that it may never be 
realized.  
This chapter explores how this hope can be mobilized within certain institutions. It focuses on a 
small group of thirty-five vendors and artisans who have managed to come together as the 
Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative, or JAMIA. Through membership and the principles of 
organization, skill development, and production, JAMIA seeks to help the excluded reclaim a 
place of importance in the Jamaican economy. They aspire to this ambition through a cooperative 
ethic that draws on the historical experiences of the independence and democratic socialist 
periods. 
Despite the limited size of the group, they represent a larger ethos of cooperation through 
cooperatives, which is an intrinsic part of the history of Jamaican civil society, as will be 
discussed in the following section. Cooperatives, as amply demonstrated (Faulk 2008; Millar 
2010; Subramanian 2009), are an effective means of enabling the participation of a marginalized 
citizenry in the economy. In this context JAMIA serves as a robust example of how a new co-
operative faces the challenge of that participation while establishing themselves in the post-crash 
economy of Jamaica. This chapter explores the themes of production, organization and skill that 
are central to JAMIA's ethos. It examines how a mode of cooperation can be established and 
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whether it can generate institutions that can mitigate experiences of sufferation and structural 
forms of inequality.  
JAMIA as a "People's Project": Cooperatives in Jamaica 
I became aware of the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative at the 2011 Montego Bay 
Chamber of Commerce's "Business Expo." Among all the major and upcoming brands and 
companies at the event, such as the massive Flow Jamaica communications company and the 
newest spirits brand on the island, Rum Fire, sat a booth wonderfully decorated and embellished 
with attractive metal, leather, and wooden craft goods. Across the top of the booth was a banner 
with the organization's name and its motto "Putting Able Hands To Work" proudly stated. Their 
hope was to win "best booth," but the group, who were all similarly dressed in bright yellow 
short sleeve button down shirts with the organization logo over the left breast pocket, were quite 
satisfied with their "honourable mention." After introductions to the head of the organization and 
a few members I was invited to their next meeting at JAMIA headquarters the following 
Wednesday. 
Arriving early to the meeting, located in an abandoned two-storey hotel overlooking the 
Montego Bay Airport, I had the opportunity to chat with JAMIA founder, president, and 
chairman, Baldwin Dulston. A clearly motivated and charismatic man in his forties, Baldwin 
explained that the organization emerged in early 2010 after he became inspired to start a skills-
training cooperative. An accomplished leather-smith, Baldwin spent time in Canada on an arts 
training fellowship directed toward commonwealth artists. One of the objectives of the 
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fellowship was to motivate participants to go back to their countries and "start something." He 
thus came back to Jamaica and in late 2009 set the foundations for JAMIA. He did this with his 
wife June and associate Roy, with whom he did some community organizing in his neighborhood 
of Flankers, an area just outside of Montego Bay, which has had its own recent success with 
community initiatives.  Baldwin's idea was to provide skill training in craft production for 21
vendors and other locals wanting to learn how to produce crafts. The organization believes that 
Sindhi access to mass-produced goods enables their control over the local souvenir market. 
Therefore, increased capability to locally produce crafts, would thus improve Jamaicans' place in 
the market by disintermediating Sindhi wholesalers. Increased local production most importantly 
served, to Baldwin’s mind, as a means of national development.  
The members of JAMIA believe that they have one critical advantage compared to the Sindhis, 
which is as an unquestioned claim to authenticity. It was for this reason that JAMIA included the 
term indigenous in the group's name. The use of the term indigenous was quite curious to me. It 
usage was explained by Roy as being,  
A strong, political word saying these crafts are Jamaican made by Jamaicans, it is 
ours, and our intention is to let it remain ours. So our name starts out with 
'Jamaica,' getting stronger with 'indigenous,' speaking to the framework of 
production and that there is a need to establish the reality of our place and that we 
need to stick to our guns if we are serious about it.  
JAMIA apparently deliberated for more than five months on including the term in their name. 
"Some members thought that indigenous should be left for later," Baldwin recounts, "I said no, 
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we can't start on the footing that we are not really serious about it. Let's start with what we 
believe in, then work toward achieving it, eventually everybody then found that this is the way to 
go."  
Early encounters with tourist organizations like the Tourist Product Development Company, and 
the Jamaican Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), where founding JAMIA members attended 
meetings looking for assistance and guidance, were influential in creating the initial framework 
and mindset for organization. Baldwin recalls, "We [himself, June, and Roy] attended JAMPRO 
meetings and we used to think that nothing came out of those meetings, but here we are." In 
those meetings, the seeds for their craft center were being planted. Baldwin recalls, "While we 
were there in dialogue the framework was being built and the foundation was created and caused 
what you would consider a mushroom of progress. It no [fully] happen yet, but it is happening." 
I would learn at that first meeting visit that JAMIA membership is mostly comprised of current 
craft vendors from the two main markets in Montego Bay, a good portion of whom hail from Bay 
Fort. Baldwin sold his leather goods at Bay Fort craft market, where his sister ran a stall. It was 
from this base that he began recruitment for JAMIA, which he admits "was slow going at first." 
From his community organizing Baldwin was familiar with the various agencies that supported 
community based projects and quickly began the process of registering JAMIA with the 
Department for Cooperative and Friendly Societies (DCFS). JAMIA's organizational model is 
largely structured by the DCFS guidelines, and by its "Statutory Obligations" in particular.  22
These guidelines mandated that JAMIA hold bi-weekly member meetings and the payment of 
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membership dues. The group agreed upon a dues amount of JAM$ 500, or roughly US$ 7 each 
meeting, which go toward paying the rent for, and renovations of, the facility that they lease. 
These meetings maintained a strict observance of the DCFS mandated protocols, requiring an 
official call to order, every considered suggestion to be call to motion, and a seconding for its 
implementation. And most importantly a fastidious taking of minutes, as they served as evidence 
of the keeping of meetings for DCFS review.  It seldom occurred that anyone spoke without 
being "given the floor," and if they did, they were reminded of the appropriate procedure.  Such 23
parliamentarian practice was indicative of how "serious" JAMIA members were by their 
adherence the DCFS protocols. 
Evident in this "seriousness" was an "ethic" of organization as influenced by the Department of 
Cooperative and Friendly Societies. The statement from the DCFS website of the organization's 
"role" is illustrative of that point: 
Co-operative Societies and Friendly Societies in the island have all come into 
being with the object of bringing about an improvement in the economic and/or 
social life of the people who comprise their membership. The role of the 
Department in this effort is to assist societies to achieve this end by the 
application of proper co-operative techniques. [emphasis added] 
By "proper cooperative techniques" the DCFS seeks to improve the economic and social lives of 
its members. The term "techniques," and its compelling preceding modifier, "proper," I am sure 
were considered by the DCFS to be no more than anodyne terminology. Though I risk being 
perhaps unnecessarily pedantic, I would emphasize that the implications of these terms are 
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significant as they engender particular modes of behavior, which are formed in the members 
meeting. In the meeting these techniques have been effective at creating for JAMIA members an 
alternative subjectivity of emphasized organization, whereby they are able to overcome the non-
productive influence of bad-mind in the market. By participating in the meeting they become 
organized and productive "self-managed actors" who are learning to function "according to 
corporate norms of self-initiative, self-responsibility, and self-engineering" (Ong 2006:222).   
Through cooperative membership, JAMIA members are provided with a framework to overcome 
the complex issues of disunity facing Bay Fort craft vendors discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. Baldwin noted that their experience of disunity is the product of a failing economic 
model which he hoped to remedy with JAMIA. He hypothesized that if all the 200 members of 
Bay Fort craft market had collectively saved over the past several years they could have owned 
the property, enjoyed greater autonomy, and thus brighter financial prospects. It is a "mind for 
organization" that the vendors lacked, and it is that which separates them from JAMIA's craft 
vendor members. Mervie is a vendor at Bay Fort craft market, and one of the few who attended 
the BEEP training session discussed in the last chapter. She credits her membership in JAMIA 
for giving her "the vision" to see the training as an opportunity, unlike so many of her fellow 
vendors who shunned the program: 
"Jamaicans like free things fi di [for the] belly, people don't see the money in the 
business....they see it in a hustling way just do something and come a [to] market 
and make a money, maybe a food money.  But when your work done where you 
going get pension from? You have to work for today and tomorrow, because when 
the strength leave you... because one part of your life you work for money and the 
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next you [have to] make money work for you. I tell my kids if I should pass early 
they should burn me [cremate] because you spend thousands....let me tell you 
what Jamaicans value...how could you spend JAM$ 500 thousand on a coffin....fi 
[to] please who? When the insurance company calls [I told my kids] take the 
money and enjoy your life....mi [I] can't enjoy no casket....help mi now when 
mummy ask you for a cup a tea." 
In her explication, Mervie attested to what she saw in her market colleagues as an unwillingness 
to think and plan beyond the day. This was evidenced by their failure to attend the BEEP 
training, which would have taught them some very basic, but necessary, business principles and 
practices that could perhaps work to secure for them a more prosperous future. According to 
Mervie, they saw their work as a "hustle," which is understood locally as an approach to work 
with a sense of casualness. But for herself, there was a strategy for creating long-term security 
for her family.  This long-term plan, as noted, even included forgoing the very traditional and 
standard funerary practice of casket burial.  This kind of thinking is central to the ethos of 24
JAMIA membership: "We have been pushing to have members understand that only you can free 
yourself from the bondage and the complexities that affect us," Baldwin explained. 
The "JAMIA subjectivity" of organization if you will, could easily be identified as being crafted 
by a neoliberal practice of corporate efficiency. In fact, one could argue that this neoliberal 
subjectivity is directly created and maintained by adhering to the protocols of the DCFS. The 
organization's mission statement reads that the DCFS seeks to facilitate "the establishment and 
regulation of Co-operatives and Friendly Societies as viable business alternatives and effective 
social organizations…"[emphasis mine]. Vargas-Cetina (2011) notes how cooperatives have 
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moved toward capitalist business models as they try to compete with larger corporations 
operating within the same or similar markets. Thus, she contends, cooperatives become a type of 
corporation as they aim to compete in international markets with very little or no help from the 
national government (2011:133; 2005:239). What this does, she asserts, is move cooperatives 
away from the "notion of utopian community," as the "cooperative imaginary" becomes stronger 
than the notion of community itself (Vargas-Cetina 2005:245). 
Though Vargas-Cetina's position is convincing and likely true in many contexts, rather than a 
neoliberal ethic, I would instead consider JAMIA and the entire notion of cooperatives in 
Jamaica to be shaped by the aspirations and necessities of Jamaica's independence. Mantz has 
shown how the Caribbean predilection for flexibility in the market, as evidenced by hucksters, is 
"historically constituted through a much longer engagement with capitalism" that precedes the 
post-Fordist era of neoliberalism (2007:35). Slocum and Thomas have also noted that petty trade 
in the Caribbean has often embodied "cultural values such as independence and self-reliance in 
the face of extraordinary socio-economic adversity" (2007:6). There is similarly an ethic of 
organization in the Caribbean that would appear neoliberal, but instead precedes the emergence 
of its influence in the region—arguably with the start of relations with the IMF— and can be 
found as noted above in the pre-independence and independence ethic. A quick history of 
cooperative agencies in Jamaica may help prove that point.  
  
The DCFS (formerly the Co-operative Department) was established in 1950 and influenced by 
its founder's, E.A. Surridge's  experience with cooperatives in India.  The department's main 25
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purpose was for the regulation of the increasing cooperative societies that emerged beginning in 
the 1940s with the Jamaica Welfare Society founded by Norman Manley in 1937  (Rao and 
Ibáñez 2005). This was just before Manley's founding of one of Jamaica's two major political 
parties, the People's National Party (PNP). Interestingly the funding for Jamaica Welfare came 
from the United Fruit Company (UFC) who agreed to contribute one US cent per stem of banana 
exported from Jamaica to fund an organization for "the good and welfare of the people of 
Jamaica, with emphasis on the rural people," to be led by Norman Manley (Rao and  Ibáñez 
2005). This arose from a bout of negotiations with UFC headed by Manley on behalf of the 
Jamaica Banana Producers Association. At its inception Jamaica Welfare invested primarily in 
the building of community centers but quickly expanded its agenda toward the "cooperation and 
self-help activities among the rural poor" (Rao and  Ibáñez 2005:794). This shift in focus from 
community centers to community associations saw the emergence of community residents 
participating collectively for the improvement of neighborhood life through self-help activities, 
education and the establishment cooperative-structured cottage industries. The ideology of 
Jamaica Welfare was guided by the philosophy of its early director, Thom Girvan, which was 
"work together in groups to do those things which we as individuals cannot do" (Rao and  Ibáñez 
2005:795). By 1949 Jamaica Social Welfare became The Jamaica Social Welfare Commission, a 
statutory body. In 1965 it then became the Social Development Commission (SDC), continuing 
the work of Jamaica Welfare in aiding community based organizations develop cooperative and 
self-sustaining programs.  
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The 1970s saw an increased interest in cooperative societies by Prime Minister Michael Manley's 
Democratic Socialist government. His administration promoted and supported numerous 
cooperative programs which came under the remit of his "People's Projects."  These projects 
aimed to improve the lives of Jamaica's black majority through reforms that saw the increase of 
the minimum wage, public housing schemes, literacy campaigns and controversial land 
distribution programs (Manley 1990). The ideology of democratic socialism that guided these 
social initiatives was a philosophy of self-sufficiency and "ownership" by the people. Manley felt 
this was necessary for workers to have a personal stake in their country, or as he stated, to 
"enable the majority of people to secure for themselves and equitable share in the social product 
of their nation" (Manley 1990:226). 
Many of the initiatives could not live up to the ambitions of their models. The era eventually 
witnessed the failure of many programs alongside the eight-year premiership of Manley's first 
administration, as noted in the introduction. The general momentum of cooperative societies and 
their governance survived, nonetheless. In 1996, the Jamaican Social Investment Fund (JSIF) 
was instituted by Prime Minister P.J. Patterson's PNP government and is also largely modeled on 
Jamaica Welfare (Rao and  Ibáñez 2005). JSIF is a limited liability company incorporated to 
provide funding for small-scale community-based projects. It is largely funded by the 
governments of Jamaica, Japan, and the Netherlands; the European Union; the World Bank; the 
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID); the Inter-American Development Bank; the 
Caribbean Development Bank, and the Canadian International Development Agency.  The SDC 
partners with JSIF by identifying communities, which have projects eligible for JSIF funding. It 
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was through complying with the DCFS protocols that JAMIA hoped to become eligible for JSIF 
funding. 
    
In the above paragraphs I provided a brief history of cooperatives in Jamaica beginning in the 
early 1940s. However, it is critical to note that the cooperative ethic has much earlier roots in 
Jamaica’s history of values. In fact, the platform on which the early nationalists based their 
efforts are often considered middle class "Creole" values derived from earlier Baptist missionary 
sensibilities of "respectability." Nonetheless, from the early iteration of "self-help" in the late 
1940s, which gave way to the idea of "giving power to the people" of the Manley era, the 
ideology of self-management was present. These ideas emerged from the campaign for 
independence and continued by necessity once it was acquired. The reasons for this are simple: 
the efforts and energies of a newly formed citizenry are necessary for the development of new, or 
recently independent nations. The ideology of "self reliance, local mobilization and community-
based problem solving" (Thomas 2004:18) characteristic of the period, I would argue, are 
evidenced in JAMIA's framework of organization, training, and production. Moreover, joined 
with the organization's social agenda, articulated in the group's motto, "Putting able hands to 
work," JAMIA in my opinion can be considered a reinterpretation of Manley's "People's 
Projects."  
Although Jamaica is now over fifty years into its independence, the project of nation building 
continues. Due in large part by the terms of IMF lending agreements to reduce national debt, 
Caribbean governments have had to reduce spending on public services and other government 
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expenditures. This mandated deregulation has also seen the removal of measures, which 
provided market assistance to citizens, such as price controls and subsidies (Miller 1997: 44-45). 
In such atrophying conditions as these, the independence ethic is as necessary for national 
advancement today as it was fifty years ago.  
Organization at Work: The JAMIA Craft Center 
JAMIA members are keen to present themselves as "craft producers who are serious about the 
thing," and the group's seriousness is evinced in their performance as an organization. As 
discussed in the previous section, the member meeting is the primary site where the group fully 
embodies this notion. These meetings were held in the ground floor section of the defunct and 
deteriorating two-storey Calabash Hotel. Accepting limited interest from the state and its 
agencies to invest and improve upon the current state of the tourist goods market, the group aims 
to develop a JAMIA tourist and craft center on the site. The center would reflect their ideals and 
vision for what the craft industry can become. JAMIA envisages the center, which will house 
craft and art galleries and an artisan workshop, becoming an access point for creative 
networking, teaching, and production. They also hope that it will become a sought after 
commercial alternative to the dissonance of the craft market and, as they claim, the inauthentic 
experience of Sindhi shops. 
The hotel's neglected structure was gradually being renovated with funding from collected 
member dues. The renovation was planned to occur in phases, with the first project being the 
main art gallery, whose development was given priority since the area functioned as the 
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organization's principal meeting space. Also to be developed would be an enclosed area for 
higher quality and more expensive items, as well as an extra display area. The foremost areas of 
importance to be developed, however, were the artisan workshop, which would also serve as the 
training site, and the administrative office. For the ambition of a training program to materialize, 
it was important to fully realize their sense of being an organization. It was for this reason that 
the administrative office was so critical. As Baldwin was known for saying, "A business without 
an administrative office is not strong enough to carry its own weight." These were only the 
beginning of JAMIA's plans for the hotel. Their hope was to eventually take over the first floor, 
which was primarily occupied by squatters, many of who were suspected of being lottery 
scammers.  
JAMIA's renovation of the hotel recalls the work of a workers co-operative, BAUEN, in 
Argentina discussed by Faulk (2008, 2012). The cooperative restored an abandoned hotel to fully 
functioning status and ran it as a co-operative business. The project was largely in response to the 
post-crisis unrest in Argentina over workers rights.  Through their efforts, the workers were able 
to demonstrate their value and that of the hotel's infrastructure, thus reclaiming their right to 
work through work. Through the "conversion" of the hotel, Faulk argues that BAUEN sought 
their own conversion, "from a discarded surplus of labour into workers…" (2012:159). Likewise 
with the renovation of the Calabash hotel, JAMIA members sought to formally situate 
themselves into the Jamaican economy, as people who were organized, and as potential 
producers. The ethos behind JAMIA, and expressed through their motto "putting able hands to 
work," was a "logic of cooperativism" which asserted their right "to play an active role in the 
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public sphere, as actors capable of influencing the political and economic direction of the nation 
as a whole" (Faulk  2008: 589). 
The capital required for renovating the multiple areas of the hotel much exceeded the means of 
dues payments, which despite best efforts were sometimes difficult to collect. JAMIA been 
approved for application by the Social Development Commission (SDC), again, the agency that 
identifies groups eligible for funding by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF). The group 
was applying for funding from JSIF for the hotel renovation, but their application also sought 
funds to furnish their workshop with advanced tools. This was a key provision for the many 
artisans and craft trainees who would otherwise only have access to rudimentary equipment like 
machetes and handsaws. JAMIA's proposal to JSIF also sought support to create their training 
program. This program initially sought to train sixty people in three or four areas to meet their 
objective of increasing awareness of local craft and encouraging product diversity. "What we are 
seeking to do," Baldwin explained, "is to train as many people as possible in various arts, 
bringing instructors from abroad to train people, for example, in blown glass, metal symmetry, 
stone sculpture, and jewelry from metal, silver, gold, and brass." The idea is that the 
development of varied skills, products, and services begets a concomitant development of 
opportunity and autonomy.  As one member, Cherise, a vendor in Montego Bay's second largest 
craft market explained, "once we get trained, we as vendors can then say, I don't have to buy the 
Indian [Sindhi made] dress and hang it up in my store—I can produce my own thing."  
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JAMIA's craft center is largely inspired by the one time success and popularity of Things 
Jamaican, Limited. Originally Crafthings Jamaican, Things Jamaican is  a company formed by 
the Social Development Commission in the late 1960s to "promote the craft sector through 
research, design and marketing of high quality Jamaican hand-made products for both the local 
and tourist markets" (Social Development Commission 1967:6). At its height Things Jamaican 
operated a 50,000 square foot training center in Kingston that trained local artisans in areas of 
wood, pewter, straw, leather, ceramics, and weaving. The facility closed in 1996 and Things 
Jamaican now operates a few retail outlets featuring locally made crafts and other goods. Despite 
there being a model such as Things Jamaican, JAMIA struggled to gain support and recognition 
from DCFS to start their center.  "We fought for so long to have something like JAMIA, but 
when we went to register [with the Department of Cooperative and Friendly Societies] they were 
hesitant because they've never seen anything like this and said it wouldn't work because how can 
craft be a cooperative society? 'We know co-op banks and fisherman co-ops...but craft?' they 
said."  
The early struggles JAMIA confronted with the DCFS were a part of the same institutional 
"failure to empower" craft that their center and their organization were meant to help eradicate. 
JAMIA would continue to come up upon these failures in their continued challenge to acquiring 
funding, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Some JAMIA members framed the 
problem of support similarly to craft vendors, imputing "the system's bad mentality," for not 
enabling craft to progress, theirs was an argument of sufferation. The member's critique could be 
considered a fair assessment, as even the IMF has attributed Jamaica's "inhibited growth" to "an 
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absence of the enablers."  Toward the general problem of funding craft, Boxman, an artisan 26
named so for the intricate inlaid wooden jewelry boxes he makes, suggested that if the 
government did not want to support JAMIA specifically,  or the craft industry in general, that 
they should then work with banks in lending to those in the industry, asserting that "the money 
[is] in the system already." Boxman elaborated upon his vision, "NCB [National Commerce 
Bank] should put an amount of money aside and say we are going to put it at risk, but they're not 
really risking, what they are doing is having a talk with individuals who know what they are 
doing." 
Implicit in Boxman's solution were all the traits of JAMIA's independence subjectivity. For good 
measure, however, Roy, founding JAMIA member and the group's liaison officer, fastidiously 
interjected, "I'd like to remind my colleague that no organization is going to take money and 
bring [it to] us in a suitcase!" He continued, "Any donor agency will first ask you what are you 
doing for yourself, in order to attract anything you have to be organized then the funds out there 
will overtake us." To which Baldwin added, "There are going to be government agencies hunting 
us to give us money." With the group nodding in agreement, one member asserted, "We know 
what we need and where to go!" she continued with a throaty timbre of enthusiasm "if they give 
us what we need we will just take off like a rocket!" Boxman became animated when considering 
the potential of JAMIA, "I keep telling everyone," Boxman begins, "that anytime we are 
promoted in any area they are gonna say 'the Jamaicans are coming!'" Vendor-member, Jane, 
responded with the common Jamaican phrase of optimism "We likkle but we talawah!" or, 
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"although we're small, we're strong!" One member, Michael, a painter, who seldom ever spoke at 
meetings took the opportunity—and the floor— to express his gratitude for JAMIA :  
I'm glad for this organization, really, really glad. I as an individual, I am happy 
with my work. But you have people who come [to Jamaica] and feel like their not 
supposed to spend too much money [on souvenirs], like they have some kind of 
yard sale mentality. But you see me I want to come out of that situation. I want to 
set up a ting [center], so that when a man come he knows that is somewhere 
special. He will know him have to spend his money if he wants good work. So 
with this organization together we are even stronger. 
This rousing of enthusiasm and spirits was exactly how JAMIA, especially its leadership, 
approached the reality of sufferation, which from time to time crept into meeting discussions. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, for vendors sufferation was ever-present in the market. But 
with JAMIA, and in the meetings, the hope of a craft center pierced the shroud of sufferation. 
Every effort of JAMIA was, therefore, put toward developing and maintaining the requisite level 
of professionalism and organization that would attract donor agencies to fund their center, and 
ultimately, as Michael articulated, tourist customers to patronize it. In addition to being 
organized, however, members of JAMIA, in particular the vendors, would have to become 
skilled in a craft in order for the full vision of the organization and the function of the craft center 
to materialize. Acquiring a skill, or at least the promise of skill acquisition, would have an 
equally powerful effect on members' self perception, and their response to sufferation.  
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"Skilled" as a new subjectivity 
The local craft markets have a program that provides vendors with opportunities to vend their 
wares in a few all-inclusive resort properties throughout Montego Bay and neighboring Negril, 
and Ocho Rios.  Access to these hotels is for many the best chance to interact with tourists in a 
marketplace of reduced competition. But the selection process, managed, or rather brokered, by 
each market's president, is so fraught with favoritism that only a few ever get the opportunity. 
JAMIA offers a similar program to its members. It also guarantees that all will have a chance to 
participate, which is what initially attracted many of its members to the organization. This was 
especially true for vendors unable to afford a stall in the craft markets. JAMIA access to the hotel 
nights was made possible by Sandra, a relative of Baldwin's who is also a JAMIA member, when 
she became in charge of managing the on site "vendor days" at one of the local all-inclusive 
hotels. These vendor days occur every Friday night at various hotels and roughly five to seven 
spaces are available to JAMIA vendors each night. While in the craft markets vendors are 
assigned by favoritism, in JAMIA places are allotted to vendors on a rotating basis, so each 
vendor is able to attend at least one event a month. These nights can often yield several weeks 
worth of equivalent earnings at the markets, but they can also be entirely fruitless. The value is in 
the opportunity—to have one more venue in which money could be earned. 
Access to these hotels is a key feature that helps to grow and retain JAMIA membership while 
the organization works toward establishing its skill-training program. Though each member in 
our discussions lauded the collectivist agenda of the cooperative, they all admitted that they 
came to the organization for its provided access to the hotel nights. Facing increasing difficulty 
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in generating revenue from their market stalls, vendor access to the hotels was an obvious 
opportunity. However beneficial, the hotel nights are not a part of the larger envisioning of 
JAMIA's agenda. For Baldwin, in the all-inclusive hotels "there are more dogs than bones 
fighting for left overs" and while the site is highly coveted amongst local craft vendors, he 
considers hotel opportunities to be nothing more than "the crumbs off of the table." Moreover, 
the regular competitive "puss and dog fight" among vendors who "only want to eat a piece of 
food [are opportunistic] and to extract everything the tourists have" is not remedied by access to 
the resorts, as the location is plagued by the same issues caused by product repetition discussed 
in the previous chapter. Baldwin recognized that to overcome the systemically misguided and 
ineffective structuring of the market system, the market as it is cannot simply be replicated in an 
environment with more customers.  "After all," he moralized, "you cannot expect to do the same 
thing and get a different outcome." "Maturity and discipline in the business is required," is what 
he prescribed. "What you need is a reorganization of the craft markets and a retraining of the 
people in those markets." The prescription that he lays out for the craft markets is the same that 
he tries to implement with members at JAMIA. Baldwin elaborates, "When you become a 
member, you start to look at ways to transform your life.  JAMIA is about how to get down to the 
bottom of what it takes to transform, but first and first most, transform the mind." "Because," 
Baldwin continued, "there is no other solution than to work on getting ourselves off of our butts 
and do something for ourselves." 
Though the hotel night's were an initial draw for vendors to JAMIA, since joining, many of them 
have become convinced that actually learning a skill is the best, if not only, way for financial 
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independence, and have fully taken on board Baldwin's prescription for transformation. One 
somewhat recent and loyal member, Janice, notes this: 
You know [one day] me'd a sit down and think to me self, maybe me shoulda mek 
two earring, and you know when me mek them, them sell quick, quick? So then 
me hear of JAMIA from Mervie, and that me could learn other crafts, and so one 
of the Wednesday that them keep [hold] meeting, I went and listen, and from then 
me join and don't miss [a meeting]. When me start learn fi mek mi tings dem, dem 
a go sell off!  
The promise of JAMIA intimates a "relationship between knowledge practices, skill acquisition, 
and the constitution of economic selfhood" that Rebecca Prentice similarly noted among garment 
workers in Trinidad, and how learning skills "relate[s] to their capacities to forge livelihoods in 
an unstable and demanding industry" (2012b:401). And like those workers, the craft vendors who 
join JAMIA do so by learning a skill that enables them to navigate the "changing demands of a 
neoliberal economic environment in which workers must be opportunistic, flexible, and self-
reliant" (Prentice 2012b:410-11).  
This was evidenced in the exemplary story of one member, Shaunice, who was independently 
trained by an artisan member of JAMIA to work with coconut. Shaunice's success was provided 
during a meeting as a motivational account by Roy who exclaimed, "…She became quite skilled 
in producing crafts from the material and it gave her a new source of income and in just one year 
she is doing extraordinarily well and is featured in all the all-inclusive programs."  With an 
anecdote of his own supporting why having a craft skill is so essential, Boxman told of how at 
one of JAMIA's nights at a major Montego Bay all-inclusive, Secrets, his stall selling inlaid 
 111
wood vases and jewelry boxes, fared much better than neighboring vendors selling the 
conventional array of items found at the craft market. He recounted: 
They [vendors] think that you have to have a lot of variation to survive, but when 
you specialize then you find that you get a chance to excel and in so doing I did 
very well. I use types of wood that other artisans don't value or they don't know 
of...the only persons who know more about wood than me would have to work in 
forestry and be over 40 years old. They must learn a skill so instead of being just 
an ordinary vendor you are an artisan. Especially when people [tourists] see you 
at work [on your craft] they are fascinated and ask questions and see a better 
reason to buy what you have. Because you see down at the craft market once you 
go to the first five shops you don't need to go anywhere else. 
The belief within JAMIA is that acquiring a craft skill is a reflexive process for which one needs 
to transform the mind, and by which one's mind is transformed. That process, as Boxman 
promised, makes an "artisan" out of an "ordinary vendor." In possession of a skill a sense of 
autonomous possibility does much to cut through the anxiety caused by economic 
precariousness. The skill opens up opportunity and creates the ability to flexibly produce a type 
of merchandise if others could not be afforded. The few vendors in Bay Fort who could craft 
straw goods evinced this fact. These ubiquitous items, as it seemed most stalls carried them, were 
largely supplementary to the other, mostly Sindhi goods sold. However, at least they had 
something that they could sell on their own terms.  Stories like Shaunice's and Boxman's and the 
security that skilled JAMIA members expressed having, even when faced with what were often 
penurious circumstances, engendered optimism in members yet to learn a particular skill.  
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It is clear that the leadership of JAMIA, having long been trained and become expert at their 
trades, production is doubly understood as a personal vocation, with an emphasis on the artisanal 
affect of craftsmanship, and also a means of creating a mass manufacturing system. I would 
argue that production for members of JAMIA, however, is instead a rather interesting take on the 
DIY movement than that based on conventional factory or artisanal models. The reason for this is 
vendor-members interest is the idea of self-sufficiency. Being able to move away from goods 
provided by others sits at the heart of the DIY movement (Spencer 2005). Though DIY has been 
touted as a "a return to the sort of artisanal labor Karl Marx himself romanticized as the 
antithesis of capitalist alienation" for JAMIA members DIY enables their access to capitalist 
opportunity (Luvaas 2013:130). 
Returning to Trinidad, Prentice has noted how Trinidadian garments workers who learn to sew 
"simultaneously learn to adopt an economic disposition of self-reliance, adaptability, and 
resourcefulness…" (2012b:402). She tells us that "skill is not a technical set of capacities but an 
embodied project of self-making through the acquisition and performance of expertise" (2012b:
409). Similarly, Michael Herzfeld has suggested, that in the "self-crafting that accompanies 
artisanal production," "a strong analogy subsists between the production of objects and the 
crafting of a selfhood…" (2004:25,38). In fact, many anthropologists working on skill have 
forwarded that the acquisition of skill is at once the cultivation of other tangential values 
(Argenti 2002; Dilley 1999; Ingold 2001; Prentice 2012b; Simpson 2006; Venkatesan 2009; 
2010). This idea is especially central to the work of Venkatesan who asks, "What else is learned 
alongside the learning of a skill?" (2010:158). She contends that people learn craft skills in a 
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socially embedded setting (2010:173), and therefore "the acquisition of a skill is embedded in 
larger social knowledge about the value of the skill based on ideas about the body, gender, 
identity, politics, and economics" (2010:158). 
However, for most JAMIA members they had yet to be trained in any particular craft skill, 
though most can manage small DIY projects, like Janice's earrings. In fact their membership had 
been centered on only two activities: attending meetings and vending in locations arranged by 
the organization. Yet, I wondered if without the skill they were able to fully undergo the 
transformation that Baldwin set out as being so necessary? What I observed from JAMIA was 
that as important as learning a skill was the notion that learning a skill was important and that a 
large part of that belief was created not in the process of learning a skill, but in the practice of 
JAMIA membership. Through organizing and the principle of skill development, the citizen-
subjectivities of JAMIA members are transformed. Through membership and organizational 
ideologies JAMIA reposition and reclaim a sense of identity through a framework reminiscent of 
the post independence, democratic socialist period, in which owning a stake in the nation meant 
merely taking part.  
Putting Able Hands to Work 
Providing skill training to members is only part of the bigger objective at JAMIA. The plan is 
that with increased training JAMIA can become a site of mass production. The organization cites 
the government's "failure to empower" artisans and their industry as having real consequences 
for the local trade of craft souvenirs.  The impact of foreign made crafts has been one where local 
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artisans are incapable of meaningfully participating in the craft trade due to an inability to 
produce in competitive volume. In Bay Fort there were a few stalls that sold sculpted crafts. 
Speaking with those vendors, the price of those sculptures was often prohibitive. They took time 
and energy to make, which went into the pricing rationale. A good quality Rastafarian mask 
would run about US$ 50. Though frequently admired by tourists, I witnessed very few such 
masks being purchased. "What you're paying for a wood sculpture compared to five years ago is 
twice the amount!" stated Baldwin. "Some people don't even do sculpting as a business anymore, 
they do it as a hobby. I know people who don't even bother to carve, and when they do you have 
to come to his place and pay a high price for it…," he continued. 
In JAMIA's estimation, and to their disappointment, the Tourism Product and Development 
company, TPDCo, whose primary mandate is tourist product diversity, demonstrates little regard 
for locally made tourist products, focusing rather on how vendors meet expectations of customer 
service and product presentation than the goods being sold. "The largest aspect of the tourist 
product is left behind which is the arts and crafts," asserted Roy, "...simply because they can go 
out there and buy some product, bring it in and serve the tourist."  What some JAMIA members 
overlook is that TPDCo considers the markets themselves, as it does other attraction sites, as the 
products and not necessarily the saleable goods within. It is for this exact reason why TPDCo 
does not oversee the operation of goods provided by Sindhi shops, as they are independent 
businesses not under the aegis of the government.  Therefore, little concern is afforded to tourist 
goods in craft markets beyond that there is an adequate volume of merchandise on offer and that 
vendors are courteous.  
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By "failing to empower" the crafts sector, JAMIA members argue that the government has 
overlooked a significant domain of job creation. As one vendor member, Juicy, zealously 
asserted, "We have more jobs in Jamaica than the amount of population and they [the 
government] don't know!" Concurring, Boxman gave an example to the fiscal potential of craft 
for the nation:  
A few years ago Sinbad [the comedian] came down [for his 'Annual Summer Jam' 
70's soul music festival]...and he came with so much energy. I didn't have any 
work to sell, but I had given some work to a lady who hadn't paid me. There was 
so much energy with the black [American] people dem [who came for the 
festival], they bought everything. They crave Jamaica...so much that the week 
after I heard that the [Jamaican] dollar regained its value because of that visit, and 
locals selling their works.  The week after the lady called me and said come for 
your money and when I went all 50 pieces sold! That is to show you the energy. 
So to help Jamaica, the government should [encourage] the craft.  
While it is quite reasonable to consider that the music event helped bolster the local economy of 
Montego Bay, and was certainly a boon to local artisans and vendors, it is unlikely that it, or the 
selling of craft, was responsible for increasing the value of Jamaican currency. What the 
anecdote shows, however, is that Jamaican craft, if placed in the appropriate context and given 
the necessary opportunity, can yield remarkable results for local producers and vendors. 
Interestingly, the telling of the anecdote reveals that among JAMIA's members is a sense that the 
craft industry can work in aiding the nation. This is a significant and timely notion for the group 
to have with Jamaica recorded as being the most indebted nation in the Caribbean with its debt at 
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over 140% of GDP and with the country having recently undergone its second debt restructuring 
in three years.  
JAMIA asserts that Jamaica's economic progress will come by way of increased production. This 
sentiment is shared by Dr. Gene Leon, IMF Resident Representative to Jamaica. In his 2011 
presentation to the Jamaica Exporters' Association, titled "Imagine a New Brand Jamaica! 
Strategies to achieve economic growth," Dr. Leon addressed some of the obstacles that 
contributed to Jamaica's low growth rate, which he claimed averaged just 1% over the past two 
decades (2011:4). One of the identified obstacles was Jamaica's "deficient human capital," a term 
used to describe the low skill quotient of the population, which along with other factors 
contributed to low productivity (Leon 2011:4). Regarding production and "deficient human 
capital" he challenged his audience to,  
Imagine Brand Jamaica ranking among the top 25 countries for pay and 
productivity, rather than the bottom 25 where we are presently. Imagine for a 
moment if 80% of Jamaica's workforce were in areas of high productivity, using 
high-end technology, solid secondary or tertiary education, or certified technical 
skills? (2011: 5).  
It is unlikely that the craft industry would represent an "area of high productivity,"  for Dr. Leon, 
or the government  for that matter, and that the noted deficiency could be satisfied by craft skill. 
There is nonetheless a striking correspondence between the perspectives of the IMF 
representative and JAMIA, namely, that training and productivity are necessary for the 
development of the country.  
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Production, at its "very basic definition" is "the act or instance of the manufacture of things…
from a set of raw materials…" (Dilley 2004:799). The trope of production is one, which has had 
decreasing scope in the Jamaican public sphere with the gradual decline in sugar production over 
the past few decades. Additionally, former Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, oversaw the sale of 
the last state owned sugar industry assets in 2011 to China-based company, COMPLANT, which 
also has a significant foothold in Jamaica's construction industry.  The country's two leading 27
industries, tourism and bauxite, contribute very little in the way of production. The tourism 
industry requires virtually no production, and the bauxite industry has seen consistent declines in 
production over the past several years (Barclay and Girvan 2013; Berge 2009).   28
There is relatively little being "produced" in Jamaica, but are the limited industries in Jamaica 
the causes or "consequences" of the increasing "invisibility of production" (Dilley 2004: 808)? In 
trying to work out the perceived shift in economic interest from production to consumption, 
Dilley (2004:809) asserts that "production has not become invisible because production itself has 
become unimportant…," but rather has been a result of "the separation of production from 
consumption…"(ibid.). However, in tourism, the one industry in Jamaica in which the market of 
consumers comes directly to the product, there is little opportunity for local Jamaicans to 
produce. The workshop discussed in the previous section, which sits at the heart of JAMIA's 
production agenda, was described by Baldwin as a site "where people can see you producing, 
and where you can sit and wait for sandals, bangles with your name etched in, and blown glass 
made to your liking." It would potentially serve as a site that creates that link between production 
and consumption. This kind of workshop-cum-demonstration space is common across the 
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touristed developing world, but is rare in Jamaica, given the declining activity of artisans. 
Therefore, JAMIA's tourist center is considered to have the potential to transform the local 
souvenir market in Montego Bay, bringing much need dynamism, personalization, and character 
to the industry, but with the production factor it becomes a key site for the local creation of 
industrial opportunity.  
"Until we equip our artists and producers, using the same mechanism [of manufacturing/
production]…," began Baldwin, "we will not be able to rub shoulders [compete] with the 
Indians." The entry of Sindhis into the industry of "Jamaican things" recalls the nineteenth 
century introduction of indentured East Indian labor into the colonial sugar industry. 
Contemporary relations between Sindhis and black Jamaicans are not marked by what Verene 
Shepherd noted as a "mutual contempt held by Creoles and Indians for each other," during the 
period of indenture (1996:82). However, the Sindhi presence is often seen as a tacit 
acknowledgement of a deficiency in manufacturing capability and business acumen among the 
Jamaican population involved in the souvenir industry.  29
By training vendors and others "as JAMIA grows," JAMIA estimates that they will, in time, be 
able to produce enough to compete with Sindhis, and thus, "rub shoulders" with them.  Until 
then, Baldwin reckons that the local souvenir and craft market would continue to "belong to the 
Indians." He nevertheless saw JAMIA as the best chance for locals to reclaim prominence. The 
thought made him think back to when Hip Strip gift shops were run by locals, "But there was no 
leader," he mused aloud, "as a result there was no one to see the need to say we need to own 
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something for ourselves." It was the lack of leadership then, he charged, which permitted Sindhi 
entrepreneurs' take over of the strip. The onus was now on Jamaicans to take part in the shaping 
of their country's tourist market, but he disapproved of any victimized posturing, such as that 
which many craft vendors employed when criticizing the state of the market.  "When you go out 
there and say the Indians are not supposed to sell this or they're not to do that, you are not 
speaking my language, my language is to say I want this as a part of what I believe I deserve."  
As an example he asked me if I knew of Ms. Bev's shop on the Hip Strip. I did. Ms. Bev, owns 
"Ms. Bev's Boutique," one of three local black owned shops on the Hip Strip. Ms. Bev's neighbor 
and competitor is a Sindhi-owned shop called "Jamaican Culture," whose name is an 
unambiguous remarking of the salability of Jamaican culture. Most Sindhi shops have names, 
which try to impart a sense of locality, such as the anodyne "Sunshine Gift Shop," or "Reggae 
City," but none as overt as "Jamaican Culture." The name and the shop owner incensed Ms. Bev, 
as she would claim that he would pay drivers to avoid her shop and other underhanded tactics. 
"So you see what Bev do?" Baldwin asked. It was hard not to. As a kind of promotional salvo 
aimed at "Jamaican Culture," Bev plastered on her shop windows at least 15 signs saying, "100% 
Jamaican," and "Jamaican Owned." "But even Bev," Baldwin began, "have to buy from the 
Indian." To Baldwin  the signs were no more than hollow promotion. "Such tactics have little 
impact unless you are producing," he stated as having made his point. The message was clear, 
anything other than actual production, would be ineffective at promoting genuine change and 
progress. The advancement toward such change however, would have to start in the minds and 
hearts of local Jamaicans, and that was the actual challenge of JAMIA. 
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A Dream Deferred, or Sufferation as Usual? 
Promoting the ideal of organization is a far simpler undertaking than its execution. Despite the 
diligence at meetings put toward assembly protocol and in voting upon motions, few decisions 
ever came to fruition. One of the first decisions made at the start of my attendance of the 
meetings was the installation of a JAMIA sign outside of the hotel. However, over the fifteen 
months I spent in the field, the sign never went up. Of JAMIA's thirty-five members only 
twenty-four were regularly active, and among those there were rarely more than twelve in 
attendance at any meeting and they usually comprised mostly the group's artisans and an 
alternating selection of committed vendors. The reason was simple: the concern among the 
members with their everyday sales in the craft markets often superseded their attention to the 
organization; after all, except for Shaunice who was independently trained, JAMIA had yet to 
officially train any of its non artisan members. Assembling for meetings every fortnight was also 
a challenge, because these were scheduled for 11am on Monday's, one of the busier ship days of 
the week. Making it another day of the week to work on any particular task, such as painting the 
meeting area, was nearly impossible to orchestrate.   
Irregular commitment underscored the fundamental challenge JAMIA faced in providing lasting 
opportunities for its members. Baldwin noted that many members within the organization tended 
to exhibit a "wait and see mentality," in which they predicated their level of commitment based 
on estimated opportunities, which could only wane since JAMIA was still in the process of 
seeking funding to develop its programs. Outside of the rare festival exhibit, there was often little 
demonstrated enthusiasm. Ironically, the one thing that held up membership was the same access 
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to the all-inclusive hotels, the same, which Baldwin decried as "crumbs on the table." However, 
when JAMIA lost vending privileges at one of their main resorts, the organization suffered a 
massive curtailing of member involvement, though no one left the organization.  
Though Baldwin maintained an enduring spirit of optimism, some vendors were vocal about 
their frustration with the group's progress, "We've been hummering and doing all that we can do 
for well over a year, we registered with JSIF and it's pure going and coming around and people a 
dead fi hungry [are dying of hunger] and you nah get nowhere," a disgruntled member publicly 
charged, during one meeting. Earlier in the chapter I stated that sometimes sufferation crept in, 
other times it barged in. Defensively, Baldwin riposted "If you think you're not serious or you've 
lost seriousness, the door is open, you know what to do. If you want to pull out, you can have 
what you put in, JAMIA will move on." Then vulnerably he confessed, "Sometimes I stay up 
thinking about how we can move forward, but I believe in time because time takes care of 
things." His statement hinted at the Pentecostal optimism witnessed among the vendors.  He 
continued, "There are times when I feel like I can't take it anymore, but I know as the captain of 
the ship I will be the last man standing. So I say to you members let us bind ourselves together, 
let us push forward and not lose focus on the ball." Snapping back into his administrative 
formalism, he admonished the secretaries, "I need you to get serious about the minutes, and I 
want you to dialogue more with each other, its is very important that we have the records of our 
meeting for the DCFS we want to the records to show that we're serious." 
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Though somewhat concerning, the vacillation of member commitment was a secondary concern 
as the institutionalization of JAMIA and the work required to secure its longevity were 
paramount. "If the foundation of JAMIA is not built on a solid rock," Baldwin ominously 
ruminated in a private discussion, "it will become irrelevant pretty soon." It was for this reason 
that he recently abandoned efforts to increase membership. He was cautious of attracting new 
members without the means to retain them, a striking reversal on his ambitious initial goal of 
targeting over two hundred members within a three-year period. "For the moment the priority is 
to maintain focus on the bedrock of JAMIA and to make a significant mark on society, the 
tourism industry,  and the arts and crafts sector," he explained. "Let it be said," Baldwin 
propounded,  "that whatever amount of time ago that we trained some people in this area and 
formalized the business of arts and crafts so that people take a different approach to their 
business and the way they produce and their awareness of the environment, because right now 
people just do anything…"  
JAMIA's challenges are not indicative of organizational shortcomings in the group, but rather 
demonstrate the emphasized importance of the process of organization. The group's at times 
unsteady advance toward their ideal vision of JAMIA should not be grounds for finding the ideal 
untenable or unattainable— although few votes ever amounted to action, and meeting attendance 
and member participation fluctuated where it did not altogether flounder. It is through 
maintaining a devotion to procedure, even imperfectly so, and an expectation of progress, by 
which new subjectivities as "skilled" and "soon-to-be-skilled" are crafted into an empowered 
citizenship. Most importantly, it is only through this formal infrastructure that JAMIA reason 
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they will be able to materialize their ambitions and aspirations, thereby making the 
transformation, real, if not entirely realized. 
On a phone call to Baldwin towards the end of my fieldwork I was devastated to learn that their 
lease for the hotel space had been rescinded. The owner of the hotel had found a buyer and 
evicted all of the tenants. Also, the JSIF contract that they were so hoping on still hadn't gone 
through, as JAMIA could not raise its share of the capital contribution that all JSIF funding 
programs require. To make matters worse, they lost the vendor day contract with one of the 
larger hotels. All of these poor outcomes made it evident that their vision of local production 
through the cooperative was a virtually impossible horizon. Lacking a central and steady locale, 
meetings had become irregular, though they frequently met at the KFC that was located 
downtown near Bay Fort craft market. Baldwin was of course undeterred. Though a craft day 
that coincided with the Jamaica Jazz and Blues Festival that was being planned towards the end 
of my fieldwork was no longer a possibility, there was an art show coming up soon and he was 
going to get some members to vend some crafts there.  
After the call, I thought about Baldwin's optimism and knew that despite his best intentions and 
efforts, with one less hotel for vendors to visit, and with no place to "meet"— the only activity in 
which "the cooperation" of the cooperative was enacted—membership wouldn't be sustained for 
long. JAMIA's circumstances reveal an intrinsic tenuousness to cooperation, and cooperatives, 
economic or otherwise. Cooperatives, and cooperation it seems, require a basis in already 
existing resources, whether they are capital, or merely commitment, both of which are often 
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related as evidenced with JAMIA. The previous chapter demonstrated the frustration that 
vendors articulated with the lack of cooperation, and the meaning they ascribed to that lack. 
However, in this chapter, cooperation in the form of a cooperative seemed to accomplish little 
more than circumvent the discourse of sufferation. Is the lesson, therefore, that economic action 
and advancement does not function by cooperation in this context? If so, does that then provide 
another dimension to sufferation: that cooperation is rare, but even when present, it is entirely 
ineffective? These past two chapters have thus examined how people perceive of and act in an 
economy where the cooperative ethic is dramatically undermined by an unsupportive 
environment. In the following chapter, we look at the case of the Sindhi merchants against whom 
JAMIA and the vendors at Bay Fort have largely positioned themselves. We will interrogate their 
business model and commercial practice and see if in fact there is hope in the local Jamaican 
tourist economy, and if JAMIA and the vendors simply lacked know how and will. 
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3            Enter Through the Gift Shop 
  The Sindhi Merchant Community 
 
Sad to say  
But, white people ah bawl  
Indian people ah bawl  
Black people ah bawl  
Chinese people ah bawl  
System, design fi set we up 
-Popcaan, "The System"; 2012 
As shown in the accounts of Bay Fort vendors and JAMIA in the last two chapters, Sindhis are 
seen to trespass against a Jamaican right to commercially benefit from Jamaican cultural 
commodities. For Sindhis, the market of souvenirs has no ties to nationalism or a sovereign 
commercial right. The market is free from the specific ethical moorings that define it for craft 
vendors and the members of JAMIA. Instead, the market is strictly composed of goods that are 
simply appropriate for the commercial context of Jamaican tourism. The only ethic in the market 
is that of success—a sentiment Sindhis share with the futures traders discussed by Zaloom 
(2006) and the Wall Street brokers of Karen Ho's (2009) ethnography. The Sindhi business model 
reflects this ethic in the extended hours that they operate their shops, which are open for nearly 
twelve hours a day, seven days a week. Giving oneself over to the market and making the 
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necessary sacrifices to become great businessmen is the way Sindhis understand becoming 
successful. "Living" the market in this way has opened up the Sindhi business community to 
criticisms of immorality by some Jamaicans and by the vendors in this thesis. For Jamaicans the 
bases of value in the market extends beyond profit, whether as a means of cooperation as a site 
of realizing certain Christian ethics. 
As Falzon (2004) has shown in his multi-sited ethnography of Sindhi business in Malta, London, 
and Mumbai Sindhi merchants in Montego Bay likewise work to embody success by becoming 
the consummate "businessman." As such, again like investment bankers (Ho 2009:52) and 
futures traders (Zaloom 2006:132) Sindhi merchants "live" the market in their constant pursuit of 
profit. Living the market for them  means tenaciously adapting to the trends of tourism, customer 
preference, and industry cycles—all indices that mark the market's rhythm. This also, and most 
evidently, requires working longer and selling cheaper. They also seek to seize the market 
through combining business, kinship, and community through the structure of sindwork contracts 
and living arrangements. Through that pursuit what has occurred, some locals argue, has been the 
displacement of Jamaicans in both the production and sale of souvenir goods. 
In this chapter, I will explore the Sindhi market ethic and their procedures for employing that 
ethic in trying to control the market of Jamaican souvenirs. I seek to understand what Sindhi 
commercial practice looks like from within the shop and in the broad context of the Jamaican 
economy. I then examine what problems Sindhis face in the Jamaican tourist sector. These efforts 
are examined against the backdrop the sufferation market in Jamaica as being identified by the 
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groups in the two previous chapters—although Sindhis do not use the term themselves. However, 
by examining their business practice we can better assess the tenability of the term as an analytic 
frame for the market in Jamaica. By doing so, we can  determine if, in fact, the problems faced 
by Bay Fort vendors and JAMIA stem from their ethics and expectations of the market, or from a 
general hardship experienced by all in the local economy. 
Sindhi Merchants in Jamaica 
Following the British annexation of Sind in 1843, Hyderabadi Sindhi merchants, who up to then 
vended their wares throughout the region, explored foreign markets for Sindhi crafts and jewelry. 
This expansion resulted in the inception of the migrant "sindwork," trade around 1860 
(Markovits 2000).  The inflection point of the trade came when traders began making use of 30
expanding British trade routes in an effort to exploit the burgeoning market of travel tourism in 
Egypt and the Mediterranean (Falzon 2004; Thakur 1959). The British tourist market would 
come to greatly determine the logistics of Sindhi firms' business locations as efforts were focused 
toward travel destinations. International consumer tastes were met with a diversification beyond 
the local products of Sind into curios and oriental fare drawn from throughout India and the Far 
East. Following tourist pathways and alternative routes of trade led in large part to Sindhi 
merchants arguably forming one of India's most mobile diaspora groups, relocating to locations 
from Hong Kong to Panama.  
Some scholars consider Sindhi choices of location to be serendipitous as they consistently 
appeared ahead of, or in step with, the market trend in tourist travel (Markovtis 2000: 287;  see 
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also Thakur 1959),. This notion is evidenced by the arrival of two Sindhi families, the Daswanis 
and Chatanis, in Jamaica from Hyderbad, the former arriving in the late 1920s and the latter 
during the early 1930s. Their arrival coincided with Jamaica's tourist industry experiencing its 
first revival since the First World War (Taylor 1993). Other families also came to the country, but 
left for other islands like Trinidad and Barbados, perhaps comprising the groups Sindhi historian, 
Claude Markovits, notes as having expanded the Sindhi merchant network throughout the 
Caribbean region (2000:141).  
After becoming established in Jamaica, both families would commence recruiting workers from 
their networks back home. The first to come were siblings and cousins to help run the early 
shops in Kingston, but as business expanded broader networks would be tapped. This 
recruitment was the lifeblood of the Sindhi trade. There seemed to be no shortage of young 
Sindhi men, deemed "sindworkis," attracted to the opportunity to learn a business trade in which 
they would eventually become established. The agreement of a three to six-year contract 
provided passage and accommodation alongside their salaries. In return these young men were 
expected to be "at the service of their managers round the clock" often working long hours daily 
(Falzon 2004: 141). The rupture of Partition saw the en masse migration of Hindu Sindhis out of 
Sind, which became a part of post-Partition Pakistan, and into Indian cities. Nonetheless, Sindhi 
recruitment and deployment continued as it had previously in Hyderabad as revealed by later 
recruitment of Sindhis to Jamaica. Recruits were located using broad networks of kinship, most 
often from within the Bhaiband jati—a term used to denote a jati, or community, of Sindhi 
traders, traditionally associated with the Hyderabad area of Sind (Falzon 2004).  
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The early businesses, like "Daswani's Hindu Bazaar," sold madras cloth and shorts, Indian 
souvenirs, perfume, and jewelry. Interestingly, both families would move to western Jamaica in 
the mid-1950s opening up branches in Montego Bay as the city became the island's premier 
tourist destination. In this new location they continued the sale of oriental curios, but in time 
these early families would come to focus on luxury items, such as watches and jewelry, leading 
to their ultimate engagement with the duty-free tourist  goods business. The Sindhi community in 
Montego Bay developed in typical fashion with the recruitment of Sindhi workers. This cycle 
reproduced the duty free business model as recruits often opened their own stores at the end of 
their contracts. Eventually, entrance into the duty-free luxury goods business was made difficult 
by increased start up costs and the general saturation of the market. Mr. Daswani and Mr. 
Chatani, the sons of the two pioneering Sindhi-Jamaican families, explained to me that starting in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Sindhi entrepreneurs began entering into the local souvenir trade, 
some into wholesale goods, but most opening retail shops.  
Many of the earliest Sindhi gift shops were located adjacent to the duty-free luxury stores in 
which they used to work, at a shopping center near downtown Montego Bay, known as City 
Centre. Over time, however, these businesses began to relocate onto Gloucester Avenue, or what 
is popularly dubbed as the "Hip Strip." Again, this stretch of road, measuring at just over half a 
mile long, is home to Montego Bay's greatest attractions, which include Jimmy Buffet's 
Margaritaville, opened in 1995, and the famous Doctor's Cave Beach Club, whose waters have 
been renowned for their salubrious qualities since the 1920s. Before the arrival of Sindhi shops 
on the strip, a handful of Jamaican-owned tourist boutiques served the area, as mentioned by 
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Baldwin in the previous chapter. However, according to accounts of the few remaining local 
operators, the early Sindhi shop owners offered to pay higher rents to landlords as a means to 
secure any newly available property. Over time Sindhis would come to dominate the strip, with 
there now being nearly forty stores in operation.  For some, the souvenir trade was simply a 31
pathway to opening their luxury duty-free shop. For others, it became a legitimately lucrative 
enterprise in itself. The most successful of these early Sindhi souvenir traders—who once 
worked for one of the original Sindhi families—eventually moved away from the strip and 
opened a larger store nearer to the large hotels in Rosehall. However, he earns a share of the 
profits of three shops run by his former workers still in operation on the strip. In the following 
section, I give detail of one particularly productive shop on the strip, Reggae City. 
Reggae City 
With its high concentration of shops, the majority of Sindhi trading activity in souvenirs remains 
centered on the Hip Strip. Both the retail and wholesale interests of the traders revolve around 
this tiny commercial node, and so I concentrated my efforts there. What I found was that earning 
money remained the raison d'être for these traders, evidenced by their commitment in both time 
and resources to their businesses. This was best exemplified by one Sindhi merchant named 
Ravi, the owner of Reggae City, a long established souvenir shop located almost directly across 
from Doctor's Cave beach.  
Ravi has been in Jamaica for over 20 years. He initially came to the island to work for the 
Chatanis, who I've noted are one of the two first Sindhi families in Jamaica. For several years he 
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worked as a salesman, then manager at the Chatanis' luxury duty-free shop.  As I have outlined, 
Ravi, unable to make his way directly into the luxury goods business detoured through souvenirs. 
Being one of the earliest Sindhi merchants in the trade, he was also one the first to set up his 
shop on the Hip Strip. However, whether by an inability to make the final transition into the 
luxury sector, or by virtue of found success, Ravi remained in the souvenir business. Over time, 
he opened two stores adjacent to each other, the second of which is generically named "Gift 
Shop."  
Lakshan and Krishna, Ravi's two Sindhi employees work between both stores.  Lakshan, 28, 
was well into his second three-year contract, and Krishna, 21, was almost at the end of his first 
when we met.  It was through local relationships back home in Ulhasnagar, an area just outside 
of Mumbai, that they both came to work for Ravi— Lakshan in 2006 and Krishna in 2009. In 
addition to Lakshan and Krishna, Ravi has four Jamaican women employed between his two 
shops, all of whom have worked for him for several years, the most recent having been taken on 
just before Lakshan's arrival.  
Lakshan and Krishna, live and work under typical sindwork conditions. Though they are 
provided communal accommodation and a salary that is considerably higher than what the two 
made back home, their work consists of a seven days a week schedule, and they are provided 
with limited social time. The two share a one bedroom apartment one floor below where Ravi 
lives with his wife, daughter, and mother. According to Lakshan, his salary runs about US$ 600 
per month, but that money is not paid to him in regular intervals. Instead a portion of his salary is 
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sent to his family and he is given a weekly allowance for the purchase of lunch or other 
incidentals. However, the stipend is seldom used for the purchase of food as, in addition to 
accommodation, he and Krishna receive daily meals cooked by either Ravi's wife or mother. 
Though not located far from home, Lakshan and Krishna are driven between there and work by 
Ravi.  
Under Sindhi bosses traditionally existed the categories of salaried managers, shop assistants, 
and a further sub category of "servant" (Markovits 2000). Contractually, the responsibilities of 
shop assistants and their subordinates differed minimally, with the exception of the obsequious 
nature of servants' duties and domestic responsibilities (Markovits 2000).  In Reggae City, 
Lakshan as the more senior qualified as a manager, determined more so by responsibility than 
salary. He regularly demonstrated his superiority over Krishna when Ravi was not in the shop, 
which was normally after 5pm when he went home to his family.  Lakshan often commented 32
that he "worked with his head" while Krishna "worked with his body" in that Krishna did the 
menial evening tasks of packing away and cleaning up. On many occasions I witnessed Lakshan 
harshly berate Krishna for one minor mistake or another, or criticizing him over general 
comments made with replies such as "how must you know, you a small boy compared to me!" 
Also, Krishna' facility with English was not as strong as Lakshan's and therefore made him more 
deferent to Lakshan in transactions with customers. To his credit though, Krishna was a quick 
learner of both English and the trade. Skill sets like English determined the differentiating 
qualities between the categories of worker presenting a skill-based politics (Markovits 2000: 
176).  
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Shop hierarchy is complicated by the presence of locally employed black Jamaican workers. 
Sindworki responsibilities, regardless of ranking, are concerned with customer service, with 
limited physical work, such as cleaning and inventory stocking throughout the day. In Reggae 
City and within most shops on the Hip Strip with adequate staff, that work is left for the 
Jamaican workers, whose presence is claimed to be mandated  by the government at a ratio of 
two Jamaican workers to one Sindhi. I could not however verify this claim with members of 
government I spoke with, nor was it referenced  in the Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth 
Citizens Employment Act, 1964, which seeks to ensure that qualified Jamaicans are given first 
consideration in employment opportunities. Interestingly, these positions appear to be 
exclusively filled by women, and the racial and gender dynamic of their presence provides an 
interesting point of inquiry. It appears, however, that the premier task of these Jamaican women 
is to welcome customers into the shop by standing in or near the shop entrance and solicit their 
custom.  As Rose, one the few black shop owners asserts, 
The Indians put a black girl on the front and then they [the Sindhis] stay in the 
shop. They hire these girls for sales strategy...not for government policy, to catch 
the tourist them...the tourists will warm to that shop because they see a Jamaican 
there. Because that's who they've come to see, a Jamaican. Somebody to tell them 
a little more about the culture…They hire them to make it look like they are 
hiring Jamaicans, but they don't pay them anything. 
By insisting, whether on the basis of fact or not, that the Jamaican workers are mandated into 
their employ, Sindhi bosses create a means to rationalize the barely decent treatment of those 
workers. According to Kerri-Ann, whom is the longest serving employee of Reggae City, during 
her tenure of nearly a decade, she has never once been allowed to ring up customer purchases, 
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and has been denied pay commensurate with those received by Lakshan and Krishna. The 
discrepancy of pay is a good point to explore. Recall that Lakshan's salary is US$ 600 per month. 
Whereas the workers are paid at or just above Jamaica's national minimum wage of JAM$ 5000, 
or US$ 56 per week. Additionally, there is no job mobility for the Jamaican workers. In both 
Reggae City and a neighboring shop with a prime location near to the entrance of Doctor's Cave 
Beach, Beach Shop, the Jamaican workers have time after time been denied promotion over 
Sindhi employees. At Beach Shop, Lisa, who has been working with the company for more than 
ten years complained to me that she was in the process of training "one Indian bwoy who just 
reach" and is becoming the shop manager, and thus her boss. She continued,  "That likkle bwoy 
deh so [little boy there], him just 19, and them wouldn't put me as manager because they're 
Indian and they're not gonna have a Jamaican run their store….I'm overly qualified, but of course 
I'm Jamaican…but everyday he's asking for my help." Ms. Bev, you will remember from the last 
chapter, owns a gift shop on the Hip Strip, and protests against the Sindhis with signage that says 
"100% Jamaican." More than twenty -five years ago, Ms. Bev  experienced the same treatment 
working for one of the first Sindhi families in their in-bond shop. She complained that for years, 
despite high sales and excellent customer service, she was continuously denied promotion. This 
eventually prompted her to quit and open a shop in souvenirs, not unlike the strategy of Sindhis 
working in the luxury business. 
While receiving a third of the salary of sindworkis would seem egregious on the face of it, when 
the Jamaican workers go home at 5pm, Lakshan and Krishna, and every other Sindhi worker 
(though seldom the owners) remain on the job for another several hours. Additionally, although 
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they are technically paid more, Krishna and Lakshan will not see the bulk of that pay until the 
end of their contracts. These two facts are central to the model and market ethic of Sindhi 
business. They are the means by which they seek success, and the bases on which they justify 
their place in the Jamaican economy, as will be discussed in the following section.  
Capital and Cultural (In)Competencies 
Sindhi business strategies, whether in retail or wholesale and distribution have caused a great 
deal of disquiet among many, if not most, local Jamaicans involved in the souvenir goods sector. 
Rose succinctly sums up the multiple charges against them: 
The Indians come in and they take the best part, which is tourism, and they 
occupy the retail, the distribution, and the wholesale part of it...because they are 
the wholesalers, the distributors they are competitive and are just here to make 
money. When I started in this business there were a lot of black people in the 
wholesale business, now the Indians get competitive and they've priced black 
people out of business and take over the distribution, and so I've purchased items 
from them too because there is nobody else for us to purchase from. And what 
happened now is that they don't contribute to nothing in Jamaica. They just collect 
the money and send the money back to India. 
As discussed in chapter one, Sindhi merchants are able to competitively price their goods, 
especially when compared to the vendors, by way of their ability to acquire inventory on credit. 
However, Therefore, most Sindhi shops also engage outside networks in their competitive 
strategies. The most popular, and contentious of which is the incentivizing of tour bus drivers. 
The process is as it sounds, as Sindhi shop owners offer either a percentage of total purchase or a 
fixed dollar amount per tourist brought into the shop. The percentage usually goes no higher than 
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10% and the cash incentive remains around JAM$ 100 - 200 per person. The practice has 
become pervasive, with many shop owners adding extra incentive in the form of a lagniappe, or 
brawta, as it is called in Jamaica. This usually takes the form of a bottle of rum or some extra 
monetary remuneration.  
This practice  often means that already successful shops are likely to have the means to guarantee 
their continued success. This typically results in sentiments that range from resentment on the 
part of struggling Sindhi shops to outright indignation among the few Jamaican-owned shops and 
local craft vendors. Rose explains the process: 
The Indians buy out the cruise ships. What they do is that they talk to the people 
who work on the pier and arrange for the buses to be dispatched to their shops and 
no other shopping stop, and when the bus operators take them to the shops they 
are given money. So they train them so now the bus drivers are expecting you to 
pay them when they bring tourists to you…it's like an extortion. So when a bus 
man carry 8-10 people here to shop, you have to give them...some of them even 
demand a certain percent of the sale, so that's how the extortion part comes in. 
One day a driver put his back to my front door and directed the tourists to the 
Indian shop next door, the Indians taught them how to victimize us. 
Although locals like Rose decry their tactics, Sindhi merchants and wholesalers take a different 
view. To them, their presence in the tourist market, and the strategies they employ, is not only a 
boon to the Jamaican economy, but a necessity. They argue that without the acumen and industry 
of their business community the local trade in souvenirs would inevitably fail. Bill Maurer has 
noted the same sentiment among immigrant "Syrian" [Palestinian] merchants in the British 
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Virgin Islands (BVI), who claimed that without Syrian shops, Tortola, the largest of the BVI 
islands, would "[go] back one hundred years" (1997:140).   
Dinesh, the Sindhi wholesaler located across from the craft market found his role in the country 
necessary because, as he saw it, the government was "screwing up." He explained, "[the] 
government allow these big companies to come in Jamaica and monopolize— hotels, all-
inclusives [they] monopolize. The day all-inclusives started in Jamaica everything got screwed 
up. All of this happened because of all inclusive." Paradoxically, he did not seem to class Sindhi 
business as also problematically being "allowed" to come in. Nonetheless, for Dinesh, the 
government's complicity was the result of its corruption. To his understanding, "the root of this 
country is not right— the politicians, they are together with these big guys and have been bribed 
well."  
The government's corruptibility was just part of a larger issue of Jamaican ineptness that, in 
equal measure with the government, Dinesh identified among Jamaica's craft vendors and 
artisans who he claimed lacked both will and ability:  
Jamaican people are not capable, poor guy. I understand, fine, but there should be 
some way. There's not even one Jamaican— the best guy who can get a big piece 
of land and make a shopping center for all Jamaicans? Nobody wants to 
cooperate, but everybody wants money, it's only in Jamaica I see people fighting, 
there's no cooperation, there's no love.  
Mr. Chatani, although a first-generation Jamaican, was of the same opinion:  
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True the negroes were slaves, and they fought for and rebelled for freedom, but 
after they got freedom, what did they do? They continued the fighting but with 
each other. Fought with each other, there was no love, and today it is like a part of 
their genes. Which other country in the world you know have over a thousand 
murders a year and is not at war?  You see this country? This country could be 
paradise on earth, every single person would be happy with not  a care in the 
world if they could only get together. It won't happen in my lifetime, though. 
Mr. Chatani's criticism of Jamaican disunity remarkably resembled the argument made by 
vendors in the first chapter. However, his criticism was more than anything a statement of 
Jamaican incompetence. Though vendors desired a collectivity as an expression of their 
'blackness' which would honor their shared historical experience of suffering and its future 
resolution, to Mr. Chatani cooperation was simply a route to economic success.  Such a model is 
the opposite of that of the female vendors, for whom individuals driven by a goal of economic 
success were morally suspect and generators of dis-unity through bad-mind. Mr. Chatani's 
assertion was typical of the radical virtue of competitive individualism present within Sindhi 
business.. Interestingly the Sindhi businessmen and the vendors were in accord on the point that 
Jamaicans were the architects of their own downfall.  
Sindhis were simply making a living as they knew how, and as best as they could. As Mr. 
Daswani, of the original Sindhi family in Jamaica, clarified, "Sindhis buy something for a dollar, 
they sell it back at $2.50 to pay their rent. Their shops are well manicured, well stocked, and 
that's what the tourists look for. There's a work ethic, that I don't see elsewhere in the industry." 
He continued, "In a fast moving world, in a free democracy [liberalized] world, money talks and 
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bullshit walks…when I was 8 or 9, my father would give me the broom to clean under the 
showcases. We were taught that we had to work…if you want ice cream you have to go do 
something for it…work ethic." In his opinion, this ethic didn't exist in the craft market in 
particular or throughout the Jamaican side of the souvenir industry. Ravi also felt similarly: "You 
think a Jamaican is going to sit in their shop from 8 a.m. until 10:30 p.m. every day? The craft 
vendors close up shop at 4 or 5 p.m., and other [Jamaican] shops around here close not too long 
after! Come on!"  
In the estimation of these men, the Sindhi work ethic and commitment to capital accumulation 
stood at the heart of the survival of the souvenir goods industry. Like the investment bankers 
discussed by Ho (2009:102) Sindhis employed "the culture of overwork" as a site to reinvigorate 
hierarchies in the market and establish their business superiority. Theirs' were the shops that 
brought tourist traffic along the Hip Strip and maintained it as a viable attraction. "If we don't do 
it, who can?" was the question posed by Ravi. The question was striking. It wasn't one of who 
would do this work, but again, who (else) could.  For Sindhis their business acumen was based 
upon a competency that was not simply skill centered, but biological—"Sindhis have business 
brains," as I was told by Nish, a young, but rather successful Sindhi shop owner. Nish has been 
in business for the past twelve years after finishing just one three year contract term in one of the 
most successful and longest operating Sindhi souvenir shops in Montego Bay.  Again Sindhi 33
self-perception was similar to that of the investment bankers described by Ho, who possessed "a 
particular combination of intelligence, ambition, and hard work, which they view as the driving 
and legitimating forces behind their dominant position in the financial markets" ( 2009:103).  
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As described by both Ravi and Mr. Chatani, it would appear that the practices of Sindhi business 
competency were all about the willingness to work long hours and to poorly remunerate their 
shop staff, and for their staff to accept those terms. In fact these conditions and the will to endure 
them were what upheld the entire Sindhi business model. As mentioned earlier, each of the 
Jamaican staff were paid somewhere around US$ 56 per week, the cost of two to three quality t-
shirts, or the combined cost of a package of coffee and a decent bottle of rum. And the 
Sindworkis' comparatively higher salaries were not typically paid until the end of their contracts, 
or were paid in smaller and intermittent sums throughout as needed.  
This practice brought a critique from locals that the conditions endured by sindworkis like 
Lakshan and Krishna were tantamount to indentureship. Markovits has noted how certain labor 
conditions and relationships in sindwork "smack[ed] of indenture," and he provides accounts of 
sindworkis who brought claims of indentureship against their bosses to South African authorities 
in the early 1900s (2000:171-175). There are elements of East Indian indenture that bear a 
striking resemblance to the existing labor conditions of contemporary sindwork. The most 
immediate similarity is the contracted labor that binds employee and employer together for a 
determined length of time. For indentured agricultural workers the period was five years (Tinker 
1974:64), whereas for the sindworkis it was and remains three. Provided accommodation is 
another similarity between both forms. However, of course, Sindhi accommodation could never 
be as dire as that once provided to indentured workers. Nonetheless, these two points of 
similarity were not the bases on which contemporary Jamaicans made a comparison between 
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sindwork and indenture. . They focused on the length of time and the fixed context in which 
these young men worked, and of course the fact that they are Indian.  
I asked Lakshan how he fared with the hours he worked to which he replied, "It's like I am in a 
prison and all I see are the shops around me." Of similar sentiment, (though perhaps somewhat 
worse off) was Lam, who claimed to have never been to the beach in his three years in Jamaica, 
despite being located directly across from it. Conditions varied between shops, as I met some 
sindworkis who were provided with day passes to all-inclusive hotels, and even Lakshan and I 
took a day trip to Negril on one of his days off. Sindwork among the young men that I came to 
know was never seen as a career. The three-to-six years they worked, however difficult, were a 
means to eventually establish themselves in the trade, to learn the ropes and eventually open up 
their own business. In the interim however, it was their hardship that served as the basis on 
which their bosses' shops were profitable. And if they succeeded in starting their own shop it is 
that economic model of hardship that they would replicate.  Within the Sindhi ethic there is an 
acceptance that business is primarily about current sacrifice in order to achieve a greater 
prosperity in the future.  
As has been noted, Sindhis employ multiple strategies to generate profit, but there was a 
divergence in the way that Sindhis determined how they and Jamaicans understood profit itself 
that reinforced their sense of competence. According to Sindhis , Jamaicans sought to extract the 
maximum profit from each item they sold, inevitably meaning they sold very little. "How can 
they sell an item that normally costs $10 for $50?" exaggeratedly queried one Sindhi retailer, 
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David. "How do they expect to get customers?" he asked sardonically. Sindhis in contrast were 
willing to sacrifice profit margins as long as their turnover remained high. This was likewise 
evidenced in Falzon’s work among Sindhi merchant communities in Malta and London 
(2004:155).  Therefore, inherent in the "Jamaican" notion of profit was a myopia, in which long-
term viability was sacrificed for immediate gains. If the Sindhis had "business brains," they then 
also had "business vision," investing in long-term profitability and thus long-term security. The 
short-term perspective of Jamaicans could be read throughout the society they created. It was in 
the Sindhi opinion the reason why the country was in such disrepair: no long-term vision, with 
everyone trying to get what they could for themselves today. It was a harsh critique, but one that 
as we have seen in previous chapters is also shared by other Jamaicans.. 
What the Sindhis I spoke with failed to realize, or perhaps simply refused to acknowledge, was 
that the strategies forming the profit logic of both groups were in large part dictated by the terms 
under which each acquired inventory. Sindhi retailers received their goods on credit from 
wholesalers, and were expected to make their payment within 30 to 60 days. Thus, their need to 
move product necessitated their willingness to lose on profit margins. Nevertheless, by making 
their payment they were able to borrow again, allowing time for whatever little profit they earned 
to slowly accumulate in significance. Jamaican craft vendors, by far the second largest market 
for Sindhi manufactured goods, on the other hand paid for their goods up front, as previously 
explained. Therefore they required the maximum profit on each item in order to both make a 
living and acquire further inventory. Regardless of this fact, there remained among my Sindhi 
informants a superior sense of how they did business. This superiority is perhaps due to sindwork 
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being informed by the notion of being a "businessman." For sindworkis, the ambition at the root 
of the concept determines "the nature of his intercourse with other Sindhi businessmen, with his 
kin, and…employees" (Thapan 2002:38). Therefore being adept at business is viewed as not only 
an inherent Sindhi quality (business brains), but also a constituent element of self, thereby 
determining business as a Sindhi's only true vocation (Thapan 2002).  34
With over forty shops located within such tight proximity, competition was high, and all 
communication during business hours was strongly discouraged. The "culture of profit" 
generated by being businessmen meant that there was little room for "community" among the 
Sindhi traders in Montego Bay, but this was perceived as a virtuous effort (Brook & Luong 
1997:34). This competitiveness between shops is paradoxically the opposite of the community 
mindedness that the vendors and JAMIA members attributed to Sindhi success. Lakshan told me 
that there are a few guys along the strip who do get along, but they usually don't own shops near 
each other. Mr. Chatani also explained that "We are competitors from 9-5 but after 5 we are 
sitting and having a drink together." From the position of success, there was an "after 5" in which 
he and his competitors could commune. However, there was little possibility for this for the 
shops on the strip. All shops were open by 9 am and earlier on days when cruise ships were in 
port, and would frequently close only after 10 p.m. in the evening. As once stated by Nish, "Our 
competitors are greedy motherfuckers, but its business. It's a tough business, so store hours are 
important, even if nothing is happening, just chill, you never know when somebody's gonna walk 
in." 
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At the start of fieldwork I heard that there were plans to build a Hindu temple in Montego Bay. I 
took this as a sign that there might in fact be some community infrastructure that would facilitate 
such a collective project. However, as I went along the Hip Strip interviewing shop owners and 
workers, one by one I was told that they knew nothing of such plans. One sindworki reckoned 
that if it were true, then it was likely being done by members of the older generation that was 
born in Jamaica. However the most telling reply was by Ravi, who declared that he wasn't 
interested in any temple as whatever time he had would be better spent in his shop, and that he 
would visit the temple on his next visit back to India.  
Competition was a virtue for the Sindhi merchants. This was made clear when Ravi, having 
spent the past twenty-five years of his life working in Jamaica, told me that he had finally 
thought it time to leave. His reason, was partly business related as things had slowed much since 
the recession, but it was mainly that he would rather his young daughter go to school in India. 
Myself being familiar with the high academic standards of Jamaican private schools, especially 
at the primary level wondered what he thought was wrong with the Jamaican system. I was 
surprised when he replied that the class sizes were too small. As a former high school teacher in 
South Florida, Ravi's view was heresy to me. He patiently waited for me to finish my recitation 
of advantages of small class size, and when I was done he said, "OK, fine. I understand. But in 
India, you have class sizes of up to one hundred. I want my daughter to be at the top of that class, 
not a class of just twenty!"  
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Ravi's aspirations for his daughter made me fully appreciate the fact that Sindhi merchants 
seemed to prefer to operate in highly competitive commercial circumstances. There were 
inherent advantages to the number and especially proximity of the shops. In such a constricted 
environment, only the best businessmen could have success: those who were willing to open 
earlier, close later, and sell for cheaper. As Mr. Daswani noted about the Sindhis on the Hip Strip, 
"those people on bottom road sit down from 7 in the morning till 12 at night, they will try and 
sell their mother for a dollar if they have to, they are taught work ethics second to none…" This 
was in direct contradiction to the way the vendors felt about the matter of competitor space, 
although I have argued that their real problem is a lack of flexibility in the market. The 
welcoming of competition was the reason that promotion within shops was rare and that former 
workers were permitted, if not encouraged, to open up new businesses. Falzon explains that in 
this process, former Sindhi bosses provide young upstarts with credit and so in the process of a 
sindworki leaving his boss' employ, the employer "earns himself both a competitor as well as a 
customer" (2004:144). Mr.  Daswani succinctly confirmed that workers leaving to open their 
own shop was acceptable, if not expected: "Once a few years go by, these guys make a little 
money and go into business for themselves, no problem" expressed. 
The continued entry of Sindhi businesses into the marketplace creates a "culture of instability 
and competition" (Ho 2009:75), that Sindhi merchants seem to thrive on. Not only welcoming, 
but largely creating this competition again proves who is the best of businessmen, and who will 
go furthest to succeed. These are the terms through which Sindhis present themselves as capable 
agents who maintain the viability of the tourist goods market. This chapter has so far been 
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concerned with Sindhi retailers. In the following section I will detail some of the ways in which 
Sindhi wholesalers achieve structural dominance in the market. 
Made in the U.S.A.: The Sindhi Wholesale Model   
One afternoon, I was getting to know Lam, a sindworki from a shop toward the bottom-end of 
the Hip Strip. When I asked Lam where he was from and he replied "the U.S.A.," I laughed 
incredulously. The smirk on his face quickly transformed into a full-tooth smile, when he 
explained that his "U.S.A" was in fact the Ulhasnagar Sindhi Association.  Ulhasnagar is a city 
located approximately 40 miles northeast of Mumbai, as is the hometown of many Sindhis in 
Montego Bay, like Ravi, Lakshan and Krishna. Ulhasnagar was converted into a township in 
1949 after Partition saw over 100,000 Sindhi refugees flee from the newly created West Pakistan 
to the area in 1947. The Ulhasnagar Sindhi Association came into being as a merchant guild of 
the city. It later lent its name to an acronym that led to the term "Made in the USA" being applied 
to counterfeit goods manufactured in Ulhasnagar by local industries. As Falzon explains, since 
Indian independence "import restrictions and exorbitant import tariffs meant that 
'phoren' (foreign) brands, often smuggled into the country by "couriers', were highly 
desirable" (2004:168). Enterprising Sindhis in Ulhasnagar responded with "desi," or counterfeit, 
versions of the most popular brands. The counterfeit goods ran the gamut from apparel to 
electronics.  Although second-rate in quality, the "USA" industry satisfied the local demand for 
foreign goods up until the 1990s. The relaxed import tariffs and stringent monopolies legislation 
associated with Indian economic liberalization resulted in expanded domestic markets for foreign 
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commercial goods. The increased availability of genuinely branded merchandise diminished, 
though not entirely, the demand for the Ulhasnagar "Made in USA" labeled products.   
At the same time that "USA" goods were in decline in India, Sindhis opening up shops and 
wholesale outfits in Jamaica created a new market for counterfeit goods. Three forms of 
counterfeiting took place among Sindhis in Jamaica: that of locally made goods; of large popular 
brands; and of popular brand motifs. The souvenir industry in Jamaica at that time was 
dominated by the long-serving staples of local producers: handcrafted products; wooden 
statuettes; straw basketry and other weaving; embroidered and sewn products; ceramic goods; 
paintings; t-shirts; and beaded and wooden jewelry. Sindhi wholesalers bought Jamaican-made 
goods from artisans and local producers and sent them abroad, either back to India or to China as 
prototypes for items they would have mass manufactured and imported into the country for sale. 
According to local accounts, as the increasing number of Sindhi retail shops began carrying these 
foreign items, the local industries suffered significant decreases in demand and profitability. 
Early in my fieldwork I met a Rastafarian artisan named "Country" whose long-time specialty 
was in carving small wooden animals. The afternoon that we met Country stopped in at Bev's 
Boutique. Country, however, was not selling his wooden animals, but was instead peddling other 
goods, as some years ago, he explained, he sold "a portion" [a large amount] of his animals to an 
"Indian" shopping at Bay Fort craft market's producer day. Typically on Friday morning, these 
are days where producers go the market to do wholesale business with craft vendors. Country 
claimed to have started seeing animals similar to his all around Montego Bay several months 
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later.  "If you sell to the Indian, next year you won't be able to sell again," began his warning. 
"They go to crafts people, and offer them nothing for all of it, but the people [producers] do it 
because they're hungry! But the next time you see it will be from China…the Indians them 
monopolate [sic] the ting [industry]. At this point Ms. Bev joined in:  
Because remember that they bring in things by trailer load from China. They have 
warehouses in Montego Bay, but mainly in Ochi, and what happened is that they 
hire their boys [sindworkis]…because you see some Indians are the bigger 
Indians, you know...so they hire their boys to be sales rep, and they bring their 
catalogue to you, or you can go out to their warehouse. And we have to buy things 
from them because they [control ] the wholesale and distribution. You see with 
the local production, it costs you more and not many people do it.  When I came 
into this  industry there were a lot of guys that used to come around with their 
own  t-shirts and so on, but the Indians box them out...they are taking over what 
Jamaican people would be doing. 
One example that supported Country and Ms. Bev's charge involved wooden statuettes that 
Sindhis have been importing from Indonesia.  The carvings came with a tag onto which a logo 
outlining the shape of Jamaica was imprinted with the country's name within and the words 
"Island Souvenirs" just below.  Messaging just below the logo implored shoppers to "support our 
local cottage industry." The conflated image and message deceptively conveyed the idea that the 
item was made in Jamaica. The item's origin was betrayed however by a small sticker located 
underneath that stated that it was  "Made in Indonesia." This was the one protective measure that 
the Jamaican authorities imposed. However, of the fifteen or so carvings in that particular 
wholesale shop, only one had the sticker remaining, the rest had been carefully removed.  
 149
This overall practice is of great concern to the Jamaican government and in particular to the 
Jamaican Intellectual Property Office (JIPO). When a member of the organization learned of my 
work, I was asked to present my early findings to the agency and other invited representatives 
from interested agencies at JIPO headquarters in Kingston. All in attendance remarked at how 
unaware they were as to the degree to which the Sindhi's copied local products and how 
infuriating the practice was. The representative from the Jamaica Customs Department was 
concerned over how these goods were being permitted entry into the country. JAMPRO, the 
Jamaican Production Company was worried about the effect these copies would have on 
Jamaican branding. However, members of JIPO admitted that legally there was in fact very little 
that could  be done. They argued that because the goods were not personally registered, nor were 
they officially trademarked products of Jamaica, the copyright laws did not apply. I asked local 
artisans at JAMIA about copyrighting their products. Each one despaired at the cost of doing so, 
as each design they made would have to be registered. Additionally by the time their application 
was processed, they presumed that the Sindhis would have already copied and begun selling their 
goods, thus making the whole thing pointless. 
The Sindhi counterfeit practice was not limited to just locally made goods. There are a few key 
brands that sell successfully among tourists, one being Tuff Gong, which is the official label for 
the Bob Marley family of goods, another being Red Stripe, and most recently the Usain Bolt 
branded line. Another apparel brand, which does quite well, and particularly among American 
tourists is Harley-Davidson, which brought attention to the issue of counterfeiting in Jamaica's 
tourist goods sector. From the mid 1990s, Harley-Davidson was the largest counterfeited brand 
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in Jamaica, with proposed losses of US$ 8—10 million per year.  As with the wooden statues 35
discussed above, the counterfeit Harley-Davidson gear would establish authenticity by being 
tagged with an official looking brand name and logo. Ten wholesalers/retailers in Montego Bay 
and Negril were identified as the main offenders, and were legally pursued by the company.  In 36
addition to litigative actions, Harley-Davidson opened up its own retail spaces in order to 
guarantee that their customers purchased legitimate goods, one of the stores being located right 
on the Hip Strip. Harley-Davidson's legal action helped to bring the commercial community of 
Montego Bay into compliance with the legitimate production and distribution of well-known 
brands. As a result, to benefit from the sale of those branded goods, Sindhi producers have begun 
to purchase the merchandise distribution rights for them as is the case with Tuff Gong and Usain 
Bolt lines in Western Jamaica. 
I briefly mention the direct counterfeiting of known brands to address a more intriguing strategy 
now being practiced by Sindhi producers. Despite ceasing the copying of the direct logos and 
trademarks of popular brands, Sindhi producers, with an eye toward U.S. clothing trends, have 
found another means to appeal to the North American tourist aesthetic. In Ravi's shop I noticed a 
particular style of t-shirt that strongly resembled the thematic styles and motifs of hugely popular 
American brands Hollister and Abercrombie & Fitch. There has been some discussion on the 
direct counterfeiting of the Hollister brand name in Guatemala (Thomas 2013:153-154). But, by 
only employing the motifs of those brands, such as their deep V-necks and surfer aesthetic, the 
shirts in Montego Bay traded on what Nakassis has deemed the immaterial "surfeits" of the 
brand—the "excess of social meaning that emerges out of engagements with branded 
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goods…" (2013:112, see also Nakassis 2012). The surfeits may be the "gap between materiality 
and symbolic value that is always under negotiation," in the process of branding (Newell 
2013:141). Perhaps the motifs provide the shirts with a type of  branded  hau  as Mazzarella 
(2003) has suggested. Indeed, by their presentation and the thematic implication of the original 
Hollister aesthetic, these shirts were imbued with the relaxed, laid back island spirit that tourists 
came to expect from a Jamaican holiday. Ravi informed me that a local Sindhi wholesaler 
produced the shirts under the labels "Surf Classic" and  "Sunkissed Jamaica."  These shirts were 
some of Reggae City's best sellers, and were especially popular with American tourists. 
The t-shirts could be found in most of the shops along the strip, but Nish's shop had a particularly 
broad selection of Sunkissed merchandise. Nish's shop was located next door to Ravi.  With his 
now seasoned Jamaican accent, Nish told me how over the past few years he has been closely 
involved with a local producer who designs his own goods and uses Nish's shop as a product test 
site.  Nish told me that the producer's name was Raj, and that he was based in Negril. Raj was 
fond of visiting Miami Beach and became influenced by the brands that conveyed the laid back 
atmosphere of the city, which held a certain consonance with that of Jamaica, or at least Montego 
Bay. He thus came up with an ersatz Hollister motif that replaced the brand name with the word 
"Jamaica" and inserting the Jamaican date of independence—1962—where on most Hollister 
shirts the company's date of establishment is located. The imagery on the shirts would maintain 
the Hollister themes of surfer, beach, and island iconography, some with Jamaica's national 
flower, the hibiscus.  
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Admittedly the shirts were extremely attractive and made all the more appealing by their soft 
cotton texture.  Nish was quick to assert his contribution in the design process by exclaiming 
how he had insisted that the designer use the V-neck: "they were revolutionary, the V-neck was 
unique to the market, and it was me who told him to do it!" Nish also designs some of the items 
that he sells in his store, which standing at over 3000 square feet is a testament to his success. He 
explains that in last five years— not coincidentally around the time of the Harley-Davidson 
crackdown— "Sindhi design has grown a lot, and we have three really good suppliers, really 
creative man, who have been living here for twenty years, because we Indians had to learn the 
culture, and create designs what a white man would like, a black man would like, and they serve 
the whole industry… you have to get to know what people will like." By counterfeiting these 
goods, Sindhis "challenge the logic of copyright law [and] the injustice of income 
disparity…" (Luvass 2013:130) by seizing upon the circuits of accumulation thought to be 
exclusive to major corporations. Indeed, through copying and redesign they "enact a material 
intervention into the workings of the global neoliberal economy" as Luvass (2013:130) has 
asserted with Indonesian DIY fashion labels that trade on the infringement of popular brands. 
But in Jamaica, the local, black Jamaican market of goods is also undermined by the design 
efforts of Sindhis.  
These top quality shirts, while sold at most of the Sindhi-owned shops, were not available at the 
few local Jamaican souvenir shops, and certainly not at the local craft markets. The Sindhi 
wholesaler that we met in chapter one, Dinesh also designed many of the products  in his shop. 
Dinesh claimed to serve the craft markets exclusively, and almost as a point of virtue because of 
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his proclaimed sympathy for the craft vendors' plight, "... these poor guys, I give them the 
blessings, I work with them," he explained patronizingly, again intimating the inadequacy of 
Jamaicans involved in the souvenir trade. His "blessings" consisted of his purported exclusive 
provision to craft vendors of selected products that he designed and manufactured. "Indians will 
not like me because some of the things I design I will not sell [to] them. A quarter of my store, 
Indians will not have it," he asserted.  
However good his intentions, vendor interaction with Dinesh was far from unproblematic. What 
follows is an abbreviated transcription that details the types of relationships Dinesh has with his 
vendor customers: 
Vendor 1:  "If there was a police officer here Dinesh you would go to jail for your   
    prices!"   
    [they argue over the US$ 6 cost for an item] 
Dinesh:  "You're still short by $2" 
Vendor 1:  "Short, you blow-wow! This is a man I come shop from all the time and  
    him a tell me say me a rob him $2?"  
Vendor 2: "Him always trying to gain…" 
Vendor 1:  "All him have is sweet mouth and him can't use that on me" 
Dinesh:  "You a argue over pickney [child's] money, nuh backside!" 
Vendor 1:  "I need a bill. Last time you let me out and never gave me a bill, and I want  
    to know how I spend my money." 
Dinesh: "But you never pay the full amount why should I give you a bill?  
Vendor 1:  "I pay you the full money…wha' wrong with you?! Me did ever owe you  
    anything?" 
Dinesh: "Of course!" 
Vendor 1:  "Man, write me the bill and give me…" 
[Now whispering to me]:"You see him nah put no carbon [copy] underneath it 
[the receipt]…everybody a run from the tax, that's why the country cant come 
up. Him no have no copy so him nah pay no tax... so when the tax man come 
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there is nothing to see…If you watch him, there's nothing on the copy, he will 
write and give you a blank, so when they come, he will say its not there." 
[Vendor 2 approaches the counter and  salutes Dinesh: "hey criminal!"] 
Vendor 2:  "You no hear you name call, criminal? Give me some keychain."  
Dinesh:  "$3 for one, I charge you less you know. $4 dollars for these you know…"  
Vendor 2:  "But the sign there says 3 for $10, how you giving me a special price?" 
Though couched in a fair bit of banter, the above dialogue reveals an adequate amount of distrust 
and indifference toward Dinesh on the part of the vendors. It is, however, typical of the kind of 
verbal relations that Caribbean locals have with immigrants in the commercial sphere (see 
Maurer 1997: 140). 
Dinesh has been in Jamaica for over thirteen years and began working, like most Sindhis, in the 
employ of a previously arrived Sindhi boss.  He began his wholesale business four years ago in a 
nondescript second-floor wholesale/retail space in downtown Montego Bay just across from the 
craft market.  His shop's location would appear to confirm his claim of craft market exclusivity, 
but it became quickly clear that serving the neighboring two hundred stall market was merely a 
business strategy.  While plentiful, his stock would not be considered high-end merchandise. He 
nonetheless did brisk business as the vendors from the market often came to him as a primary 
source of goods. Or in moments when tourists asked for a particular item they did not have in 
stock, they would run across to Dinesh to see if he did. This of course meant that the goods that 
Dinesh sold and more importantly, that he designed, dominated the craft market, the problematic 
implications of which have been demonstrated in the first chapter. Where Nish and Raj were 
designing goods directly for the tourist market, it appeared that the quality and commensurate 
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affordability of the goods that Dinesh designed and sold were meant for an alternative, secondary 
market. Again, while not unattractive, Dinesh's products had no flair, no impression of a larger 
consideration for the tastes and preferences of the end customer. They were the kind of 
disposable goods that were perfunctorily purchased. Dinesh's customers were the vendors, and 
how they fared with the goods beyond their purchase was their concern.   
Dinesh's main selling point was that "no Indians will get these bags," or whatever item a craft 
vendor was contemplating. That his vendor customers were regularly reminded of this was 
critical, as his prices were not really all that good. On one occasion, a vendor charged, "I am sure 
I have seen those bags in Falmouth...not you alone sell it. Everything you tell me in here is your 
design, but I prove that to you that it is not!" Dinesh replied in an accent that sputtered in its 
attempt at Jamaican patois, "Go on and leave the ting, I don't want your money, you want 
everything for free anyway nuh backside!" The vendor was right. I had personally seen the same 
bag elsewhere. It was a plain black over shoulder carrying bag, which had the word "Jamaica" in 
Comic Sans typeface repeated across it at varying angles in multiple colors of red, gold, and 
green.  In fact, I had seen a similar, if not the same, bag on an earlier trip to Barcelona, with the 
city's name displayed in similar fashion, though with different colors, and again in Miami with 
that city's name.   
Perhaps Dinesh's contribution, taking him at his word that he in fact "designed" the bag, was the 
addition of the word "Jamaica." But implied in his declaration of design is an insistence of 
production, and bringing something into the commercial space that is needed. In fact, in every 
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instance of either counterfeit or design, what has been demonstrated is the evolution in which 
counterfeit becomes design, as exampled by Luvaas' Indonesian DIY-ers (2013), and thus a 
contribution that is particular to Sindhi business. And so, as suggested by Nakassis, we observe 
how the brand surfeits produced by Sindhis "opens up new performative spaces, possibilities, 
social relations, and material forms that exist in tension with, and beyond, the brand even as they 
emerge through it" (2013:123). From that space emerges a performance of the Sindhi ethic and 
skill of business that allows Sindhis to create and seize new opportunities for profit that place the 
market more under their control. 
However, despite their efforts to control that market, and their seemingly indefatigable sense of 
business savvy and capability, how successfully have the Sindhis managed to seize the market? 
Without question, their performance in the local souvenir market is markedly more profitable 
than that of their fellow Jamaican shop owners, and much better than that of the craft vendors. 
But is the structural form of Jamaica's economy sustaining for Sindhi business? Or are they, too, 
vulnerable to the effects of sufferation? 
Sindhi Sufferation? 
In the post-recession economic climate, it appeared that Sindhi merchants, especially sindworkis 
were sacrificing more and receiving less. In fact, the ever-increasing profits they were thought to 
have been earning were hardly a reality. The number of stay over tourists had remained mostly 
stable during and after the recession, and had quickly returned to growth as the recession abated. 
This was a statistic that Jamaican politicians—especially the Minister of Tourism—bandied 
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about as evidence of the industry's steady economic position.  But, according to Sindhi 37
merchants, what has failed to be recognized, or admitted, by those politicians was that the 
spending among those stop overs had decreased.  
As one long time merchant, Sam, confided, "If other people like you would come and sit out here 
for a day and see how many people come here, and see what sort of business we're doing, they'd 
probably ask how we pay the electrical bill. It's not a bed of roses, but what are we going to do? 
You can't make blood out of stone, you have to ride with the times and be patient and hope that 
things will turn." Sam continued to explain that many Sindhi shops were unable to ride with the 
times. He claimed that the period saw the increased closing of Sindhi shops throughout the area, 
and where they didn't close, they downsized. 
This was experienced first-hand when Ravi seemingly abruptly decided to send Lakshan back 
home without warning toward the end of my time in the field. One afternoon, I was at Reggae 
City chatting with Krishna and a couple of the Jamaican workers. Ravi and Lakshan pulled up in 
Ravi's Toyota Matrix, and Lakshan entered the shop with tears in his eyes. Saying nothing to us, 
he grabbed a few items from behind the counter and shaking his head, he left only saying, "he's 
sending me home and I don't know why." The entire store was in shock, with the exception of 
Krishna, who looked much less perplexed than the rest of us. 
A week passed before I could ask Ravi what happened. He explained that he "caught Lakshan 
smoking ganja…" and that he "wouldn't have any of that." As if to try and convince me, he asked 
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if I had noticed how odd and aggressive Lakshan had been acting lately. I had not, but I gave an 
expression that intimated that perhaps I had, so as to not unnecessarily contradict Ravi's 
assertion, of which he had clearly convinced himself. Over the next several weeks, I heard pieces 
of the story from the girls in the shop, and from neighboring shop owners, proving that under the 
right circumstances the Sindhis did comprise some form of community, if even just to simply 
gossip.  The story was that Ravi could no longer afford to keep Lakshan on staff. Lakshan was a 
truly successful salesperson with a repeat clientele that included regular holidayers to missionary 
groups, who would only buy souvenirs from him during their annual missions. On the basis of 
this success he began to demand a higher salary. Apparently Krishna had proved himself a 
capable worker, and a  therefore would be a more affordable replacement for Lakshan. The 
gossip was that Ravi made up the ganja story to both save face and to justify voiding Lakshan's 
contract. But all of the neighboring shopkeepers knew that times were rough, and that Ravi was 
overextended with two shops, and two Sindhi and four Jamaican employees. What was 
interesting about this situation was that, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, salaries 
were not paid out regularly, but remittances were sent to Lakshan's family on his behalf, and his 
salary would have to be paid in full at some point. A closer look at the actual financial expenses 
of a Sindhi shop reveals why Lakshan would have been let go.  
In our discussions, Sindhis would often note how their payment of the rent, electricity, and taxes 
served as patriotic contributions to the Jamaican state. They asserted that certainly no one's rents 
or commercial electric bills were as high, and no Jamaicans paid taxes as consistently as they 
(although that they even paid taxes was challenged by local Jamaicans, as shown in the earlier 
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dialogue in Dinesh's shop). "We are holding up JPS (Jamaica Public Service Company—the 
energy company)! The JPS bill alone can kill your business!" Ravi once vehemently proclaimed. 
Immigrant merchants in the British Virgin Islands engaged in the same sort of discourse in 
suggesting that their payment of "customs…lights, water,[and] tax" was somehow necessary for 
the local economy (Maurer 1997:40-41). The rate JPS, the sole electricity supplier in the country, 
charged commercial properties was exorbitant. At Reggae City, which was an average size store, 
the bill was reported to be over US$ 1500 per month. The cost of electricity was universally 
lamented in Jamaica and locals critical of Sindhi businesses cynically asserted that they could 
easily afford it. Sindhis in response asserted that locals could not know the difficulties of actually 
paying one's electric bill, since they assumed that their critics either didn't pay, or stole 
electricity, and because of these tactics  they couldn't fathom the amounts that Sindhi retailers 
paid. 
The recessionary environment coupled with the high costs of electricity made the chances of 
success in opening a new shop extremely low. This was illustrated by the situation of  new shop 
owner Vijay, who had renewed his contract again at the start of the recession, and thought that 
three years later it might be safe to start his own souvenir shop. While things were definitely on 
an upswing by 2011, Vijay echoed Sam's previous statement: "Those [tourists] who come have 
no buying power. They come and look and look, but they don't buy. And when they do it's always 
key rings or some small thing. It would have been better to have taken my pay and gone back to 
India. The [Jamaican] government collects money off of each tourist that comes in [landing fee 
and departure tax included in ticket], so they're ok." Vijay, Sam, Ravi, and even Lakshan were in 
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their own way feeling the effects of the recession.  Embedded in their comments, and even in 
those made earlier by Dinesh, was a critique of Jamaican governance, which suggested that 
things could not get better. So, could it be suggested that the business environment created by the 
government can be considered a condition of Sindhi sufferation? 
I mentioned earlier how Ravi complained about the high cost of doing business, particularly the 
cost of electricity commanded by JPS. Before that I described how Dinesh derided the Jamaican 
government for damaging the chances for its citizens by allowing all-inclusives into the country. 
Also we just heard Vijay comment on how the government benefits from tourist arrivals, even if 
they do not shop with local or Sindhi merchants. These perils, as the Sindhis view them have 
made significant demands on their business, and have drawn out of the merchants the skill and 
ethic necessary to face these challenges. Despite the high cost of electricity, Ravi, and others 
remain in business by cutting staff and having those that remain work longer hours. And the all-
inclusive's exclusiveness has been largely worked around by Sindhi shops incentivizing hotel and 
other bus services to bring tourists to their shops.  
The opening of the Royal Caribbean port in Falmouth, the capital of the neighboring parish of 
Trelawney intensified the structural problems faced by Sindhi shop owners: This was planned to 
be  of benefit to all tourist-related businesses on the north coast, but it had the opposite effect. 
"When they opened that port it was like a bomb went off," said Ravi. He continued, "It 
completely blew away all the business in Ochi [Ocho Rios]," "have you been to Ochi? It was 
second only to Montego Bay on the north coast…now it's like a ghost town." According to Ravi 
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only 20% of the Sindhi shops in Ocho Rios remain. Entire Sindhi owned complexes, such as  the 
ornately designed Taj Mahal Shopping Centre stand nearly empty. The pitch of Ravi's voice 
became higher, "Tell me why the hell they'd [the government] do that? Build one town to destroy 
a perfectly working 'nother town?" "It makes no sense! And now things are slowing here in 
MoBay," he expressed obviously distressed.  
The idea behind the Falmouth cruise port was that the city, with its Georgian architecture, would 
be a picturesque setting that would attract tourists to Jamaica. In addition to renovations to the 
immediate area, shops were built right on the terminal, so that cruisers could conveniently buy 
their souvenirs just before re-boarding the ship. This was part of the "landed" business model of 
cruise ship companies that endeavored to retain as much revenue as possible. It was a format that 
brought the all-inclusive experience of the ship on land in "tourism villages" where cruisers 
could eat and shop, and sometimes sunbathe and swim without ever really venturing inland 
(Becker 2013:154). According to Mr. Daswani, these shops required a start up cost of nearly US$ 
200,000, making them cost-prohibitive to all but the most successful and liquid of would be 
retailers. Additionally in order to apply for a shop license one had to actually go to Royal 
Caribbean's Miami headquarters. Mr.  Daswani, who could afford to open a shop at the pier tells 
of the cost: 
Stores at the pier cost 75 dollars a square foot for rental and US$ 80,000 upfront 
deposit. When Falmouth says that is what you have to pay, who's going to do that, 
Jamaicans?  Many Sindhis do that because Ocho Rios is devastated. And me born 
and grow here, was never supported by my government, they fed me to the 
wolves, I had to listen to the tune of Royal Caribbean.                      
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The increased activity of Royal Caribbean at the Falmouth port saw a concomitant increase in 
terminal shopping and a commensurate decline of both activity and shopping in Montego Bay. 
The Sindhi business model of extended work hours and razor-thin margins is predicated on a 
long-term engagement with the market. However, the market for Sindhis in Montego Bay has 
become one of attrition. And so merchants like Ravi and Vijay are stuck. Having not made 
enough money early enough to pull out of this market and find more fruitful terrain, they (like so 
many others) had to try their best to merely persist. Those who could not, failed in their 
businesses and in their ethical project of being Sindhi businessmen. Their continuing efforts to 
persist in this increasingly difficult market place were driven by their attempts to realize these 
ethics. The shop owners and sindworkis drew on their sense of their own essential business 
subjectivity to face the challenge, or as  articulated by Zaloom, that "capitalist ethic that centers 
on the mastery of the self under conditions of hazard and possibility" (2006:94). They looked to 
their inherent skill to navigate the circumstances rather than beginning a political or social 
critique of their situation in which they could have potentially joined in with other Jamaicans 
engaged in the tourist trade.  
In the previous chapters I have argued that the market is constructed through the broader 
assertion of values that aim to militate against the effects of sufferation. Sindhis are obviously 
not a group within the tourism sector that experiences as great a degree of sufferation as other 
Jamaicans such as craft vendors and artisans. After all, the ability to afford a US$ 1,500 monthly 
rent or an US$ 80,000 deposit is impossible for these people. Yet by detailing Sindhi efforts in, 
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and sacrifices made for, the market I have illustrated that the structures of the tourism market in 
Jamaica are highly problematic even for those groups that are seen by other Jamaicans to be 
successful in it. In addition I have revealed how these difficulties are framed through specific 
ethics that rarely makes visible the structural constraints of this marketplace.  
These ethics, like those described by Zaloom and Ho for financial traders, emphasize that if a 
person has the will and the requisite innate talent they will inevitably succeed in the market. It 
therefore supports continuing activity in a volatile, precarious and insecure situation. Yet it is 
different from that described in these ethnographies because it is founded, like in vendors 
discourses of race, in a sense of an essential ethnic quality of "the Sindhi business brain." This 
belief in a quality of a community that inheres in individuals allows sindworkis and shop owners 
to endure in an increasingly precarious situation. This sense remains different from that of 
JAMIA and vendors, however, because the market itself is understood as the medium for the 
expression of a specific kind of moral self rather than an impediment in its realization. When we 
step back from these various ethical projects, however, it is clear that there are objective, 
structural reasons that relate to government policy, class privilege and the positioning of Jamaica 
within the Caribbean and global economy that contribute to the sense of suffering endurance that 
they all contain. As an anthropologist concerned with these ethics and the unequal situation that 
generates them, I am able to scale up these specific senses of sufferation into an analytic of 
sufferation. So while female vendors and JAMIA would not recognize the Sindhis as fellow 
sufferers, my analytic reveals that they are.  
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In the next chapter we will examine the market configuration of, and response to, sufferation 
from yet another vantage point provided by the experiences of the Rastafari Indigenous Village. 
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4                 Babylon Makes the Rules… 
 The Rastafari Indigenous Village 
 
Take Rasta man culture for instance  
Dem think is political joke  
But we people know better than that  
I and I know the truth of it all   
And now I say we must create a scene  
We must recapture our culture by any means 
Babylon makes the rules…  
Where my people suffer  
-Steel Pulse, "Babylon Makes the Rules"; 1979  
The previous chapters have presented the ethics and practices by which vendors, artisans, and 
Sindhi merchants have respectively tried to negotiate their place in the tourist economy of 
Montego Bay and find success in spite of sufferation. All these ethics of sufferation identify the 
market place people endure in as an environment in which they do not receive the correct or 
sufficient support. For the vendors at Bay Fort it was the government's failure to  protect them 
from  Sindhis that generates sufferation. JAMIA sought greater support from the government for 
their artisanal labour and industry of crafts. Even Sindhis were distraught over the government's 
failure to better provide equitable opportunity with the opening of Royal Caribbean's port in 
Falmouth. All of these ethical attributions are focused on the business of selling and production 
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of the material products of souvenirs and tourist goods. Through examining these attributions I 
have scaled up Jamaican and Sindhi experiences of suffering into an analytic of suffering. In this 
chapter I turn this analytic onto another arena in which the government has failed to support its 
citizens, in the enabling of their cultural property rights.  
In this chapter I analyze the radically alternative strategy of the Rastafari Indigenous Village 
(RIV hereafter, or the Village). This group seeks to stake claim to the heart of that which they 
believe brings tourists to Jamaica— the country's cultural reputation—that they believe is largely 
predicated on Rastafari culture. RIV claims that the state and the wider exploitative, 
"Babylonian" economic system profits from their culture, and in doing so they assert a 
framework of sufferation. Through the creation of the tour, RIV has devised a means by which 
they can become integrated into the circuit of tourist revenue. This, they believe, can create 
opportunity for the village members, as well as mitigate their cultural exploitation. As we will 
see, RIV's market participation is guided by an ethic of rights, which is framed through a 
discourse of intellectual and cultural property. The basis for this claim of rights through property 
is an argument of Rastafari indigeneity. However, their strategy is not without its complications. 
This chapter examines these claims of rights and reconsiders the standard anthropological 
accounts of the relations between the market, property, and indigeneity. 
The Rastafari Indigenous  Village 
IION Station (IION), which is an acronym for the "Indigenous Initiating-circle of Nature" is a 
group of Rastafari who came together to form the Rastafari Indigenous Village. IION are self-
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described as "united by their shared concerns over the slow responses within the Rastafari 
movement to rapid socioeconomic changes taking place within Jamaican society." Through 
regular interaction throughout Montego Bay over the past several years, whether at community 
events or musical performances, the group became what its members describe as a "social family 
network." They articulated their concerns through expressions of talent as artisans, poets, 
musicians, craftspersons, and designers, but they mostly functioned as a fusion Reggae-
Nyahbinghi music group. As a network they shared aspirations to raise positive awareness, 
increase education in their communities, and to create opportunities for their small businesses, 
which were tied to various artistic practices based on collective and cooperative development. 
In 2007 members of the group were approached with a request from a party of ninety black 
American women tourists who wanted an immersion into Rastafari culture focusing on the 
wellness aspects of Rastafarian ital food, herbal remedies, and spirituality. Given the size of this 
group of tourists, IION Station approached the Tourism Product Development Company 
(TPDCo.) for assistance in organizing the event. You may recall from chapters one and two that 
TPDCo. is the government agency charged with overseeing the standards of tourism "products," 
namely  attractions like craft markets and tours. Another function of the agency is advising the 
community on the development of new tourism projects as related to regulations, training, and 
overall compliance.  
With the help of TPDCo., the IION Station brethren created a successful event. Following the 
event two members of IION Station recognized that creating a similar more permanent 
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experience was an opportunity to take advantage of a very clear demand in the market.  Doing so 
would help them achieve their social agenda, and help to lift the brethren themselves out of the 
poverty that some of them experienced. Additionally, this would be a chance to present Rastafari 
culture to visitors and to share its message on their own terms. This would correct what members 
described as thin presentations heavily oriented toward Bob Marley and his music.  
Admitting that tourism could be used as a mechanism of development, sustainability, and 
outreach was difficult for the group. This was mainly because Rastafari by tradition and virtue 
are anti-capitalist (Chevannes 1995). Also, the tourist industry is often viewed extremely 
negatively, with many Rastafari, and even the brethren of IION remarking that "tourism is 
'whore-ism'." Moving toward this endeavor caused a rift in the group leading to the departure of 
several members. The remaining IION Station members were joined by a TPDCo. official, 
Arlene, who, with her academic training and interest in heritage tourism became a partner in the 
newly founded venture. Together they formed a company under a limited liability registration as 
"the Rastafari Indigenous Village" and a non-profit, the Royal Africa Hall Benevolent Society, so 
as to qualify for public funding.   
At the start of my fieldwork the village was led by First Man, Kanaka, and Arlene. However, 
because the Village does not officially subscribe to hierarchical organization, the term "guided" 
was preferred. First Man and Kanaka were the two members who initially reached out to TPDCo 
for assistance with the original group of American tourists, and Arlene was the TPDCo official 
who assisted them. Not long after I began working with the group Kanaka passed away 
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unexpectedly. His passing was considered a critical loss to the direction of the Village. Aside 
from being a founding member, his stringent adherence to Rastafari ideology and his strong 
aversion to all things Babylonian functioned as an influential check against the over involvement 
of RIV with the government or commercial endeavors. He balanced the more directly 
commercial ambitions of Arlene. This allowed First Man to take the middle ground between 
Kanaka and Arlene  thereby mitigating some of the possible contradictions in the project of the 
Village.   
The remaining members of the village included performer, and original IION Station member 
Izinigha, who also oversaw the Village craft mall; Maureen, who ran the onsite "ital" kitchen; the 
Village's Nyahbinghi drummers: Jah Teba, Golden Ankh, Fire Shine, and Jah B; and local dub 
poet Ras Rod. Ras Rod would over the duration of my fieldwork take on a more central role in 
the direction of the village, in large part serving as Kanaka's replacement. There was a larger 
membership to the Village, but they seldom took part in the day-to-day tours, but rather 
participated in major events. The Village's members came from impoverished to modest 
backgrounds, and one of them lived on the premises for lack of residence elsewhere.  
Outside of Arlene, First Man, and Ras Rod, the remaining members were little concerned with 
the direction of the village. For the most part they trusted the decisions of Arlene, First Man, and 
Ras Rod. They were primarily focused on the unique opportunity to both earn an income and 
pursue their Rastafari ethic. This income, while somewhat more secure than other sources open 
to them, was still not sufficient enough for them to turn down outside opportunities for work. 
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This fact would somewhat temper their sense of investment in the Village project. Therefore 
members  sometimes struggled in interviews to articulate their ambitions for the village and what 
long term value it held for them. The common account of their participation in the village was 
that it provided a sense of autonomy where they "had no boss." This notion was explained by 
First Man as the Village's "horizontal" organizational structure. This structure is founded on the 
value Rastafarians place on acephalous organizational forms, and also from the long enduring 
work ethic of self-enterprise and suspicion of authority (Edmonds 2002). This could easily be 
confused as RIV functioning according to the "corporate norms of self-initiative, self-
responsibility, and self-engineering" of the neoliberal subject (Ong 2006:222). As I have shown 
with both Bay Fort vendors, and JAMIA, there are particular ethics of work and organization in 
the Caribbean that are consonant with the general thrust of neoliberal practices of individualism, 
but in fact precede the concept's import into the region. Additionally, Rastafari draw 
organizational inspiration from the social, economic, and development platforms of the culture’s 
figureheads. Alvaré (2014) has shown this to be the case in Trinidad, with a group of 
Rastafarians who have modeled their Faith Based Organization on Haile Selassie’s "gospel of 
development." 
The Village is located on a roughly three acre sized parcel of a much larger area of land owned 
by a politically connected family, the Nelsons. Leasing to the Village was a strategic move by the 
Nelsons as the tour provided patronage to the Nelsons' restaurant and bar located on another 
property site, which would complement the tour by catering to the tastes of tourists in an arena 
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the Village would not. In fact to access the Village tourists have to pass through the Nelsons' bar 
on entry and exit.  
The village itself is designed to be an authentic living interactive museum, where a wide range of 
visitors are introduced to the many facets of Rastafari and Jamaica.  Situated in a garden of 
mostly natural flora and fauna, it has a medicinal herbal garden; a place to develop and exhibit 
art and craft; and serves as a gathering place to share Nyahbinghi rhythms and chants. It is a 
"working village" in that, while none but one of the "villagers" lives on premises, they work 
together as a community, to live the philosophy, movement, and lifestyle of Rastafari. Visitors to 
the village numbered more than a thousand in 2011 and included: Jamaican school children; 
university students; and local residents; but mostly overseas tourists. These tourists include a mix 
of middle-income European visitors, and some Americans, who were almost always white. The 
makeup of the clientele however was greatly determined by the tour companies that RIV 
partnered with. One in particular, Caribic Tours, had a strong base with tourists from Germany 
and the Netherlands. Toward the end of my fieldwork, as the Village benefitted from broader 
publicity through the Jamaica Tourist Board, the visitors became much more diverse. The 
following section provides a depiction of the tour. 
The Village Tour 
After a tour group passes through the Nelsons' restaurant and bar they are guided through a 
garden and across a lawn by a barefoot docent clad in a burlap outfit, or what is known in 
Jamaica as "crocus bag." When the tour approaches the Montego River, which at this point 
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stands no deeper than a foot, the group is told how river water is important to Jamaica, and that 
the country's name was given by the original Taino inhabitants, Xamayca, means "the land of 
wood of water." Before crossing, and as the guests are removing shoes and rolling up their pant 
legs in preparation, the guide provides an explanation of the spiritual importance and symbolism 
of  rivers saying that "like life you never go through the same river twice." They then welcome 
the group to take a reflective moment to "give thanks" and use the opportunity to "take one step 
at a time and to share the world space communally." The tourists generally are very taken by this 
moment and become visibly emotionally affected. In the process of crossing, some guides opt to 
explain that in Yoruba heritage the river is represented by the river goddess, or orisha, named 
Oshun, the "river mumma." She controls the river, it is explained, and guests are invited to give 
thanks by throwing five one dollar coins into the river, an amount and denomination I was told is 
completely arbitrary.  
Having crossed to the other bank, guests decide to either slip on their shoes or take in the full 
barefoot experience (following the example of the guide).  A wall of tall bamboo that panels the 
background is the next point of discussion. The group is told that bamboo is technically a grass, 
and one of the world's fastest growing, and that it helps with cleaning the air. The guide 
continues to explain  how  Jamaican bamboo differs from its Asian variant. If not amused by the 
botanical minutiae of the plant, the group's interest is gained when they are told in a 
mythological fashion how bamboo must only be cut on the darkest of nights, in the absence of 
moonlight.  
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By now the Nyahbinghi drums being played in the village can be heard in the distance. As the 
group moves along the path toward the sound the guide points out the Poinciana tree, whose 
pods provide the beads used in maraca-like shakers played in conjunction with the Nyahbinghi 
drum orchestra. Guests are often encouraged to pick up fallen pods and shake them as they walk 
along. Next along the tour, the group comes upon an area of several Castor plants. Stopping to 
look closer at the castor nuts, the external and internal benefits of their oil are described. At this 
point it is advertised that castor oil made by a local woman is available for purchase in the 
village.  
Talk of the ingestible plant segues into a discussion of the nut dense vegan diet subscribed to by 
many Rastafari, which opens up into a presentation of the many banana trees coming up on the 
approach. Seen as a treat to the many North American and European visitors, who, while often 
keen consumers of banana, have seldom, if ever, encountered the fruit trees. The visitors are 
given a comprehensive lesson on bananas, their uses both unripened (green) and ripened, how 
they are picked, and as an allegory demonstrating the relatedness between all in nature, are told 
that bananas, like babies, take nine months to grow.  Moving past the bananas, the group comes 
upon an old, single, semi functional sugar cane mill. The guide simulates how the cane is pushed 
through one side as the top mechanism is turned  and juice comes out the other. Further detail of 
the remaining process from cane to sugar is often provided, though this depends upon the length 
and size of the tour.  
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Tall coconut trees are just beyond the mill, and as the group moves nearer to them different types 
of coconut trees are given a brief history as their produce of water, oil, and husks, and their uses, 
are described. The group is warned not to stand underneath the tree, which is deemed to be 
“generous." This is often responded to with laughter and cautionary glances upward. As the 
group follows the trail past Heliconias and other attractive flora like Ginger and Lily, they are 
shown the local elongated Otaheite apples, which are to be sampled later along the tour. 
Afterwards they are shown the local cacao tree whose podded beans are used to make Jamaican 
chocolate tea. Often this stop is omitted because local children have stripped the trees bare.  As 
the walk nears its  end, the group is told to look down at the "Shame Me Macka" herb, which 
responds to touch by rapidly contracting and immediately springing back to full form.  This little 
plant is often the star of the walk.  By this point the group has arrived at the village gate and are 
welcomed by the full pulse of Nyahbinghi drumming.  
Entering the grounds, visitors rest on shaded bamboo benches positioned perpendicularly to each 
other, giving the visitors full view of the village's main sites of attraction.  Receiving freshly cut 
coconut water to drink the visitors begin the second segment of their tour with a lecture. At this 
point their now familiar docent retires and another "brethren" takes over. Recounting the 
histories of Rastafari, slavery, and Jamaica in a blended narrative that conveys an ontology of 
Rastafarian culture, the guide directs the groups' attention to the bonfire lit in the center of the 
village. He explains the symbolic importance of fire as an agent of spiritual purification. The 
group is then brought just beyond the bonfire to "the seal," a small ritualistic basin of water 
surrounded by healing herbs, which sits in the center of a rock outline of the shape of Jamaica. At 
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the seal the guide talks about the importance of entering into a sacred space and being balanced 
within it and within one's self. The herbs present are acknowledged as having their own balanced 
and balancing energies. Guests are told that those who enter the space of the village should 
likewise be spiritually aligned and are invited become so by circling the seal three times.  
Continuing the tour, the group is guided toward the "ital" kitchen, "ital," a variant of the word 
"vital," is indicative of a vegan, unprocessed diet that shares a religious meaning similar to 
"Kosher" and "Halal."  Passing a stage area used on occasion for the reading of poetry and other 
presentations, the guests arrive at the kitchen.  A presentation is given by sister Maureen on what 
comprises the Rastafari diet and its salubrious effect. Displaying a variety of herbs, nuts and 
fruit, Maureen details their nutritional and medicinal components, often challenging more daring 
visitors to "try" the diminutive "bird pepper" (Pequin), which is touted as good for digestion.  
Leaving the kitchen the group moves on to the labyrinth. Made of short, three-foot-high bamboo 
posts, the labyrinth was created for meditation as guests make their way through the maze and 
complete their journey at its center. Here there is a sitting stone on which they can complete their 
meditation. This is described to tourists as a "healing garden," a "healing walk," or a "meditation 
walk." Visitors are told that it is a "very balancing thing to do," and that "as you walk through to 
the center, you walk through to the center of yourself." Just behind the labyrinth, a herbal spa 
overlooking the river is under construction where massages and "bush baths" will be provided, 
and together with the labyrinth, the area will become a spa garden. 
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After a few guests venture walking through the labyrinth in an attempt to gain a meditative state, 
the group passes a little hut, with a hammock hung within, known as the "chill out hut." There, 
tourists take pictures of themselves in front of the hut. This building stands as a representation of 
a purported village residence, representative because the only person who lives on site does so in 
a large camping tent hidden at the back of the property. Across from the hut one of the "villagers" 
is usually "on post" beating herbs in a large mortar, and tending to a yam being roasted upon a 
wheel rim stove. Opposite the hut is the herb garden with over ninety rock beds of healing herbs, 
not all natural  to Jamaica, but all part of the local medicinal repertoire.  Called the village's 
herbal "farm-acy," the guide typically goes over about six or so herbs like "Search Mi Heart," 
"Leaf of Life," mint, dandelion, "Dog Tongue," "Guinea Hen," and Lemongrass.  The guide often 
makes clear for wondering minds that there is no marijuana grown within the garden and then 
invites the group to go around and have a closer look.  
The tour then culminates at a visit to "the big hut." It appears just as its name implies, and in the 
hut the guests are led to bamboo chairs and benches that face a gathering of drums. The hut is 
meant as a didactic instrument. Its many posts are decorated with pictures of key members of the 
Rastafari pantheon—Haile Selassie, Marcus Garvey, and Empress Menen of Ethiopia (Haile 
Selassie's wife), as well as their speeches. It is also filled with other African and African 
diasporic iconography such as the Kemetic (Egyptian) ankh and Akan adinkra symbols. In the 
big hut all members of the village are present and the program continues with a lecture about the 
principles, beliefs, and practices of Rastafari. During this the kitchen staff serve the guests a light 
snack of fruits, or sometimes a more substantial, cooked meal, depending on the tour, plated in 
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bamboo, coconut, or calabash dishes. After the lecture and meal, one or more brethren recite a 
poem. This is followed by chanting, all to a soaring background of Nyahbinghi rhythms. This 
continues for nearly thirty minutes, and then guests are invited to try their hand at the drums. It is 
only during this moment of interaction that guests are permitted to take photos of the brethren. 
Those who try beforehand are told that to do so would objectify the brethren, and are reminded 
that they are partaking in an experience of cultural exchange, and not one way spectatorship.  At 
the end of the hut presentation guests are told that personalized engraved shakers are available 
for purchase. After saying their goodbyes to the musicians the group is led to the onsite "craft 
mall," where a variety of Rastafari and Jamaica-themed souvenirs—some locally made and 
others purchased from Sindhi wholesalers— are on sale.  Across from the craft mall RIV has 
constructed a museum as well as three two story cottages with toilet facilities to accommodate 
future guests who wish to remain in what many tourists regard as paradise. 
With the village tour, RIV is tapping into a worldwide trend in which lifestyle ideologies are 
oriented toward slower and more traditional forms of living (Jaffe 2010:31). One way in which 
they have aligned themselves in this manner is their affiliation with the Slow Food movement, 
sending representatives to the organization's 2008 Terra Madre conference in Italy. Also the 
labyrinth depicted above was explained to be part of an international network of labyrinths 
affiliated with the Labyrinth Society. This is an international group that promotes the spiritual 
and psychological benefits of maze walking. These activities are consonant with well established 
health conscious movements, products and lifestyles that are touted as the antidote to the fast-
paced lives led in the developed world. Dutch anthropologist Bart Barendregt has termed such 
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movements as "eco-chic," "a combination of lifestyle politics, environmentalism, spirituality, 
concern with health and beauty, and a return to simple living" (Jaffe 2010:31). 
Rivke Jaffe, building on Barendregt's term has coined the similarly purposed "ital chic" in 
identifying "consumption that combines environmental, ethical, and health concerns with a 
luxurious, chic sensibility…articulated principally through the indigenous practices, philosophy, 
and aesthetics associated with Rastafari" (2010:32). Ital chic is a "form of consumption that re-
valorizes local, pre-global tastes and traditions in a very modern, global way" (Jaffe 2010:40). In 
identifying ital chic Jaffe borrows Edmonds (2002) definition of "ital" as "a commitment to using 
things in their natural or organic states…" (2010:32). The ital principle as discussed in this 
section is central to the Rastafari lifestyle and that which comprises members' "livity," or 
spiritual life. It is the commodification of the Rastafarian "ital livity" that Jaffe has identified as 
the driving force behind ital chic. The process involves the "reframing of Rastafari elements as 
fashionable [that] happens in part through the global recognition and validation of Rastafari and 
the international trends toward slow, natural, and ethical living" (Jaffe 2010:33). 
The Market of Ital Chic 
The presentations of ital chic appropriate the "auratic, affective, social worth..." of Rastafarian 
culture, symbols, and aesthetic forms for commercial profit with little to no benefit returned to 
Rastafarians or any particular community among them (Comaroff and Comaroff  2009: 27). 
Rastafarian culture, therefore, suffers from its own popularity. This is noted in the number of 
products that carry direct or suggestive markings or references to the culture. Jaffe (2010) gives 
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numerous examples of commercial products and services that employ the affect of ital chic, such 
as health spas and restaurants, natural food and beauty products, and even the (modified) wearing 
of dreadlocks. I would suggest though that ital chic can be used beyond the limited sense of 
becoming natural to encompass a wider range of sentiments, such as rebelliousness or creativity. 
This  opens up an examination of  the articles of Rastafari culture to be used in much broader 
commercial contexts. 
The extended use of ital chic may simply be the presence of the Rastafarian red, gold and green 
tricolors in a clothing line, such as its popular display in Adidas' own copyrighted three stripe 
motif. Or it could be the employment of Rastafarian terms in the names and promotion of 
products, such as in London-based Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee start-up, Iriieville's brand of 
"Irie Coffee." The use of the term "irie," which is a superlative form of being "all right," in this 
case serves to demonstrate both the impact of ital chic as a presentation of relaxation as well a 
sense of coolness. Critically, it shows that ital chic can also include the use of Rasta language. 
One of the most recent and controversial examples of this use of language was Volkswagen 
USA's 2013 Super Bowl ad "Get Happy," which featured a white American man in a nondescript 
office of mostly disgruntled and pessimistic employees. In the ad this lead actor, speaking in 
Jamaican patois encouraged everyone to be more optimistic by eventually giving them a ride in 
his VW Beetle. This commercial has been primarily criticized in the Jamaican media as a parody 
of Jamaican culture broadly construed. However, the terms used throughout the commercial were 
predominantly Rastafarian. For example the cast regularly respond with the popular affirmative 
Rastafarian phrase, "Yes, I"— the "I" pronoun being used in Rastafari speak, known as "Iyaric," 
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to represent the God principle in man, commonly referenced as "I and I." Aside from the terms, 
the general positivity represented is strongly, if not exclusively, a reference to the stereotypical 
laid back attitudes of Rastafarians, which is often ascribed to all Jamaicans.  
Another example made popular by the British television program, Dragon's Den, where 
entrepreneurs pitch their ideas to investors, is the "Reggae, Reggae Sauce" brand. The product 
was created by Jamaican expatriate Levi Roots—real name Keith Valentine Graham—who is 
himself a proclaimed Rastafarian, and arguably the main object of the sauce's marketing. The 
sauce's bottle is emblazoned with red, gold, and green in the background of the silhouette of a 
dancing Rastafarian with dreadlocks swaying behind him. This image trades on the aesthetic and 
"spirit" of Rastafarian reggae culture by its imagery and accompanying tag line "Put some music 
in your food." This is the same sentiment at the heart of ital chic and that which is insinuated in 
the marketing of the aforementioned brands: the promotion of an alternative way of life, which is 
perhaps simpler, but definitely more peaceful and happy as long as you drive a Beetle, eat a 
particular sauce, or drink a certain brand of coffee. However, one only has to look to the Sindhi 
souvenir shops and their countless red, gold, and green and dreadlocked products to encounter 
the everyday exploitation of Rastafarian culture. 
Rights as Market Ethics 
These products pull apart all of the ethical principles that lie within the language and material 
presentations of Rastafari culture. In doing so they profit from the promotion of Rastafari values, 
through the "(dis)articulation of global brand logics" of these values and their "local 
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aesthetics" (Nakassis 2012:701). Through the projects of the village, RIV seeks to mitigate 
Rastafarians' loss of both revenue from products and, perhaps more importantly, control over the 
cultural image by themselves trading on the phenomenon of "ital chic." The market for RIV is 
thus understood through an ethic of rights, and the particular forms of rights in their view are 
those of intellectual and cultural property. Rasta agitation over cultural rights is inspired by more 
than the infringement of property and seeks to address the long endured exploitation of the rights 
of black people. Deborah Thomas' own discussion of the Rastafari Indigenous Village pairs that 
initiative with the history of state violence against Rastafari in Jamaica (2011; chapter 5).  IP 
claims are thus an attempt to seek recompense for that historical abuse as well as contemporary 
abuses created by the unauthorized use of Rastafari cultural images and objects.  
The issue at the core of the ethics of the members of the RIV is, as Michael Brown notes, "less 
about intellectual property than about resistance to the uncontrolled proliferation of 
signs" (2003:86). However, promoting and profiting from ital chic uses that which infringes on 
Rastafari rights in defense of those rights. For the Village the configuration and use of 
intellectual property rights serves as an equalizing force in the commercial re-appropriation of 
Rastafarian culture. For example First Man told me, "From an intellectual property stand point 
we don't have any real ownership on nothing," continuing he added "without having ownership, 
'free trade' is what is taking place, and other people can really come and take away our ideas and 
culture because we don't have the instruments to protect ourself."  
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Without full IP provisions, First Man, like other RIV members, suggested that various cultural 
industries in Jamaica, like Rastafari, are vulnerable to exploitation by outside groups. He was 
critical of the government's complicity in the matter, "A man can come and buy people's things 
who haven't protected them, set up a factory or choose a factory on the outside, and there is no 
interference from government, and then you find you have no legs to stand on more than to just 
quarrel." "Quarreling" refers to an argument of market morality, as evidenced in the first chapter 
regarding vendors' claims of injustice in the market system. Without sufficient institutional 
safeguards or processes that provide commercial security for craftspeople or others in the 
creative industry, the only recourse is to "quarrel."  "All you can do is to have something in place 
that shows that this is wrong," First Man concedes. He explains his trouble with the current 
system, or lack thereof, in the country: 
Jamaica is just a park for business. Everyone else has it as somewhere where they 
are doing business and their repatriation (remittance) process is in place for their 
dollars to go back. We as the African (Jamaican) that lives here…we live here, we 
don't do business here, we are the workers and the consumers and once that is still 
in our head we are not going to know what to tell government say and we are not 
going to try and identify our own channels, and we are going to continue to battle 
in trying to get it from them people, we need to try a create our own markets.  
For First Man one channel is the village, and its broader endeavor of intellectual property claims. 
These claims, he contends, "ensure a relationship and to safeguard [against] someone simply 
coming in [and infringing on locals' rights]…" First Man asserts that creating an attractive 
product is the most likely way of gaining protection by forcing state recognition. "There are so 
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many products that the Rasta man can do right now, like the village. No one can really right now 
do a product like the village and have it as authentic as it can be." 
Government interest in the commercial project of the village unfortunately has not translated into 
support for the issues around Rastafari intellectual property. The Jamaican Intellectual Property 
Office (JIPO) and the Jamaican Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO) are the two agencies 
respectively charged with protecting Jamaica's intellectual and cultural property and with finding 
ways in which the country can be promoted for national commercial benefit. JIPO seeks to 
curtail the increasing foreign profiting from nationally inspired products by the creation and 
issue of protective seals and markings, as well as by bringing suit against any breach of 
copyright. The limits of these agencies' power and reach, however, has meant that little can been 
done in the way of addressing concerns over IP infringement.  
Charles Robertson, a top administrator for JAMPRO conceded in an interview with me that the 
government has been "a poor steward of Jamaica's cultural property." He explained that 
JAMPRO had witnessed businesses in countries like China and India capitalize on Jamaica's 
brand through manufacturing, and likewise other foreign groups profit from Jamaican branded 
sauces, coffees, music and culture. He states, "A number of foreign [companies in] countries 
seem to take the brand and develop a product surrounding it and sell it back to us." He cites the 
efforts of his organization and JIPO where they have begun the task of registering items, images, 
etc., but admits that the challenge is in their regulation, "We don't have the resources to police, 
for example, if someone in the US infringes on our copyright. We can't sue them from Jamaica it 
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has to be done there, so the brand has to be registered there and then you litigate in the States." 
Mr. Robertson's admission gives pause, and draws to mind Brown's (2003) titular question, 
"Who owns Native Culture?" a question complicated by the limited resources available to 
claimants in the Caribbean.  
Trading on cultural branding serves as a viable means to diversify the economy for states who 
"see little other recourse given the demise of a model of development based on direct aid and 
trade preferences from former colonial powers" (Maurer 2004:310). Jamaica therefore seeks 
"The creation of distinctive 'island identities' through image industries like tourism…" (ibid.). 
Kedron Thomas has noted how increasingly the "self commodification of ethnicity is becoming 
more frequently proposed development strategy" in developing countries (2013:218). Despite the 
argument that the most popular and profitable aspects of Jamaican culture and iconography have 
been produced by the island's Rastafarian communities, unfortunately the Jamaican government 
is unable to defend against infringements on what it considers broader Jamaican intellectual 
property, much less that of Rastafari.  
First Man, therefore, told me that Rastafari IP rights "are in a redress mode, reconciliation 
mode." He affirmed that the contesting of ownership over explicit Rastafarian-influenced 
products is underway by the Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millennium Council, or more 
concisely known as the "Rastafari Millennium Council," (the Council, hereafter). Founded in 
2007, the Council is an organization composed of multiple Rastafarian groups, of which RIV is 
one, which works on behalf of the broader Rastafari community with the aim of representing 
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their causes and protecting their rights. Two of the Council's four point mission objectives 
exclusively address intellectual property and the "theft and abuse of the symbols, emblems, 
music, cultural marks, tangible and intangible heritage of the Rastafari community worldwide."  
State inability to protect Jamaican intellectual property and that specific to Rastafari 
communities, means that RIV and the Council's challenge is not reducible to a singular discourse 
or simple action. With little to no help available within Jamaica, the Council has turned to the 
United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and works primarily within its 
infrastructures in their fight to address their claim of IP infringement. WIPO has for some time 
demonstrated support for  Jamaica's Maroon communities and members of the Rastafari Council 
have recently also been able to also attract their attention. Council members have recently begun 
participating in WIPO activities during the organization's visits to the country. Once such activity 
that took place during my fieldwork saw delegates from the Charles Town Maroon community of 
Portland, Jamaica and RIV participate in a multi-day seminar on the documenting of indigenous 
cultural practices. 
Frustrated Sovereignty 
The relationship with WIPO, however, is predicated upon the assertion of indigeneity. Unlike 
that of first nation groups, Rastafari's indigeneity is made problematic by its late inception and its 
individual electability. Though considered indigenous to Jamaica in the non-legal sense, the 
Rastafari community does not, in fact, qualify as an "indigenous community" under prevailing 
international norms, which assert that indigenous groups are deemed so by "[H]aving a historical 
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continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them."  
For members of the village, "indigenous does not [necessarily] mean endemic," and the group 
charts a nuanced path to their autochthonous identity.1 The group maintains that people who were 
not indigenous to a land can become so by law, referring in particular to the Maroon community 
of Jamaica as an example of successful indigenous qualification. In their defense Rastafari 
indigeneity has been defined and defended on the bases of various instruments that provide 
indigenous status (Goffe 2009). These include: individual self-identification as a member of an 
indigenous community; the entitlement of displaced persons to the continuity of pre-
displacement tradition; and the rights as a traditional community; and minority group (Goffe 
2009). Deborah Thomas provides helpful insights into how to analyze Rastafari's alternate 
indigeneity as she considers how a Rasta indigeneity problematically sits within the history of 
Rastafari persecution in Jamaica: 
[T]he framing of Rastafari as Jamaica's indigenous population…is not only a bit 
of rhetorical sleight-of-hand…it is also an attempt to redefine "indigenous" as that 
which has been created and developed on Jamaican soil, though not necessarily 
prior to European conquest […]. [Indigeneity] is mobilized instead to draw 
attention to a history of disenfranchisement – both politically and in relation to 
land ownership. Redefining indigeneity in this way, then, gives teeth to the 
reframing of citizenship…[t]o position Rastafarians as indigenous is thus not only 
to emphasize the connection to land and their rejection of the technologies and 
simulacra that provide toxic structure to the modern condition or to focus on 
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aspects of the lifestyle that are rooted in a relationship to the natural landscape 
that few Jamaicans currently maintain. It is also to invert the usual hierarchies, to 
convince people around the world of Rastafarians lifestyle… (2011:212-213). 
Claims to indigeneity, as Thomas asserts, enable the legitimation of Rastafari citizenship and 
place within the geographical and political landscape of Jamaica. For the purpose of IP rights 
however, RIVs claims are challenged by the complex history of not only Rastafari's origin and 
orientation, but of Caribbean culture broadly. The adoption of Rastafari as a force of general 
cultural influence and formation in Jamaica, and that Rastafari "…whether urban or rural – is 
also fully globalized, in terms of adherents, technology, and outlook" (Thomas 2011:208), 
complicates claims to explicit ownership of Rastafarian cultural products. One could also argue 
that Jamaican culture is in a large part what composes Rastafari culture, supporting the notion 
that "salient features of culture are, by definition, shared and therefore public"  (Brown 2003: 
28). And herein lies the problem for RIV and the Council: IP rights claims made by indigenous 
people are made on the basis of collective possession.  
That collectivity, especially in the context of commercial infringement, is mandated by cultural 
difference (Strathern 1999:168; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:74, 3). This "difference" is defined 
by Humphrey and Verdery as "a homology between the oneness of the group or 'people' and 
certain kinds of objects in which they see their identity as residing" (2004:7). But the easy 
integration between Rastafari culture and everyday Jamaican culture and again the electability of 
Rastafari adherence, complicates who does or does not count as a "people" whether Rastafarian, 
or Jamaican and who can access their objects. Because of the blurred lines of identification 
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between Rastafarian and Jamaican culture, there has been a need for Rastafari to assert their 
difference and their separation.  
This is unlike where indigenous culture is deemed unusable and unprofitable, and thus the "thrust 
of the indigenous IPR [intellectual property rights] movement" has been to "re-embed [and] re-
contextualize indigenous ownership in indigenous traditional culture" (Strathern  1999:167). As 
Humphrey and Verdery have noted  "the question of value," is central to any property relation 
and "no one wants to establish social relationships with respect to things of no value" (2004:2). 
But, this is not the case in Jamaica as evidenced by the previous section's discussion, which 
noted the profitable display and promotion of Jamaica's "indigenous" products by the Jamaican 
state and by other local and foreign commercial entities. 
So the Council and RIV are compelled to employ the tactic of differentiating indigeneity to make 
the case for, and claims to, indigeneity. Arguably this has been done to some significant success, 
given the support they have received from WIPO. As Haidy Geismar has demonstrated with 
Māori and ni-Vanuatu peoples, intellectual and cultural property serve as categories that can 
"constitute indigenous identities and, by extension, sovereignties…for the production of 
alternative economic imaginaries" (2013:xi). Likewise RIV's proposed indigeneity is the basis on 
which they make their claims, which in working to shore up their sense of autochthony serves as 
the basis of their economic strategy. This is what Li has termed the "management of 
dispossession" the means by which the concept of indigeneity is used as a defensive response to 
capitalism, which appears in "processes of dispossession as an external force against which 
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indigenous people and their allies stand united" (2010:385). Through IP, RIV in particular and 
Rastafari, such as First Man, broadly reposition themselves within the economy, so that their 
grievances can be viewed by people in positions of authority as legitimate. 
Humphrey and Verdery have noted the problems of assuming the language of "rights" prevalent 
in Euro-American discourses of property. Instead they suggest that it may be preferable to 
employ terms such as  "claims, liabilities, or debts" (2004:6). However, there is an inherent 
contentiousness in the claims of IP rights as groups strive to assert or contest ownership, and 
imbedded in that process is a convention of morality that resonates with the spirit of resistance at 
the heart of Rastafari. Therefore the "property regime," or the "dominant set of shared 
understandings about property in a given political economy" as it is understood in Jamaica, and 
determined by organizations like WIPO, is easily adopted by Rastafari (Humphrey and Verdery 
2004:17). IP discourses employed by RIV and the Council are understood through these lenses, 
and their use should not be viewed as surprising. This is made especially clear where a language 
of reparations is used as a framework for compensation over claims of infringed intellectual or 
cultural property rights.  Humphrey and Verdery, citing Povinelli, suggest that reparations is a 
mode of compensation for an injustice that "makes a taking seem consensual" by implying  "a 
moment of consent, which must be elicited" (2004:12). Thomas asserts, however, that 
"reparations is not just a claim for compensation. Rather, the quantification of redress is a 
strategy for recognition…" (2011: 220). 
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RIV makes property claims so as "to improve their situations or seek redress…" through a 
"politics of recognition" (Humphrey and Verdery 2004: 8). As Povinelli notes, however, "the law 
of recognition mandate a social and affective (spiritualized kinship and descent) content of 
Indigenous territoriality; it mandates a specific ideological form of those social relations – 
agential, abstract, universalizing, context-breaking" (Povinelli 2004:193). In that process, RIV's 
recognition, by either the Jamaican state or WIPO enables an indigenization by way of 
"provincialization," as Haidy Geismar (2013) centrally argues in her text on the relations 
between intellectual and cultural property and indigeneity in the Pacific. Provincialization and its 
property forms, such as copyright, "consolidate multiple discussions of rights, allowing 
participation in wider spheres of exchange, while at the same time limiting the terms of their 
engagement" (Geismar 2013:61-62). Therefore the demand for recognition of RIV by its 
members is also an act of delimitation, bringing the group into the Jamaican nation-state. The 
state, Geismar asserts, is "the ultimate provincial entity" though often "compromised by 
multilateral trade agreements and international conventions" as we have seen by the account of 
Charles Robertson from JAMPRO (Geismar 2013: 21, 23). Therefore, culture as an economic, 
social, or political resource is "made viable" by state recognized entitlements (Geismar 2013:21).  
Intellectual and cultural properties are "powerful imaginaries" for the development and assertion 
of "ideas about indigenous sovereignty and alternative economies" (Geismar 2013:213). 
Progress, or "moving into the twenty-first century" as noted by First Man, means creating 
commercial opportunities for the Rastafari community. First Man explains the idea: 
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The Rastafari way of life serves as a model that says indigenous people who think 
like this and are in a way of life don't necessarily have to convert themselves to 
the system...but can find a way to get each person in their evolving space and 
expand themselves at the same time...moving toward that kind of Marcus Garvey 
model [of collective self-reliance].  
However, these imaginaries manifest in the form of the tour and material culture of the RIV and 
the demands for intellectual property rights, put into practice an "untidy, negotiated arrangement 
involving multiple tradeoffs" (Brown 2004:55). Legal recognitions are required for the making 
of legal claims, and culture has to be situated within the terms of these legal practices. In that 
process, however, much is lost, as well as gained. The village, as an agent of commodification of 
Rastafari "cultural products" becomes a "force of world making" (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009:28). Ethno-preneurialism has been shown as a "mode of finding selfhood through 
vernacular objects" (ibid.). However, in the case of the Rastafari Indigenous Village, that 
selfhood is compromised at best, and completely undermined at worst. 
Gone into Babylon: Market Moralities 
RIV has been successful in gaining some recognition from the state. In 2011 they earned a 
development grant worth over twenty million Jamaican dollars (US$ 200,000) with funding 
awarded by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) and the Rural Economic Development 
Initiative (REDI). Such a grant is what JAMIA hoped for, but did not achieve.  This grant was 
used to fund significant renovation at the village. The village was able to improve the 
infrastructure and features of their establishment with the construction of a Rastafari museum, 
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three cottages for overnight tourist visits, with separate toilet and washing facilities, a herbal spa 
center, and an improved kitchen site. The project was officially opened on April 4, 2014 by 
Sharon Ffolkes Abrahams, State Minister for Industry, Investment, and Commerce, and Member 
of Parliament for West Central St James, the parish constituency where the village is located. The 
State Minister described the Village's concept as "a great vision of how [to] do community 
tourism…". 
The support from the state has brought the village into the official catalogue of attractions listed 
by the Jamaica Tourist Board. Therefore it sits squarely within the remit of this organization's 
promotion of ital chic. RIV is a microcosm of emerging forms of heritage and community 
tourism in Jamaica. This has seen the emergent popularity of the "village as business" model, 
spearheaded by Diana McIntyre-Pike, president of Countrystyle Community Tourism Network 
(CCTN). CCTN is a network of several "villages" across Jamaica intended "to assist 
communities in developing their infrastructure so that they can offer community experience tours 
to local and international visitors, so that these visitors can experience the lifestyle of our 
villages, our people, our heritage, our culture, our Jamaican foods and so much more."  Known 38
as "the Jamaican Model," village as business projects have gained the attention of the UNESCO 
World Heritage Centre, with Mrs. McIntyre-Pike having been recently invited to their World 
Heritage Sustainable Tourism Experts meeting. The model has also garnered the interest of 
several governments invested in developing community and heritage based tourism programs, as 
evidenced by a South African delegation of entrepreneurs, scholars, and government officials 
who visited Jamaica and RIV during my fieldwork. The delegation sought to learn how to better 
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support and promote a Rastafarian village located in Knysna, a town located in South Africa's 
Western Cape province and how to apply the model to other projects in the country. 
RIV's village as business model has seen increased support from government funding initiatives 
and agencies. However, qualifying for that support did not come without ramifications. First 
Man acknowledges that the current format is problematic, however it is essential for "getting a 
group of people together who never thought about business structure, timelines and so on, to 
actually start thinking that way." Seeking funding assistance from the Jamaican state and 
becoming involved in ventures related to tourism are both activities that directly contradict the 
principles of Rastafari's anti-Babylonian ideology. In explaining the difficulty of their position, 
First Man recalled, that he "had to go around to the community of Rasta and prepare their mind 
and explain that what we are doing is progress, but the community said of course '[we] are using 
the name of Rastafari to collect how much money…'." Additionally, members of the broader 
Rastafari community were uncomfortable with what they saw as RIV's complicity with 
"Babylon."  "I had to let them know that it is criteria based," he recounted. In order to receive 
any funding, he explained that "you have to be in tourism, you have to be a benevolent society, 
be an LLC....all of these things." It was difficult even for one of the founding members of the 
village to perceive applying for JSIF funding as anything but encouraging Rastafari to "go into 
Babylon…".  "Even though you might say you don't want to take Rastafari totally into that 
mode," First Man muses, "...you certainly don't want a situation where we can't manage to 
survive in the twenty-first century. You have to be able to deliver on certain things." 
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In noting the "many 'products' that the Rasta man can do," First Man evinces the innate 
commercial value and potential diversity of Rastafarian commodities. It was explained to me that 
other future products and projects would naturally arise from the village project. One such idea 
was the easy merchandizing of Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee, simply marketed in RIV 
packaging. This model of marketing locally made goods under the RIV brand was conceived to 
potentially encompass a number of future products including soaps, oils, and crafts. Also, each 
new facility within the village was thought be an independent attraction within itself. One could 
come to the village solely for the spa services, or to stay in the cottages, without necessarily 
partaking in the tour.  
The village for its members is "Rastafari put into a framework of modern existence" and a 
blueprint for sustainability of the community. To the village, Rastafari began in a "technological 
time, and was spread by technology," and thus they "exist in a modern time [but] are choosing 
ancient ways,  [as a] modern people who are making a decision to balance technology...to move 
on into the twenty-first century and "be able to even govern yourself." "I think that what we are 
doing at the village is a good primer toward self governance…" This "self-governance" 
according to First Man included valuable skill sets such as planning, corporation, structure, 
standards "all of these things are going to be important for us to exist," First Man asserts, "...and 
its an attitude that is necessary for development." "The Maroons are searching for a model 
themselves," he declares in comparison, "and they still don't have one that empowers the 
individual, everyone is working trying to get paid, which is the same with us now, but for the 
future, their model has no definition." For First Man the village is a potential model not just for 
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Rastafari but also for all indigenous communities. First Man envisages a day when the village 
can develop beyond an attraction, and perhaps into an actual village where Rastafari people buy 
and cultivate land, and manufacture goods, though he is keen to maintain a museum and provide 
lectures.  
And so, given the limits of commercial opportunity, RIV, lean on self- commodification. This is 
what the Comaroffs have famously noted as "ethno-preneurialism," the driving force behind 
what they have identified and dubbed "Ethnicity, Inc.," "… the incorporation of identity, the 
rendering of ethnicized populations into corporations of one kind or another [and] the creeping 
commodification of their cultural products and practices (2009:21). However, Jaffe gives a 
warning that in ital chic's drawing on Rasta aesthetics and symbols as it promises beauty, health, 
spiritual wellness, and cultural pride, it simultaneously sanitizes and pacifies the sharpest aspects 
of Rastafari culture (Jaffe 2010:40). 
Alvaré (2010) encountered a similar occurrence with a group of erstwhile radical Trinidadian 
Rastafari who endeavored to found an NGO in order to access funding for their social project. 
What Alvaré discovered was that in the group's proceeding through the demands of the state's 
NGO registration process, their revolutionary ideology was challenged by the guidelines causing 
a reevaluation of their notions of social justice leading them to  "'fall into' new patterns of NGO 
practice" (2010:180). In order to not only qualify, but to compete with other NGOs for the funds 
their group had to "adopt the structure, discourses, and practices associated with the 
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professionalized NGO model" (2010:188) and "recognize their connections with state 
governments and realize the limits of their own supposed autonomy" (2010:193).  
Compliance then engenders the sanitization of, and distancing from, the radicalism inherent in 
Rasta ideology and practice. This occurs in the effort to "make  Rastafari acceptable, to ensure 
that its broad idioms are marked as clean and proper" as Jaffe  notes in the broader 
commercialization of Rastafari (2010:33). The question remains how, or even if, partaking in the 
business of Rastafari helps to attain the rights of property, or if the group simply becomes 
another stakeholder in the success of Rastafari commodification. The village project is thus 
highly problematic because of its engagement with market value as articulated through the 
positioning of its culture as property. 
As the "Rastafari Indigenous Village" (RIV), the brethren of the "IION Station" family seek to 
profit from what they see as the foundation for Jamaica's internationally popular culture: their 
own Rastafari tradition. However, as mentioned, capitalism, as a Babylonian evil, is anathema to 
the Rastafari way of life. Therefore, RIV attempt involvement in the market without being 
influenced by its values and without jeopardizing their own by seeking to separate the market 
from their ethics. In this way they are differentiated from JAMIA, craft vendors and Sindhi 
businesses that seek to more fully integrate their morals and ethics within the market. However, 
this project of separation is complicated by the organizational and financial methods and 
frameworks required to run their business. RIV, more so than any other group discussed in this 
thesis, "struggle to come to terms with the clash of deeply ingrained moralities and the daily 
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pressures, opportunities, and inequalities posed by [the] market…" (Mandel and Humphrey 
2002:1). 
Sufferation through Sanitization 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Rastafari itself was a means by which black Jamaicans 
coped with the systemic suffering produced by the Jamaican colonial state. The group came to 
epitomize "the sufferer" serving as an abiding reminder of the wickedness of Babylon. However, 
that suffering over time and through the popularized musical form by which it was conveyed 
became the basis of commercial interest. The village project was envisioned as a format whereby 
the "interest" of Rastafari commerce could be recouped from those who have capitalized on their 
culture. That process, though, has not been without its complications and controversies. Again, 
Rastafari's anti-capitalist orientation runs in direct contradiction with the commercial model of 
the village. However, as evidenced by tourism marketing there is a firm sense that Jamaican 
commercial potential is tied up in the "'exploitable' collective self" of Jamaican culture 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:5), an issue that stands at the heart of our discussion.  
During my fieldwork with RIV, Deborah Thomas released her latest work, Exceptional Violence 
(2011). The book takes violence and representations of violence in Jamaica as entry points to 
examine postcolonial state formation in Jamaica and forwards reparations as a critical and 
analytical framework.  The final chapter "Resurrected Bodies 1963/2007," provided an extensive 
discussion of the state and Rastafari relations against the backdrop of the 1963 government 
massacre of Rastafarians, known as the "Coral Gardens incident," or "Bad Friday." The chapter 
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explores the changing relationship between the two parties with a profile of the then nascent 
Rastafari Indigenous Village. She noted the apparent contradictions and incongruences between 
the conventional ethos of Rastafari and its adherents' "resistance to tethering their futures on the 
whims of a neoliberal global market that privileges movement, entrepreneurship, and 
individualism"  and the contemporary project of RIV (2011:207). However, she warned against 
the temptation to give such a project a "cynical read" (2011:16)and suggested instead  to view the 
project in light of its temporal context, stating:  
Think about what Rasta's shift from disengagement to engagement means in 
contemporary context and, in the process, consider the kinds of engagement that 
are possible today, compared with those that might have been possible at other 
moments.…[I]f during the modernist moment of the mid-20th century 
Rastafarians condemned the state, defined citizenship in relation to Africa, refused 
wage labor and instead emphasized self-determination and self-sufficiency 
through forms of communal living, in the neoliberal era they seek greater 
recognition from and representation within the Jamaican state. And while they 
continue to emphasize self-determination and self-sufficiency, the means by 
which this might be realized have changed…(2011:218). 
There is at the heart of RIV's project of intellectual property a radical proposition with the 
potential to ultimately challenge who truly owns, or at least is able to speak for Jamaica's cultural 
brand. The RIV project could disrupt what has been for so long the conventional packaging of 
Caribbean culture as Rastafarianism. However, in officially enveloping Rastafari into Jamaica's 
national branding campaign, RIV has forfeited the opportunity to challenge the restricted notion 
of what Jamaica's brand is. If they had pursued their project of seeking intellectual property 
rights to its fullest realization they would have been able to demonstrate that much of the cultural 
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content of brand Jamaica does not rest on a Jamaican 'authenticity.' Instead it draws its aesthetic 
forms from the utopian political vision of the Rastafarian movement that focuses, quite 
differently, on what Jamaican society should be.   
Perhaps, in the future the RIV, as Jaffe optimistically suggests about the commercial project of 
Rasta commodification, can "represent a space of education, or serve as a platform for political 
mobilization" (2010:45). Jaffe suggests, "The transformation of the symbols and image of a 
movement of resistance into marketable commodities can but does not necessarily indicate the 
commodification of the counterculture itself" (Jaffe 2010:45). This is exactly what RIV claim. 
They argue that the village project is in large part a political one whereby they "agitate for the 
rights of Rastafari" and challenge Rastafari's infringed intellectual property rights. So then, does 
the village demonstrate "the ways in which consumption, the state, and Rastafari have come 
together at a specific point in Jamaica's history" (Jaffe 2010:40)? Or is it instead a capitalist 
manifestation and logic "that dampens the resistive power of a movement…[and] is 
commodifying resistance." (2010:40, 45)? The existence of such questions in regard to anything 
Rastafari is anathema to the movement's ideology. Despite First Man's assertion that the "[RIV] 
model is Haile Selassie I model, which is Rastafari model," and that they are "following along 
the words of our almighty" it is in the space of justification that Rastafari is undermined, if not 
undone. However, that space may yet provide the "possibility of alternatives" to "mediate 
between sovereignty and the state [and] between market and culture (Geismar 2013:215). 
Although Rastafari perceive themselves as "exiles" in the West, "alienated from their African 
homeland" (Edmonds 2012:40), Roberts (2014:187) considering how Rastafari might be 
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"rethinking…their existence inside the Jamaican polity" cites Sylvia Wynter (1970) who 
observes, that "Through their longing for Africa, Rastafarians stumbled upon their Jamaican 
roots." I believe this is true, and also that it cannot be better demonstrated than through 
Rastafari's current potentially radical project of seeking intellectual property rights. 
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5                           Seizing Life  
Lottery Scammers in Montego Bay 
 
We want food fi nyam [eat] 
So what we do? scam, scam, scam 
Want money inna hand 
So what we do? scam, scam, scam 
Want house and land  
So what we do? scam, scam, scam 
-Stamma Gramma, "Scammer's Anthem"; 2013 
In the beginning of this thesis' first chapter I noted how Bay Fort craft vendor Hazel's claim that 
"Nuttin' no gwaan fi we!" in the market was similarly remarked by young Jamaican men in Horst 
and Miller's (2006:125) earlier work on cell phone communication in the country. Although the 
sentiment was still quite pervasive among Jamaican youth, I interestingly did not encounter it 
among a particular set of young men in one Montego Bay neighborhood. They, like young men 
throughout the developed and developing world, encountered declining educational and 
employment opportunities, which have "precipitated widespread feelings among young men of 
having surplus time, of being detached from education, and of being left behind" (Jeffrey 
2010:466). Such were the conditions that created the sense that nothing was going on. Moreover, 
it was as if the conditions were purposely so. Sufferation was often thus construed— as 
intentional. 
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However, despite facing poor prospects, by doing nothing, young men in Jamaica run the risk of 
being stigmatized as "wotlis," or worthless (Chevannes 2001:223).  Avoidance of worthlessness 
serves as a social motivation to earn capital by any means in order to "make life," whether by 
"juggling"— taking on multiple casual jobs in hope of making a survivable living, or by the 
more implicitly illegal, "hustling" (Horst and Miller 2006:129).   And so a group of roughly ten 39
men from their mid twenties to early thirties who, having exhausted and become exhausted by 
the opportunities to juggle, chose to hustle by forming a scammer crew.  They had joined the 40
quickly developing money transfer scheme, which deceives Americans into wiring large sums of 
money to Jamaica through financial service companies Western Union and MoneyGram.  
I spent many hours in the lanes and yards of the neighborhood of this scammer crew, learning not 
just about the practice of scamming, but how it created new opportunities for them.  41
Opportunities by which they would not only reimagine their place in Jamaican society, but also 
in relation to the "foreign," the colloquial signifier for migration target countries that in common 
parlance primarily stands for the United States. Scammers' use of Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) technology and their performance in phone solicitations create a new interface in which 
the contours of social interaction with the United States are revolutionized as "America" as an 
aspirational icon becomes denuded of its aura of opportunity and optimism.  
For each of the groups discussed so far there has been an ethic of the market that guides their 
strategy for navigating that market. However, for scammers, scamming as a notion and practice 
is an ethic, strategy and a daily tactic. The performance of the scam, its utilization of 
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communication technology, and the financial rewards received redress the restricted social 
mobility of poor Jamaicans and the "outlook whereby local ambitions require foreign realization" 
(Thomas 2004:261). Through their practice scammers challenge the conventional notion that the 
Caribbean necessarily lies in a situation of passive dependence upon, and expectation of, the 
tutelary mercies of U.S. tourist patronage so evidenced in all of the preceding chapters. The first 
chapter demonstrated how vendors had largely given up on actual progress and instead engaged 
with a somewhat perfunctory economic practice, the subsequent chapters have demonstrated 
multiple ethics, strategies and tactics  for engaging the market to somewhat hopeless and 
problematic ends. In this chapter scammers seek a means outside of the conscripted remit of the 
tourist economy to try and succeed.  
The "Get Money" Crew 
The crew, which for the sake of descriptive convenience I will call "Get Money" as a tribute to 
the group ethos, was comprised of several friends who lived on the same "scheme," or area of a 
housing development. As Horst and Miller note a crew is a mode of communication and 
socialization that provides support in friendship and in opportunity (2006:126). I was able to gain 
access to "Get Money" through an acquaintance of mine who often visited a friend in their 
neighborhood. Each member of Get Money had gone through the Jamaican public school 
system, with some having finished their high school O-Levels and others dropping out 
beforehand. They had each been variably involved in one occupation or another, most of which 
would be described as  casual labor.  
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Those with further education were able to get more stable jobs such as in the city's call centers. 
However, they left due to poor pay in this sector. Nearly each member of the crew lived with 
their family, the exception being one or two members who lived between their family homes and 
that of their girlfriend's parents. These cases involved a girlfriend with whom the scammer had a 
child, and who chose to remain with her family. Almost every crew member had children, with 
many of them and their mothers residing with the member's family. Their neighborhood was not 
impoverished but actually quite mixed. This was due to the some  initial construction in this area 
that aimed to turn it into a place for aspirant middle class black Jamaican families. But as I 
outlined in the introduction the downward shift in public sector opportunity in the 80s and the 
continued financial hardship of the 90s meant a thwarted mobility of those anticipated residents. 
The area eventually opened up to lower income families. 
Everyone in the crew did one of two jobs in the system of the scam: they either did phone work 
or collected the money. To handle calls one had to have "chat" or be able to confidently and 
convincingly speak with prospective or regular victims and maintain relationships with them. 
Collecting money was not necessarily easier as it was the part of the scam that carried the most 
risk. By the time of my fieldwork scamming had already been a known practice for a few years, 
having "started" in Granville, an area just outside of Montego Bay around 2007. Many money 
transfer companies became highly suspicious of multiple transactions, or transactions in 
particular amounts. Therefore, the money collector had to be willing to travel between branches, 
and also have a personal profile that would not raise suspicion. For this reason, the money 
collectors in Get Money all had "official" jobs somewhere, or at least an employee ID from a job 
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they once had. Over time as collecting money became more difficult due to increased protective 
measures being implemented by transfer operations, and as scammers came up with increasingly 
clever ways to collect money, phone calling became ever more important with all members of the 
crew participating. What immediately follows is a description of the calling component of the 
scam. 
The Empire Calls Back: Techniques of the Scam 
The Jamaican lottery scam is similar to the infamous Nigerian 419 email scam in that it aims to 
persuade a target to wire transfer a sum of money with promise of a later  receipt of a larger 
amount. Apart from this similarity the Jamaican scam differs in both premise and strategy. Rather 
than the Nigerian method of sending an email, which eventually leads to phone conversation 
(Glickman 2005), the Jamaican scam is presented from the start as a personalized phone call in 
which the target is notified of having been owed a sum of money by a representative of an 
American company, bank, or association. These respective strategies are designed for different 
outcomes. The Nigerian email scam, through incredible scenarios and poor grammar, seeks only 
the most credulous of victims by filtering out "false positives" (Herley 2012).  The Jamaican 
lottery scam, in contrast, aims to convince as many individuals as possible. For this reason the 
scam has a much greater need to manufacture plausibility, which is made possible in large part 
by identity data provided by pseudonymous Jamaican and American brokers located in the 
United States.  Scammers use this data to not only locate their victims but to personalize their 
pitch.  
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Internet technologies and money transfer services have for some time been popularly paired in 
acts of scamming. However, telephony in Jamaican scamming is a crucial component that 
differentiates its practice. To attract as many targets as possible, scammers solicit the interest of 
their targets with a procedural formality and professionalism analogous to customer service 
agents in a call center. They, like these agents, seek to establish their legitimacy and be heard as 
ideal transnational service workers (Mirchandani 2012:134). That scammers take such an 
approach is no coincidence as St. James is home to several call center operations, the largest of 
which is Xerox-owned ACS (Affiliated Computer Services) which is contracted to do customer 
service for U.S. companies in the telecommunications, health care, and technology industries 
(the most prominent of which is Amazon.com).  ACS has seven locations throughout Jamaica 42
five of which are located within St. James and most scammers have relatives or friends who have 
worked in the industry, if they themselves have not.   
  
Like their legitimate call center counterparts, scammers operate from a running script of sorts, 
though more improvisational, posing as a customer service representative for Bank of America, 
or an agent of the partly fabricated "U.S. Claims Commission."  As call center workers are taught 
to produce an affect in their speech designed to appeal to and appease their customers, scammers 
likewise try to create familiar and compelling personas. However, where legitimate customer 
service agents working to come across as unscripted, genuine, and sincere (Mirchandani 2012) 
would not be expected to entirely conceal the traits of a Jamaican identity, the scammer seeks to 
appear genuine by producing a kind of parodic American accent.  The accent is put to use as a 
means of allaying any concern that business is being conducted with a foreigner, which can be 
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easily betrayed by an unconvincing telephone performance. Customer service agents undergo 
extensive language training in preparation for their interaction with Western customers. This, in 
addition to "the continual creation of one's identity" is what Mirchandani, writing on Indian call 
centers, has termed "authenticity work" (2012:8, 36). For scammers, Jamaica's proximity to,  and 
encounter with, the U.S. serves to supplement the forms of authenticity detailed by Mirchandani. 
Scammer accents, though at times caricatural, are informed by an experiential repertoire 
developed by a long history of exposure to American media, music, and, particularly in St. 
James, American tourism beginning with the growing tourist traffic of the post-war period. As 
Obika Gray explains, "contact with distant American others through travel, film, music, radio 
broadcasts, and pulp fiction…transported Jamaicans…into an American-dominated and 
worldwide political, economic, and cultural space" (2004:100). So where the enunciative 
accuracy of an attempted accent fails, it is deftly recovered by a keen understanding of 
American cultural nuance, which often helps recover a pitch. 
  
Business process outsourcing (BPO) from North America and Europe to the Caribbean began 
throughout the late eighties and early nineties and resulted in the service industry becoming the 
hallmark of globalized business practice in the region. It was in 1986 as part of a structural 
adjustment deal that Jamaica saw the introduction of the information service industry, which 
promised increases in foreign exchange, employment, and technological advancement (Mullings 
1999:290).  Twenty-five years later and the low wages and high turnover rates of Jamaican call 43
center work supports the anthropological critique of BPO.  Illustrating what  Bear has noted as 44
the "logics of outsourcing,"—"a reduction of infrastructure, accountability and the costs of 
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labour to the minimum…" (2013:379), the industry has been shown to produce a reformulated 
exploitation of labor, and uneven development, which has done little to improve upon economic 
precariousness faced by many of its workers (see Freeman 2000). 
  
Against this background, in which embedded in call center work is "a complex interplay of 
colonial histories, class relations, and national interests…" (Mirchandani 2012:3), scamming 
presents something of a reconfigured, or perhaps even mutated, variant of the practice, inverting 
and reversing the directional flows of commerce, creating new circuits of interaction. Mimi 
Sheller has suggested that tourism is perhaps best understood as an "embodied encounter 
between foreign travelers and local people that involves corporeal relations of unequal power," in 
which gender and racial inequalities are "brought into being with national boundaries of 
belonging and exclusion" (2012:210, 211; emphasis added). The affective performance of 
scamming and the technologies deployed in the practice, enables scammers to subvert the body 
politics of the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990), their virtuality neutralizing the "(post)colonial contact 
zone… in which the grammars of racial difference are crafted" (Sheller 2012:212). Through this 
interaction, the scammer receives an ethnographic exposure to an America far beyond any one-
dimensional touristic stereotype, experiencing an interaction devoid of the familiar and uneven 
politics of the "tourist encounter" (Babb 2011). 
When a call is successful and a client agrees to make a payment, more sophisticated crews have 
networks that spread from the lanes of their neighborhoods across to friends and relatives in the 
U.S., serving as the first point of transfer. After receipt, the funds are relayed as a new transfer to 
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Jamaica, effectively laundering the money by creating a remittance. This is a routine and 
anodyne occurrence of daily Jamaican life and makes detecting the scam transfer difficult. Apart 
from the laundering effect, this first point of transfer produces a sense of locality that supports 
the call's premise because the client is unaware that his transfer will go any further than the U.S. 
address of the initial recipient. The most profitable crews can usually credit a U.S. based network 
for their success. However, not many scam operations have the benefit of such an extended 
network since many friends and relatives are unwilling to take the risk. Buttressing the networks 
and phone performances so critical to the scam is the technology employed. Horst and Miller 
nearly a decade ago identified the increased facilitation of remittances through the joining of 
money transfer services with cell phone technology (2006:117).  For present day scammers, that 45
relationship has developed into a much more lucrative pairing, in which technology does more 
than facilitate the transmission of capital across borders, and instead renders them socially and 
politically immaterial. 
Scammer "Tricknologies"  
The first, and still dominant, VoIP technology adopted by scammers is the American "magicJack" 
device. This allows free phone calls over the Internet to anywhere in the United States and 
Canada. It works by being connected by USB between a computer and a lined telephone (or 
cordless base) for the purchase price of US$ 60 and annual subscription of US$ 20. The device 
entered into the Jamaican mainstream as Jamaicans resident in the U.S. brought the device home 
for family members as a cheaper means of staying in touch.  The Internet requirement initially 46
limited the device's use to the Jamaican middle class. However, as the now ubiquitous Caribbean 
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communications company, Digicel, and the more recent Flow Jamaica, provided more extensive 
Internet coverage at more affordable rates, magicJack use expanded and scammer access to the 
device increased.   Scammers eventually began to buy the devices and pay for multi-year 47 48
service subscriptions with stolen credit card information or with U.S. prepaid credit cards bought 
online and posted to Jamaica by acquaintances.  
  
With a magicJack subscription users are given the option to choose an available phone number 
from any area code within the United States, validating their calls by way of a purported U.S. 
location. This capability enables scammers to target a particular city by opting for a number 
within its area code, creating a successful means of attracting "local" business. MagicJack's 
service policy permits a one time number change. This provides recourse if an area code proves 
fruitless or becomes associated with scamming, as occurred with Cincinnati area code 513.  For 49
an additional cost, magicJack customers can purchase vanity numbers and 1-800 prefixes. This 
addition has provided a new means to more competently stave off the incredulity of their targets 
and more convincingly situate themselves within the imagined space of legitimacy by creating 
"business numbers." 
  
Despite the predominance of VoIP and the magicJack, there are cases in which some scammers 
continue to make calls directly from their mobile phones with the local Jamaican 876 area code. 
The area code has over time become the marker of a foreign scam due to the publicity of money 
transfer and telecommunication companies, news outlets, and consumer protection 
organizations.  The use of a Jamaican mobile number is now characteristic of a novice scammer 50
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or of an unsophisticated operation.  These scammers are figured as both immobile and fixed 
within the confines of the Jamaican national and technological space, a space which has 
problematically become increasingly occupied by school-aged children who take up scamming 
by using cellular provider Digicel's international calling plan tariff.   
  
An economy sprung up around the magicJack in St. James as the device developed into a 
commodity of both informal and formal exchange. Informally, the devices are brought into the 
country by scammers or their acquaintances and sold at twice their U.S. selling price in a market 
of referral. Formally, legitimate businesses within St. James have begun its sale ostensibly for 
lawful use, though that position remains dubious given the broad awareness of the device's use in 
scamming. The market space was recently diversified by the release of an updated magicJack 
known as the magicJack "Plus." The latest iteration no longer requires a computer, but is 
connected directly between an Internet modem and telephone. Obviating the need for a computer 
widens the availability of the technology among those unable to afford the hardware. The "plus" 
version, which has altogether replaced its predecessor on the U.S. market, selling there for US$ 
60, is highly sought among scammers. It sells on the Jamaican black market for the equivalent of 
US$ 95. 
  
Despite the effectiveness of the magicJack's ability to create what Marilyn Strathern has called 
the "spatially unmatched reach of efficacy" (Strathern 2005:95), it is betrayed by being in reality 
a stationary device. With the increasing discovery of the device in police raids on suspected 
scammers' homes ownership of a magicJack has become grounds for criminal implication of 
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those suspected of scamming. Therefore, actual mobility in the practice has become a primary 
objective among scammers. Though the magicJack maintains its prominence, smartphones  and 
their VoIP applications represent the next wave of communication technologies employed in the 
practice of scamming.  
  
One particular member of the crew owned an iPhone 4 before it became officially available in 
Jamaica a few months later. The device was acquired through a Canadian contact that bought, 
registered, and shipped down the phone for US$ 700. Purchased initially for its value and status, 
the phone's functions were rapidly applied to the scam.  Though magicJack's continued to be 
used, the iPhone became the crux of the crew's operation.  The scam was now largely controlled 51
from the phone, and in a marked departure from the structural immobility of the magicJack 
devices, calls could be made and received on the go through a selection of VoIP apps available 
through Apple's App Store. The app supplied by magicJack was preferred as it used the same 
phone number as the device. This feature enabled scammers to remain available in order to 
assuage any concerns and answer any questions from their clients, or address any complication 
that arose with a transfer. This fostered confidence in clients and plausibility for the scam overall, 
leading to greater revenue and profitability. The apps' required internet connectivity was 
affordably provided by the increased availability of 3G wireless service from Digicel and Lime, 
the second major cellular telecommunication company on the island, both offering  internet 
tariffs for as little as JAM$ 100 (US$ 1.15) a day.  
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For the crew the iPhone not only symbolized the sophistication of their criminal operation, but 
their membership among a Jamaican elite that could not only afford the device, but do so before 
it officially became available in the country. For these reasons the increasingly popular song by 
American rapper Rick Ross, "9 Piece (Even Deeper)," which lauded "...selling dope, straight off 
the iPhone…," took on an anthemic quality as it spoke directly to the confluence of technology 
and criminality present in lottery scamming. But more salient was the persona that Ross 
portrayed across his oeuvre— that of a self-made "boss" who, by circumventing the law, made it 
out of poverty. The use of "foreign" technology, and increased riches from the scam seeded shifts 
in subjectivity and perspective within the crew. However, before addressing that at the end of this 
discussion, it is imperative to understand how scammers rationalize the scam, and its 
implications. 
Dem Call it Scam, We Call it Reparation 
Popular narratives of Jamaican scamming presented in the U.S. media reports are often 
portrayals of elderly Americans being preyed upon and conned out of hard-earned savings, as 
most recently demonstrated in Dan Rather's report on Jamaican scamming, titled "Just Hang 
Up."  Highlighting the appalling inhumanity of scammers, the piece featured the story of an 52
elderly white American man from the Midwest who lost his savings in hope of affording health 
care costs for his ailing spouse. In his report, Mr. Rather, having travelled to St. James, was 
compelled to confront a suspected scammer and declare, "You know what the scamming does? It 
takes money from hard working people, retired people...I can't respect taking money from 
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grandmothers, retired people…" The accosted scammer casually defended himself, deflected the 
accusations, and retorted the must have Mr. Rather's respect then, implying his innocence.  
  
The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging held a hearing to investigate Jamaican scamming 
in early 2013 and to call the Jamaican government to account. The result was the government 
updating its Proceeds of Crime Act to include provisions to prosecute for earnings made from 
victims who comply willingly or under duress. Until the revised legislation scammers in the 
main acted with impunity, with those suspected facing, at worst, the temporary seizure of 
property. The rhetoric of the senators on the committee emphasized the vulnerability of seniors, 
and their portrayal of defenseless and victimized grandparents was compellingly effective at 
emphasizing the ghoulishness of scammers. However, that the elderly are primary targets is not a 
given, as scammers' leads are often a variably sourced registry of random names, addresses, and 
phone numbers. Indeed, an increased occurrence of elderly victims says less about scammer 
targeting strategies and more about the precarious circumstances faced by American seniors and 
retirees. It is these that compel them to respond to the overtures of scammers , as illustrated by 
the victim in Rather's report trying to afford healthcare.  
  
Irrespective of a victim's age, scammers often regard the gullibility and credulity of victims with 
derisive indifference. It is this position that many scammers maintain when considering the effect 
their scam will have on their targets.  They justify their actions by reasoning that if the victims 
are so easily deceived then are they not deserving of the outcome? The presumption that most of 
these targets are guided by greed serves as further justification. The hypothesis of greed is 
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supported by victims' forfeiture of sums in the tens of thousands in some cases. Scammers 
mobilize this rationalization in the justified transmission of wealth. This was exhibited when one 
scammer chillingly referred to a collected transfer as a "retirement check," a double insinuation 
of the source and purpose of the funds. The fact that the monies being scammed came from the 
life savings of his "client" was justified by a redistributionist defense in that it helped to secure 
the economic freedom of the scammer. 
The notion of redistribution prompts a larger historical argument maintained by scammers in 
which the practice is viewed as a form of reparations. Citing a history of racial inequity, 
scammers assert that they, as with all black Jamaicans, are owed for the crimes of slavery for 
which neither they nor their ancestors were recompensed. Slocum and Thomas have noted how 
in "globalization from below," people "mobilize local history and meanings to negotiate—and 
indeed shape—their available avenues within current configurations of global power"(2003:560). 
With the postcolonial reorientation of British-Jamaican trade and political relations to that of 
Jamaica and the United States by the 1960s, the U.S. has become a site of engagement in which 
notions of mobility, aspiration, and transgression are produced. Through the transference of 
proprietorship scammers pliantly reason that the U.S. has acquired the moral debts of Great 
Britain. This seemingly complex reading of race and reparations is more simply articulated by 
scammers through the rationale that both the U.K. and the U.S. are composed of "the same white 
people." This is a  view that conflates race with a shift in geopolitical power relations in which 
"England used to, and now the U.S. runs Jamaica." 
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From this position, scamming returns are constructed as serving as individual contributions to the 
collective debt owed to blacks for past transgressions, but also for their current day implications. 
As Deborah Thomas explains, reparations "embodies a counter-discourse [that] provides the 
means by which contemporary inequalities are historicized" (2011:220). And for poor Jamaicans 
the long reach of that historical inequality is made evident in the "disjuncture between the misery 
and hardships of their lived experience on the island and the imagined experience of participating 
in the material well-being, consumer tastes and popular culture imported from [America]" (Gray 
2004:100). Compensation could, thus, only come from the United States, as it was not only the 
reformulated site of transgression, but held the desired currencies for repayment. 
  
Reparations as rhetoric for scammer justification became popularized with the release of reggae 
artist Vybz Kartel's scamming ballad aptly titled, "Reparation."  A psalmic extolling of the 53
practice's merits and of the opportunities it provides for Jamaica's poor youth, the lyrics carefully 
emphasized scamming's positive attributes, including the lack of violence produced. The song in 
slightly abridged form follows: 
Verse 1 
Big up every scamma/ Weh [that] make U.S dolla/  
Build up di [the] house fi [for] you mama 
Western Union people fi [should] give we more honor 
Every ghetto youth fi live like Tony Montana 
Presidential like Barack Obama, pool inna house and plane inna hangar  
Who say di scamma dem wrong? No, hungry, poverty that more wronger 
Better them do it than take up the bomber 
Memba the youth them nah [aren't] squeeze trigger, a just true them a nigger 
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You big mister you a the Prime Minister, college me want send mi sista 
You say education a the key,  
me a beg you no take weh me ting sah [don't take away my money] 
Chorus 
As long as them nah buy no gun, nah support no war 
Big up [praise] di man dem star from near and far 
Dem call it scam, me call it reparation, every ghetto youth is a star 
So dem wah [want to] live like one 
Verse 2 
Me just want the youth them no rob Jamaican, don't buy gun fi [to] kill man 
Foreign exchange is good fi di country, Franklin, USA; Sterling, England 
Every Ghetto yute fi a live like di big man/ Mansion bigger than Hilton 
A nuh every body can run like Bolt, and sing like me, or dance like Ding Dong...  
(Reparation, Vybz Kartel featuring Gaza Slim) 
The song, banned for fear that it would further encourage scamming, most effectively expresses 
a critique of the lack of available social and economic support in Jamaica. This argument is 
especially salient for the country's poor youth who are not, as Kartel recognizes, imbued with the 
sporting and entertaining talents that he himself, Usain Bolt, or popular Jamaican dancer, Ding 
Dong, possess— talents that seem to be the only registers of valued Jamaican capability, and 
mechanisms for advancement. The song is reminiscent of the Trinidadian kidnapping crisis noted 
by Rebecca Prentice (2012a) in which popular calypsos moralized the acts as means to repatriate 
money stolen from Trinidad's "big money people" and held in U.S. and European accounts. One 
of the songs choruses, "kidnapping go build back we economy" was a designation of the fiscally 
based moral justification of the abductions (Prentice 2012a:54-56). Likewise in Nigeria, Apter 
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tells of how 419 scamming was seen by some Nigerians as reparations for the slave trade and 
colonialism (2005:230). 
Reparations discourses manifested by criminal acts serves as a "means of exercising claims to 
rights in a situation of dispossession and disempowerment," as Janet Roitman notes among 
smugglers and bandits in the Chad Basin, who "proceeded to exercise those demands through 
seizure, contraband, highway robbery, and smuggling" (2005:96-97). Likewise, Congolese 
international traders flout import regulations to largely find opportunities in the suffered 
consequences of political and economic crisis, but also as an act of postcolonial dissent (2000). 
For Roitman, the ability to seize corresponds to notions of power and agency that express a 
desire for the possibility of economic and social mobility (2005:97-98). Claiming reparations for 
slavery, colonialism, or for the repatriation of capital from corrupt elites, challenges the 
legitimacy of western wealth as claimants construct themselves as "exercising legitimate 
authority over access to possibilities for accumulation…" (Roitman 2005:152). Whether 
smuggler, bandit, kidnapper, or scammer, the line between "legitimate and illegitimate agency…
is a frontier in the struggle to assert sovereignty or to disrupt it…"(Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006:11). This is especially so when that sovereignty is inextricably linked to capital, and thus 
their claims, whether demanded or enacted, are so constructed. 
  
Sufferation as experienced in Jamaican society, taken together with the reparations framework 
and the perceived greed of victims serve as comprehensive bases in which scamming is morally, 
socially, and historically justified. They work together to hold in place the scammer ethic. 
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However, the reparations rationale becomes increasingly untenable when one considers how 
little scammers participate in the redistribution of their seized wealth. The consequence of 
scammers accumulating wealth "without the reciprocal social obligations of redistribution" has 
been their generally poor reputation in St. James (Smith 2001:805). This disdain has persisted 
despite the absence of noted violence in the practice, and that those being scammed are not 
fellow Jamaicans. 
Perhaps this is because scamming is widely criticized as being nothing more than "ginnalism"— 
Jamaican patois for chicanery— that has been historically represented by Anancy, the trickster 
spider of Akan and Jamaican folklore, who often employed duplicity in his endeavors. The 
response of the crowd brought to mind the similarity between behavioral accounts of scammers 
and Anancy.  As Richard Burton explains, Anancy was known for his excess and individual 
greed and  he represented slaves "whose ability to manipulate the system in their favor placed 
additional burdens, above all the threat of unmerited punishment, on those they seemed not to 
recognize as their brothers and sisters"  (1997:63). 
Scammers fail to enjoy the kind of popularity and endearment witnessed in the public's reception 
of Jamaican dons— inner city neighborhood leaders born out of the political gunmen of the 
1970s, and criminal gunmen of the 1980s. These dons provide material services to their 
communities that the Jamaican state is perceived not to, whether it is welfare, employment, 
security, or justice. Dons take on functions that symbolically imbue them with authoritative value 
and meaning and an "elevated social status that combines religious, political, and celebrity 
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culture elements…" that neglects the abundance of drug and gang associated violence they create 
(Jaffe 2012b:80). 
  
The poor perception of the scamming trade was vividly demonstrated when all Western Union 
branches in St. James were closed for two weeks while they underwent security upgrades to 
safeguard against the practice. The residents of St. James were forced to travel to the neighboring 
parishes of Hanover and Trelawney to send and receive their money transfers. At the nearest 
Western Union in Falmouth, Trelawney, the frustrated crowd, who had been queuing for hours, 
outwardly voiced their irritation to one another. One man gave public warning: "Make me find 
out say any scammers deh yah [are here], me a go throw them in the sea and make them swim fi 
[for] them scam money!" The crowd gestured in frustrated agreement, irritated by having been 
inconvenienced by the cost in both time and money spent traveling to the branch. The frustration 
appeared to run deeper than the acute inconvenience of the closed Western Unions, however. 
Perhaps for these locals scamming transgresses against the "moral hailings" that draws poor 
Jamaicans to "Africanist obligations" (Gray 2004:101). Scamming should instead be "…a 
modality not only of social mobility but also of social welfare…" as Roitman has suggested with 
seizure in the Chad Basin, and as evidenced by the patronage of Jamaica's dons (2005:180).   
Smith's observations of violent public responses to 419 scammers in Nigeria showed how their 
wealth "exacerbated their differences with common people rather than re-inscribing social ties by 
sharing their wealth through customary networks of patronage" (2001:805). His findings are 
instructive for two reasons: firstly, it presents Africans declining to engage in "Africanist 
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obligations," which is also demonstrated by Newell working with young Ivorians engaged in 
"nefarious [economic] exchanges", or "bizness," (2012:80) as a means of avoiding social 
obligations to kin and friends (p. 84). Secondly, it shows that wealth gained in unprecedented 
volumes by means, which in large part lie outside the normal networks of assistance, engenders a 
particular liberal (and perhaps liberating) use of that wealth. Dons are obliged to their networks 
of patronage by necessity as their impoverished neighborhoods serve as the loci of their power. 
Alternatively scammers, freed from the course of reciprocity are able to become "actually" 
mobile, in some cases moving out of neighborhoods, but in every instance away from the 
community circuits of obligation. Scamming thus provides a view for what happens to poor 
Jamaicans who become rich outside of the arenas of music, sport, and education, all of which are 
imbued in relations of obligation. 
"Old Money, Not New Money": Mobility and Citizenship Shifts 
As stated at the beginning of this discussion, many scammers enter the practice citing the lack of 
legitimate opportunity in Jamaica and the negligible returns on any that are available. To 
scammers, Jamaica is full of potential, yet restricted, opportunity. They recognize that their 
poverty by design is meant to keep them in an unchanging state of sufferation. This sense of 
being socially and psychically stuck within an immutable economic precariousness, 
ontologically positioned as incapable of progress is paired by another sense that success is 
somehow just out of reach.  Recall the epigram at the beginning of chapter three. It was the 
chorus of dancehall artist Popcaan's song, "System." The chorus demonstrated the breadth of 
sufferation, so much so that Indian, chiney, black and white people "ah bawl." However, within 
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the lyrics of the song Popcaan pointedly expresses the experiences of sufferation among ghetto 
youth: 
None ah dem nah see me pain, further more dem neva ask yet 
Silence ah di baddest weapon so yuh know weh [what] mi do, me talk less 
Man ah work every day down ah wharf and a three grand [US$ 33] a week dem ah accept 
Dem nuh want me fi [to] build mama house, don't waan mi fi own no assets 
Sufferation everywhere me turn so give thanks to Jah [god] when yuh pass it 
So ghetto yute don't mek nuh silly plans  
Believe in yourself be ah man  
Dem want we fi dead pon di road 
Dem don't want we fi mek millions  
Popcaan's "system" is perhaps the embodiment of sufferation that maintains poor Jamaicans' 
poverty. As he says, "Dem nuh want me fi build mama house, don't waan mi fi own no assets… 
Dem don't want we fi mek millions." Scammers have decided to not accept those circumstances 
and have thus taken what they find as necessary, albeit illegal, steps to change them.  This 54
approach is not dissimilar to that of the Cameroonian bandits facing an unstable economic 
environment caused by structural adjustment discussed by Roitman (2003). These individuals 
"refute the structure of exclusion and difference" and seize wealth as a means of "making claims 
to appropriate conditions for wealth creation" (Roitman 2003:230).  
Many of the scammers emphasized the unbiased, even democratic opportunity that the practice 
provides. Even children, as I noted earlier, can scam whether to pay school fees, or to forgo 
formal education altogether, all one has to do is "take it." Returning to the earlier discussion of 
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Rick Ross' song "9 piece (even deeper)," the lyrics and their author present for the aspirant 
scammer an archetype of a black hustler who is admired and emulated not only for his street 
success, but more profoundly for having parlayed that success into valid forms of economic and 
social accomplishment. The best examples of this transformation come from the American hip-
hop genre, such as with rappers like Jay-Z, whose biography provides a presentation of a street 
hustler metamorphosed into a media and fashion mogul. Slocum and Thomas have noted how 
large black American cultural production looms throughout the black diaspora (2007:9). 
Scammers recognize in these figures a form of "subaltern power" embodied in the narratives of 
"gangsta rap" employed in "the name of rescuing a racially impugned self," which Obika Gray 
recognizes as a form of "badness-honour" (2004:131). In step with this notion many Jamaican 
scammers seek to legitimate their place in society. 
For scammers the financial opportunity that scamming provides has caused a shift in the ideals 
and trajectories of mobility and place within and without Jamaica. Rather than travel for 
opportunity scammers seek to build status and stake claim to that aspiration of the Jamaican 
middle class. Where before scamming most participants pursued various means of migration for 
opportunity, they now find that they have the wherewithal to create opportunities, and therefore a 
future of value, on the island. This supports a developing trend in which Jamaicans have become 
less inclined to aspire to migrate. However, where their reason may have a lot to do with 
decreasing prospects of opportunity in the US and elsewhere, there is not the sense that sufficient 
opportunity is available at home.   55
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When I asked one informant if he would leave Jamaica if possible, he replied that he had tried 
before scamming, believing like most young Jamaicans, that getting a visa and going abroad was 
his only chance (see Thomas 2004, Ch. 6). He therefore resorted to a green card marriage to a 
Jamaican with U.S. citizenship living abroad. When that relationship failed, he unsuccessfully 
paid US$ 2000 to obtain a counterfeit U.S. visa.  With the resources from scamming, he only 
desired to travel to the U.S., preferably New York, for what he termed business opportunities that 
he insists are legit and legal, so much so that he declared that he would not even overstay the 
term limits of his visa. He attributes the diminished appeal of the U.S. to the availability in 
Jamaica of anything he would want there, but that in the past it was "only the dollars that held 
[him] back." Maurer noted similar results among Caribbean elites, who through involvement 
with offshore finance were able to reimagine visions of nationalism that was critical of 
relationships with the United States and Europe, which "redounded into Caribbean nationalist 
discourses and self- perceptions" (2004:310). When asked how he would be able to make it to 
the U.S., the scammer stated that from his scamming income he has purchased land and is in the 
process of building a house, which he hopes will be grounds for visa approval. Evidencing "the 
multiple and contingent affects" of documents like visas, it is a compelling irony that when the 
scammer was legitimately (under)employed he resorted to illegitimate and illegal methods of 
migration, whereas his now illegal income might eventually secure his lawful travel to the U.S. 
(Navaro-Yashin 2007:95). 
Even more novel than the changing views toward migration are those of social mobility. 
Opportunities stemming from scamming have begun to reframe participants' relationship to 
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Jamaican society. Expressed were ambitions of legitimate wealth and legitimacy in wealth. At a 
neighborhood rum bar where the crew regularly met one scammer noted, in an un-ironic, 
affective tone, a desire that his wealth be viewed as "old money, not new money," a sentiment 
over which the entire crew were in accord. To this end many of the scammers were 
simultaneously scamming and starting secondary businesses. One planned on opening a liquor 
distribution business, another was in the processes of starting a taxi service, while another was 
investing in a party promotion company, all three proudly noting their purchase of vehicles and 
the beginning construction of homes. Their aspiration for legitimacy was genuinely cultural, as 
scammers sought to convert their monetary wealth into social influence and respectability. 
  
In his essay on the ascent of the black middle class in Jamaica, Don Robotham noted that 
ownership of property, especially the key local and global symbols of status of house and car, 
"are at the core" of the narrative of that ascent. However, "Most essential of all…," he continued, 
"…is business ownership as the ultimate axis of personal identity" (2000:24). Expanded access 
to public education and the civil service did much to secure the black middle class' ascendance 
through the social hierarchy (Robotham 2000:12). Yet constriction of that access has meant 
diminished opportunity for Jamaica's poor, who have all but abandoned the long pervasive notion 
that upward mobility is achieved by the pursuit of education and a career in the public sector. 
This was noted by Deborah Thomas to have begun during the 1990s in Jamaica (2004:229), and 
has been observed more recently by Carla Freeman in Barbados (2012:93). So, within the 
growing socio-economic vacuum left by the likely poor prospects of education and an 
unpromising public jobs sector, to scammers their accomplishments were proof that scamming 
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was the best, if not only way for certain success and a future of fortune, opportunity and 
membership in Jamaica's middle class.  
In Deborah Thomas' influential work Modern Blackness (2004), she argues that by the late 1990s 
in Jamaica, popular expressions of urban black culture had largely supplanted the theretofore 
hegemonic salience of creole multi-racial nationalism. The "brown" middle class had long 
asserted their ideals of respectable citizenship within the country's economic, political, and 
cultural spheres.  What Thomas notes among the ideologies and practices of the modern black 56
citizenry was thus a momentous shift that marked the mobilization of the values of Jamaica's 
"poorer sets" —values which have been popularly, though as Thomas contends not necessarily, 
equated with Jamaican dancehall music and culture. Scammer discourses of legitimacy provide 
further insight into how contemporary renderings of Caribbean respectability are conceived and 
re-imagined as they pair popular black mores with Jamaican "middle class" values in a manner 
that creates a new iteration of urban blackness.  
The independence era begot the "Rude boy" figure, which David Scott defined as, "[Y]oung, 
urban, black, and angry— that [had] come to haunt the middle-class imaginary of post-
independence Jamaica, a figure signifying not merely a lack of the esteemed rationality and 
preferred values of respectable society but a positive contempt for an refusal of 
them" (1999:210). Scammers are similar products of their generation, of the time in which 
structural adjustment has in many ways brought Jamaican development not much further than it 
was at independence— yet left further retrogressed by the expending of independence era 
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optimism and hope. However, rather than haunt Jamaica’s middle class, scammers endeavor to 
join it. Scammers invested in the process of legitimation employ, engage in, and seek to display 
various markers of success, which can often be read as supporting what is conceived as a middle 
class sensibility. Support for this assertion is evidenced by a resurgent (or perhaps emergent) 
patriarchy among the scammers interviewed. The challenges  the long observed  matrifocality of 
the poorer Jamaican family that occupied the interest of much of the earliest Caribbean 
anthropology and remains salient in contemporary studies.   This is illustrated by the informant 57
who was starting his taxi service. His scamming proceeds went into establishing his business as 
well as engaging in some luxury expenditure. Yet his greatest investment was in his son, whom 
he proudly proclaimed was attending a good (and expensive) private primary school where he 
was learning Spanish and how to swim. It is not unfathomable to consider that increased 
resources would produce a commensurate increase in paternal and familial responsibility. 
Though scammers have not extended themselves to meet the obligations of their communities, 
the pace at which they are attending to those of the family is remarkable. Irrespective of whether 
scamming is leading scammers to reproduce middle class norms of success or ambition, the 
success they enjoy has created for them a new and self-validating sense of place in Jamaica 
through an ideology of legitimation. 
Closed Circuits 
Huon Wardle, has argued that "shaping the lives of individual Jamaicans…" is a "real/
metaphorical ground of displacement…encapsulated in the idea of adventure" and located in 
visions and dreams of flight, and the everyday drama of migration (2000:84, 98). Just as young 
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Mozambican men employ mobile phone technology to address experiences of constrained 
mobility, and to shift the "interface between daydreams and reality" (Archambault 2012:408). I 
posit that scam technologies likewise enable a kind of virtual adventure, in which daydreams of 
riches become reality. Obika Gray describes an "urban exilic space" inside of which unemployed 
male youth in the Jamaican ghetto live a "hybrid cultural existence by juggling lived experiences 
and their simulacrum from elsewhere" (2004:101). This space, serving as both "a site of 
repression" and "a place where forms of social autonomy could be generated" (Gray 2004:102) 
forms what Jaffe (2012a) has noted as the projected immobility and marginality of the "ghetto 
imaginary." By scamming these young men expand beyond the (im)mobility afforded by the 
currencies of popular black urban culture and sport that delimit the outer boundaries of that 
space. Scamming make possible participation in local and global economic and cultural circuits 
in more meaningful ways than the sanctioned economy makes available (see Lukacs 2013:58). 
Scammers thus become more prominently situated along what Newell has noted as the social 
hierarchy framed within "the evaluative schema" of national identity (2012:71). Indeed, through 
telephonic practice and the seizure of capital scammers have returned the "tourist gaze" (Urry 
1990) by offering a "counter-gaze," in which scammers, as Caribbean subjects, are able to "resist 
being objectified and animalized" (Sheller 2012:225). In fact, by innovative, though illicit 
mechanisms, scammers approach power directly and practice a kind of "freedom within the 
prevailing relationships of power" (Scott 1999:214) as they, emboldened by a real prospect of 
wealth, stand up to the pervasive global influence of U.S. economic hegemony. 
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However, though approaching power, and becoming situated along Jamaica's social hierarchy, 
scammers nonetheless defer to the same source and networks of power as all previous groups of 
this thesis. Though they take an alternative approach with enables a necessity to fall back on self-
commoditized forms, scammers are nonetheless beholden to "foreign" circuits of wealth that 
stand as the only viable conduit for material progress. They are now able to access heretofore 
inaccessible goods available in Jamaica, but there remains something that still evades these 
young men. Their project of legitimation is obscured by the surreptitious means by which it is 
attained, and thereby remains perpetually tenuous. And so they, like vendors, JAMIA, Sindhis 
and RIV, persist in that odd space of an incomplete, and unrealizable ambition. 
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                                                                      Conclusion 
Better Must Come…One Day 
 
I've been trying a long, long time  
Still I didn't make it  
Everything I try to do seems to go wrong  
It seems I have done something wrong  
But they're trying to keep me down 
Who God bless, no one curse 
Thank God I'm not the worst 
Better must come one day 
Better must come… 
-Delroy Wilson, "Better Must Come"; 1971 
In this thesis I have tried to provide a nuanced account of various structural positions in Jamaican 
society through offering sufferation as a historically generated framing of the market. This has 
been attempted by examining how the groups in the thesis have moved in and around the market 
through structuring notions of history, citizenship and race. For each group the market was 
navigated through respective sets of ethics, and those ethics informed the strategies employed as 
a way out of sufferation.  
For JAMIA and the craft vendors the relevant ethic was one of cooperation. For the former it was 
based upon a subjectivity of organization, on which the aspirations for the acquisition of skill and 
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then the ideal of production resulting from the collective harnessing of that skill were based. For 
the latter, the ethic of cooperation was used to identify infractions against the ethic. It located 
disunity in the market, which itself brought out deeper, and more meaningful values of race and 
history. That ethic was influenced by a post-emancipation Baptist, "Christian black" sensibility, 
which re-presented itself in the nationalist and independence ethos of respectability. however, it 
was the extant African eudemonic of Jamaican Christianity, which helped rationalize 
cooperation’s failure, and permitted the vendors to accept their circumstances.  
The Rastafari Indigenous Village attempted to participate "in" the market without becoming "of" 
the market. Theirs was an ethic of distance that aimed to remain true to the anti-Babylonian 
ideals of their culture, rooted in the revolutionary blackness of their Afro-Christian forebears. 
However, in spite of their radical seeking of intellectual property rights and sovereignty, what 
resulted, or rather is resulting, is an interesting "social project" (Povinelli 2011) where Rastafari 
and the market are aggregated into a novel form of market embeddedness. 
The Sindhi merchants and the lottery scammers both "live" the market most fully through their 
ethic of accumulation. It is for this reason that of all of the groups they are the most financially 
successful, but also why their success is seen as most problematic by the other groups. They 
nonetheless still project particular values into their practice of the market. For the Sindhis theirs 
is an aspirant personhood of being businessmen. For scammers, theirs is influenced by the 
acknowledgment that everyday, Christian values will not work, and thus they must thrive by any 
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means. That means is through the ethic of seizure, which is based in the "radical consumerism" 
of the Jamaican era of "Modern Blackness" (Thomas 2004).  
Examining the employed ethics of the groups in this thesis has demonstrated that the ways of 
becoming economic are not in fact arbitrary as Callon, et. al. (1998) have argued. The way the 
groups understand and act upon on the market as forms of ethical positions, strategies and tactics 
have supported the assertion I made in the introduction that the notion of agencements— the 
relationship between economic actors and  the assemblages that intervene in the construction of 
markets— can be extended beyond their limitation to financial markets. Instead, the process is a 
broad and accumulative one, onto which the histories and enculturated experiences and 
expectations of life are brought to bear.  
And so, as expected, this thesis has provided evidence that "economic abstraction," where market 
transactions are rendered formal and calculative, is little more than economist fiction. But this 
finding has been demonstrated by many ethnographic accounts throughout the history of the 
anthropology of economy, going back to the formalist-substantivist debate begun in The Great 
Transformation (Polanyi 1944). Thus this thesis has not simply advocated for market 
"embeddedness" as located in the state and social institutions. Instead it has argued for an 
understanding of the market, led not by abstraction, but rather abstractness, located in broader 
more nebulous ideations of race, history, politics, and culture.  
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Therefore,  the controversy of what lies within and outside the market frame as rehearsed by 
Miller (2002) and Callon (1998) has been somewhat complicated by this ethnography. Where 
Callon has asserted that the market bears an isolating function, Miller has countered that that 
which Callon believes to be isolated exists within the frame and thus constructs notions of the 
market. I have argued that if such a frame exists, it is all encompassing. This is especially so 
when facing economic hardship and an overall stumbling economy. However, when considering 
the myriad of ethics used here to reconcile market practice and economic performance, it may be 
more productive to think of multiple frames. Elyachar’s suggestion of considering a "multiplicity 
of markets" goes along way in supporting this (2005:24).  
However, what the preceding chapters have shown is that there is a hegemonic sense of the 
market in Jamaica, which I have identified as sufferation.  To be sure, suggesting that sufferation 
is hegemonic is by no means an assertion of it being monolithic. In fact, the ethics foregrounded 
in this thesis have shown sufferation’s multiple dimensions. On one level sufferation has 
functioned as a historically produced ethic in itself; as a way of evaluating, or at least situating, 
the economy on the basis of a set of moral principles and cultural mores. It  In this capacity 
sufferation is identifiable in both acute and chronic economic hardship. It is the disunity of the 
craft vendors, the inability to compete for JAMIA, the thwarted market identified by Sindhis, and 
the experience of cultural infringement by RIV. Only the scammers, it appears, are successfully 
mitigating sufferation’s effect. But even for them, like for the other groups, sufferation is in large 
part a problem of the state and its inefficiencies and ineptness.    
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On another level, sufferation is a useful analytic for understanding the relationships between 
economic practices, ideologies, and ethical conceptualizations. Furthermore, it demonstrates  to 
what extent those relationships serve to legitimize, console, or further frustrate one’s economic 
position.  and how they differently encompass the market in the social and the effects these 
different encompassments have on market practices. Through the enacted values of everyday life 
the market becomes a site for understanding life itself, which has been my argument for the use 
of sufferation— not as just a trope employed to identify the market, but also as a heuristic for 
ascertaining this broader understanding. 
And so as a contributing to the anthropology of  economy, and especially the anthropology of the 
market, I have tried to move beyond understanding the market, the economy, and economic 
practice as merely embedded processes. I would argue that we move more vigorously and deeper 
into the cultural and assert that the economy exists primarily in either the same or similar abstract 
notions that I have described here. Instead of practices or processes, the economy and ideations 
of the market should be thought of as a cosmology that comprises the entirety of ones social, 
historical, and cultural constitution.  
This understanding also has a significant bearing on how the notion of precariousness is 
conceptualized in the global economy, which has been a major underlying theme of this research. 
Beyond sufferation’s utility as both a historically produced ethic in, and an analytic frame for, the 
market, what its analysis has accomplished is provide a long term view into how disadvantaged 
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peoples understand and cope with structural precariousness. In short,  this research has shown 
what happens when precariousness becomes normalized. I have argued that each of the ethics 
displayed throughout the ethnographic chapters of this thesis are in response to, and are thus 
aligned with, precarious conditions. Thus, in better understanding precariousness, we must look 
for its local arrangement (which may likely be based on global influences),  as I have done with 
sufferation. Doing so will provide more than a notional sense of precariousness, but instead a 
lucid appreciation of it as an experience and a practice that simultaneously informs and is 
informed by particular, cosmological, or perhaps ontological ways of understanding one's 
position in economic and social life.  
This particular view may be helpful in addressing what Jamaican political scientist, Obika Gray, 
asserts is the "conundrum" facing the Caribbean.  He defines this problem as being how to 
understand the region’s relationship "to capitalist civilization, to modernity and also how to 
address these issues in order to achieve an emancipated existence" (2004:355). All of the efforts 
of reform projects, which aimed to answer this problem, going back to the Creole nationalist 
agenda of the late 1930s, Gray argues that each has either been "in favour of Europeanist 
ontology, [or] they have pandered to Caribbean Africanisms in the most vulgar 
ways" (2004:358). Through an appreciation of the frame of sufferation, and a sincere study of the 
ethics employed in its response, this study contributes a sensitive approach to addressing this 
puzzle. It does so by appropriately establishing a view to how Jamaicans  configure their 
perception of a capitalist economy, and how Jamaican "modernity" is comprised of reflexive 
accounts, narratives, and notions of the past. 
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Though explicitly concerned with Caribbean formations in Jamaica, the problems facing this 
thesis’ subjects are likewise faced in other Back Atlantic societies (see Gray 2004:355). The 
frame of sufferation and all of the employed ethics have been fashioned in an African diasporic 
experience of blackness.  And so this work, and especially the ethics emphasized within can 
contribute to questions of diaspora and race as they are related to collective ideas of the economy 
and inequality. Particularly salient to this broader context is this thesis’ discussion on 
cooperation. The arguments made about the conflating of race and community through 
conventions of cooperation, I believe can help to shed light on the problematic of blackness. 
There is one contribution that I believe this thesis has made that extends beyond disciplinary and 
racial boundaries, and is ultimately a human one. It is the appreciation of everyday processes of 
coping. It is, as one sage interlocutor put it, the basic quality of "laughing while crying." While 
likely taken for granted, I hope that this thesis has shown that quite a great deal goes into this 
most dexterous, yet uncelebrated of human capacities. With this in mind, this research has led 
me to consider whether the market-as-sufferation discourse can serve as a kind of ontology? I 
have already suggested that the Jamaican understanding of race can be considered something of a 
"plantation cosmology" (chapter one) where historical and raced experiences inform present and 
raced experiences. Therefore, in this thesis’ conclusion a new horizon for inquiry has been 
established in the question: Can the notion of sufferation as a frame that defines the cultured 
negotiating of economic adversity be similarly extended to a construct for Caribbean being?   
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Appendix I- Photos from the field 
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Figure 1.                                                                                  Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014 
These photos are from the craft markets in Montego Bay and include images relevant to chapter 
one. The top right photo shows Big Mama at Bay Fort with her granddaughter during down time. 
The bottom right photo shows a typical craft stall at Bay Fort, fully stocked with Sindhi 
manufactured goods. The bottom left photo shows a family of tourists preparing their payment 
for goods purchased from the two vendors pictured. In this instance the vendors convinced the 
tourists to purchase goods from them both. The center bottom photo shows the wooden statue I 
discussed in chapter three that Sindhis had made in Indonesia to pass off as Jamaican made. The 
reason I show it here is that goods like this are frequently sold at the market.  The top left and 
center photos show the differing promotional signage of Sindhis and Ms. Bev. The Sindhi sign is 
demonstrative of the multiple pricing that vendors assert Sindhis are capable of providing 
because of their unity.  
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Figure 2.                                                                                  Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014 
These photos show various scenes relevant to the chapter on Sindhis. The top right photo shows 
the Jamaican workers outside a shop waiting to solicit tourists’ custom. The bottom photo shows 
three adjacent Sindhi shops. The top left photo depicts the shop in direct competition to Ms. Bev. 
with the name "Jamaican Culture," which infuriated Ms. Bev. The bottom left photo shows a 
young sindworki helping two tourists from behind the counter. The center bottom photo shows 
the Sunkissed brand of t-shirts that trade on the Hollister aesthetic.  
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Figure 3.                                                                                  Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014 
This panel of photos is of JAMIA. The top left shows JAMIA’s president Baldwin Dulston as he 
presides over a JAMIA meeting. The top right photo shows the vendor-members as they discuss 
a matter. The bottom left and center photos show the sign and front entrance to the Calabash 
hotel where JAMIA held their meetings. The bottom right photo is the JAMIA promotional 
banner, which they present at all functions they attend. It contains their motto, "Putting Able 
Hands To Work." 
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Figure 4.                                                                                  Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014 
These are photos taken at the Rastafari Indigenous Village. The top left are two adjacent banners 
at the inauguration/reopening of the village after  renovations were completed. These renovations 
were made possible by JSIF funding, hence the banner on the right is from that organization. The 
top center photo shows one of the young brethren using the cameras provided by WIPO 
discussed in the chapter. The bottom right photo is promotional footage found of the village’s 
website, inviting tourist to "explore our culture." The bottom left photo shows a tourist exploring 
that culture by taking a photo of one of the brethren as he demonstrated roasting a yam. The 
center bottom photo shows the Nyahbinghi preparing for a musical demonstration. The top right 
photo shows a village brethren in the burlap costume that is worn during visits. He sits with a 
mortar and pestle demonstrating "traditional" food preparation techniques.  
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Figure 5.                                                               Illustrations by Clovis © 2012 Jamaica Observer 
This panel shows various political satire cartoons illustrated by Clovis for the Jamaica Observer 
during fieldwork. The week of August 1st. scamming was a prominent feature in the news, with 
Western Union closing down all St. James branches for security upgrades due to the practice. 
The top left and right photos intimate the ineffectiveness of the Jamaican state at tackling the 
scamming problem. While the bottom photo criticizes the practice’s effect on Montego Bay’s 
brand image.  
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Notes 
  It is estimated that approximately 7,280  are employed as agents, while 1,092 are employed as 1
IT support and 728 persons fulfilling various managerial roles.
 Bay Fort Craft Market is a pseudonym, as are the names of all individuals interviewed with the 2
exception of the leaders of the Rastafari Indigenous Village (Ch. 4)  and JAMIA (Ch. 2) and the owner of 
Bev's Boutique (Ch. 2).
  "Gated tourism" is analogous to the much-theorized gated community phenomenon see Low (2003).3
 These studies often demonstrated that family structure in the region tended toward matrifocality and the 4
marginalization of the role of men, and, therefore, mothers, through working and assistance from her kin 
networks, would often be the primary provider.
 The second phase of the rehabilitation with funding provided by the Tourism Product Development 5
Company (TPDCo) with funds received through the Tourism Enhancement Fund.
 In August of 2013, the St James Parish Council took 32 shops out of operation for non-payment of rent. 6
Thirty-one were reopened after the fees were paid up. By October, the vendors once again found 
themselves in arrears, owing the parish council a reported JAM$ 500,500. Bay Fort Craft Vendors Default 
on Rent. Published 12, December 2013. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131221/western/
western2.html, accessed January 25, 2014. 
 Online review of field site craft market by Tim K. "Sadly this is not a great market." Tripadvisor.co.uk, 7
December 3, 2012, http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g147311-d208022-Reviews-
Crafts_Market-Montego_Bay_Saint_James_Parish_Jamaica.html#REVIEWS. (Accessed January, 17 
2013).
  What Miller does not evidence, however, is animosity in competition (which is not to say that it doesn't 8
exist). One could argue that the tension between the equally numbered races in Trinidad has led to a much 
greater in-group racial unity, whereas black Jamaicans being in such an overwhelming majority, there is 
an increased chance for in-group loathing.
 Personality and Conflict in Jamaica (1952).9
 Indians in this sense refers to Jamaica's population of East Indians descended from indentured workers 10
who came to Jamaica beginning in 1838.
 This racial monopolization was challenged by the ascent to power of P.J. Patterson's PNP in the early 11
1990s (Robotham 2000).
 Bay Fort Craft Vendors Default on Rent. Published 12, December 2013. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/12
gleaner/20131221/western/western2.html, accessed January 25, 2014.
 Higglering, believed to be a derivation of the term "haggle" dates back to slavery, where excess 13
produce from slave provision grounds were taken to the market to sell or trade on Sundays by female 
slaves.
 Examples include the Meditations 1974 song, Tricked, and Barrington Levy's 1979 Don't Fuss Nor 14
Fight, both of which note that neither the Chinese, Syrians, whites, nor Indians were fighting, but "only 
we [blacks] who have been fighting."  Also, Hugh Mundell's 1978 title asked pointedly, "Why do black 
men fuss and fight?"
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 See Look Lai (2005) for an extended example of Chinese integration into the Caribbean.15
 Miller's (2008) account of things is a useful discussion of the "thing" in the general affective sense of 16
things in Jamaica. But the "Jamaican thing" is closer to the Comaroff's "ethno-commodity" (2009). 
 The acceptance by the craft vendors of Sindhis selling luxury items indicates two things. One it shows 17
how long the Sindhis have been involved  in the luxury industry, and how recent their involvement in 
souvenirs is. Two, it presents a kind of separation of 'domains of quality' between the two groups.
 http://www.ilejamaica.org.jm.18
 That response was interesting as it indicated that TPDCo. was aware of the issue of vendor 19
aggressiveness.
 "Better must come" was a popular slogan of Michael Manley's 1972 campaign which communicated its 20
populist ideology of democratic socialism. It was adapted from the 1971 song of the same title by reggae 
musician, Delroy Wilson.
 "What violence-torn St James, nay all Jamaica, can learn from Flanker." 21
 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/What-violence-torn-St-James--nay-all-Jamaica--can-learn-
from-Flanker_14299652, Accessed  21 November 2013.
 http://dcfsjamaica.org/site/factsfriendly.html22
 See Crewe 2005 for a more evolved example.23
 "Jamaicans shy away from cheaper burial method" http://jamaica-star.com/thestar/20101106/news/24
news3.html. Accessed May 15, 2012.
 http://dcfsjamaica.org/site/dcfshistory.html25
Comment made by Dr. Gene Leon, IMF Resident Representative to Jamaica (2011) "Imagine a New 26
Brand Jamaica! Strategies to achieve economic growth." Presentation to the Jamaica Exporters' 
Association
 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Gov-t-seals-sugar-deal-with-COMPLANT_9457372, Accessed 27
July 5th, 2012.
 The latest figures from the bauxite-alumina industry reveal that in January 2014 crude bauxite 28
production fell by 15% compared to January 2013. http://digjamaica.com/blog/2014/02/28/industry-
update-bauxite-alumina-declines-jan14/, accessed March 29, 2014
  When pressed, this is the argument by which many Sindhi retailers defend their place in the souvenir 29
industry.
  The original vending of indigenous goods from Sind, has led some scholars to term the Sindhi trade 30
"sindwork" and Sindhi traders as "sindworki(e)s" (Falzon 2004:6; Markovits 200:8). However, no Sindhis 
in my field site identified, or were familiar, with either term. This is likely due to the term having been 
used among Sindhis who traveled for trade before partition, whereas the Sindhis concerned with in this 
thesis would have entered the trade thereafter. For the sake of continuity with previous literature, I will 
maintain use of the term, but use it exclusively when referencing Sindhi souvenir shop workers. For shop 
owners I will use the more generic  terms "traders" or "merchants."
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 The majority of the Indians on the Hip Strip are Sindhis,  but there are a few South Indians in business 31
too, who came to Jamaica alongside relatives recruited to Jamaica to serve as doctors in Montego Bay's 
hospitals. Sindhis are also often recruited outside of kin networks, via the Internet  http://
www.timesjobs.com/job-detail/Sales-Business-Development-job-in-Interscope-INTERNATIONAL-jobid-
nICuhWx3fR1zpSvf+uAgZw==  8/29/13. 
 Prohibition of employment of women in night work except in certain circumstances. 32
3.(1) No woman shall be employed in night work except where the night work is - 
(a) for the purpose of completing work commenced by day and interrupted by some unforeseeable cause 
which could not be prevented by reasonable care; or  
(b) necessary to preserve raw materials, subject to rapid deterioration, from certain loss; or  
(c) that of a responsible position of management held by a woman who is not ordinarily engaged in 
manual work; or  
(d) carried on in connection with the preparation, treatment, packing, transportation or shipment of fresh 
fruit; or  
(e) that of nursing and of caring for the sick; or  
(f) carried on in a cinematograph or other theatre while such theatre is open to the public;  
(g) carried on in connection with a hotel or guest-house, or with a bar, restaurant or club; or  
(h) carried on by a Pharmacist registered under the Pharmacy Act
 Working in more profitable  shops enabled Sindworkis to earn more by the end of their contracts, 33
giving them, as in Nish's case, sufficient capital to open their own shop after just one term.
 It was noted by my informants, as well as by Sindhis interviewed by Falzon (2004) that younger 34
generations of Sindhis are turning away from business, opting instead to enter into the "professions" of 
medicine and law.
  "Harley-Davidson rolls into Jamaica - To open 3-4 stores starting April." February 23, 2007. http://35
jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070223/business/business1.html. Accessed September 5 2012 .
  "Harley-Davidson rolls into Jamaica - To open 3-4 stores starting April." February 23, 2007. http://36
jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070223/business/business1.html. Accessed September 5 2012 .
 http://jis.gov.jm/jamaica-leads-caribbean-out-of-tourism-recession/. Accessed October 5th, 201237
 http://www.jamaica-no-problem.com/villages-as-businesses.html38
 Juggling serves to example the "occupational multiplicity" noted by Lambros Comitas as being 39
"systematically engaged in a number of gainful activities, which for him form an integrated economic 
complex" (1973:157).
 Peter Wilson has noted that crews in the Caribbean, comprised of friends, serve as networks that can be 40
considered as a grass-roots structure of information dissemination and economic mobilization (1973).
 In Jamaica, residents who share common facilities and yard space at the back of an apartment lot are 41
considered to live in a yard. Yards serve as a central site of Jamaican social life that "elicit a certain 
camaraderie inevitably punctuated by tensions and suspicion" (Austin 1984,43; see chapters 3 and 8 for 
in-depth discussions on yard life). 
 VistaPrint has recently begun building an 11-acre customer service center. They were formally located 42
at Montego Bay Free Zone.
 See Freeman (2000) and Mullings (1999), for further discussion on gender in the data processing 43
industry.
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 At the time of fieldwork, one call center worker for ACS in St. James, through personal 44
communication, quoted her salary at US$ 55 per week.
 This advance enabled confirmation numbers to be shared between senders and receivers, expediting the 45
receipt process.
 Miller and Slater noted how at the turn of the millennium in Trinidad, the introduction of 'Voice over 46
IP' technology potentially reduced all long-distance calls to local ones, disrupting traditional telephony 
(2000,125).
 Digicel has operations in 31 markets with over 13 million subscribers across the Caribbean, Central 47
America and Pacific regions. http://www.digicelgroup.com/en/about/board-of-directors. Accessed 
January, 13, 2014.
 Horst and Miller (2006:162) note Digicel's success in the proliferation of the cell phone in Jamaica 48
since 2000. It achieved 1 million subscribers within five years on the basis of highly competitive pricing 
and highly aggressive marketing.
 513 is the magicJack's default for new subscribers who do not specify an area code. http,//49
www.fox19.com/story/20485913/scammers-call-from-513-587-4417-fox19-investigates. Accessed June 
19, 2013.
 This awareness has resulted in the creation of a Jamaican scam-baiting phenomenon on YouTube where 50
American users upload video of their misleading, taunting, and accosting Jamaican scammers who try to 
solicit them.
 The crew would later expand their smartphone hardware to include other brands and models, like the 51
Samsung Galaxy.
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geell5Q5EPY52
 Despite Vybz Kartel's promotion of scamming's lack of violence, at the time of his song's release he 53
was imprisoned awaiting trial on murder charges. In fact, the song was recorded in prison. He would be 
found guilty in April 2014 and sentenced to life in prison.
 For an example from within the U.S. see Bourgois (2003) especially chapters 3 and 4. 54
 Jamaica For Us! Majority Of Jamaicans Would Turn Down The Chance To Migrate. Jamaica Glearn 55
24, January 2014. Acessed 5, May 2014. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20140112/lead/lead1.html
 While the term "brown middle class" connotes a homogenous race-class conflation, in fact there are 56
multiple categories which differ in ethnic background— some of mixed race, and others of Lebanese 
origin; and political orientation—holding membership in both Jamaica's opposing political parties. 
However, I contend that despite the political or ethnic differences of members of the "brown" middle 
class, they are nonetheless consonant with regard to cultural values.
 For examples of the continued study of matrifocal Caribbean kinship, see Barrow (1999) Besson (2002, 57
esp. ch. 8); Chevannes (2001); Clarke (1999 [1957]); Henriques (1968); Smith (1962); Smith (1995); and 
Quinlan (2006).
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